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ABSTRACT
Planning Development: International Experts, Agricultural Policy and the Modernization
of Nigeria, 1945-1967
Bekeh Utietiang
The period after the Second World War was a significant moment in British colonialism
in Nigeria. It was the height of the decolonization movements in many of Britain’s colonial
holdings and was the cradle of what David Low and J. M. Lonsdale call the “second colonial
occupation.” This occupation in which the British government carried out expansive development
policies was an intentional attempt to wrestle with social unrest due to the neglect of the social
welfare of the people during the Great Depression and in the period thereafter. Such a
development vision was represented by the passage of the 1940 Colonial Development and
Welfare Act. Unfortunately, the implementation of this act was interrupted by the war. After the
war, this act was updated and passed in 1945. With a fund of £120 million earmarked for
development in the colonies, this represented the single greatest financial investment by the
British government in the colonies. Each of the colonies were asked to produce ten-year
development plans. The plan that was produced by Nigeria depicts an important starting point in
development planning and it reflected an agrarian bias. Several other plans have been produced
since the 1945 plan. My study focuses on the 1945 plan and the 1962 plan which was the first
post-independence national plan.
This study particularly looks at the process that resulted in the plan documents. This is
important because it helps to reveal the factors that led to the success or failure of development
plans. The planning process shows us that outcomes do not always reveal intentions and it is
important not to use the outcomes to judge intentionality. This work argues that the failure of late
colonial development in Nigeria was not as a result of bad intentions but because of the racial
limitations inherent in the colonial state. Such limitations led to the exclusion of Africans in the
development process and in the rejection of indigenously produced knowledge. A case study of
the Niger Agricultural Project, Mokwa treated in the fourth chapter sheds light on the importance
of local knowledge to the development process.
This study also reveals that persons and institutions matter in the development process.
These reflect the human side of development. This dissertation shows how the feuds and conflicts
between the technical departments and the political wing of the colonial state affected the 1945
colonial plan. The 1962 plan suffered because of conflicts between the main architect of the plan,
Wolfgang Stolper, and the World Bank advisor to the prime minister, Narayan Prasad.
This work also shows that despite the rhetorical claims of modernization theorists such as
Walt Rostow and his colleagues at CIS, in practice, modernization theorists continued colonial
development policies. In Nigeria, the 1962 plan that was designed by US social scientists such as
Stolper continued the agrarian bias that was emblematic of colonial development. The study
concludes that both the colonial and early “postcolonial” plans were affected by five factors:
development ideology, human resources, financial resources, International experts/indigenous
knowledge, and corruption.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION: PLANNING DEVELOPMENT

Introduction
In the summer of 2010 I visited the old neighborhood where I grew up. It is
located in a little town called Obudu in the southern-most part of Nigeria. Over the years,
I had heard stories from family members about how it had changed since 1995 when I
graduated high school and moved away from home to attend college. Around that time,
my parents also moved to a small village seven miles away where everything was rural
and the people were sustained economically through peasant agriculture. My old
neighborhood was comprised mostly of educated middle class people. We had good
schools – two public elementary schools just a few blocks from each other and two high
schools, one for boys and the other for girls, also only a few blocks from one another.
These were by all accounts excellent public schools, and I believe that I received a very
good education. When one thinks of rural Africa in the 1970s and 1980s, one is tempted
to think of the lack of public infrastructure. This was not the case in the neighborhood
where I grew up. We had running water, constant electricity, landline phones, paved
roads, televisions and radios, etc. When I returned from the United States in 2010 to my
old neighborhood, I encountered a different reality. The schools had deteriorated and
were now failing, running water was gone, electricity was at best erratic, and unplanned
houses were squeezed into every available space. The whole place now looked like a
slum. What I also discovered was that this problem was not unique to my old
neighborhood; it was now a national problem. While I wept for my old neighborhood, I
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was left with the question: what happened? This question for me was my “historical
turn.”1 I had to try to find the answer to the developmental trajectory the nation had
taken by looking at the history. How did we get here? This dissertation is an attempt to
understand development by focusing on the planning process of the 1945 and 1962 plans.
In Nigeria, since the 1940s, the state has been engaged in development planning. The
state saw the planning process as important for development. It is my argument that in
order to understand the policy interventions and programs that are intended to bring about
“development”, it is important to look at the planning process. Thus, my focus is on the
often boring but revealing aspects of the planning process. Looking at this planning
process is important because it helps to reveal the ideology that drove the architects of
these plans and how these plans reflect the interests of the planners. The planning process
also reveals the human side to development planning. Thus, I pay close attention to
individuals that were part of the planning process and their relationships.
Nigeria has a history of development planning. Between 1945 and 1981, the
country launched six specific development plans. My study focuses on only two of the
development plans: the 1945 ten-year plan and the 1962 six-year plan. I picked these two
plans because they help to shed light on planning in the late colonial period and in the
early “postcolonial” period. The architects for the 1945 plan were the colonial
administration and they drew the plan for a ten-year period. On the other hand, the new
independent Nigerian government prepared the 1962 plan. Though Britain remained a
factor in the drafting and implementation of this plan, US social scientists and
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1!I!use!the!term!“historical!turn”!to!describe!the!point!in!which!I!decided!to!look!back!and!find!out!

how!“development”!came!about!in!the!first!place!and!its!roots!in!!the!specific!case!of!Nigeria.!!
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foundations took on a more leadership role. Studying these two plans allows us to see the
continuities and discontinuities between development in the late colonial and early
“postcolonial” periods and also enables us to see the ideas that drove development.
Developmental planning in the late colonial period by the British was influenced
by a set of ideas that were different from the American led modernization in
“postcolonial” Nigeria. My study uncovers some of these ideas. It is important to note
however that, in practice, American led development in Nigeria adopted and continued
most of the development policies of the British. While the 1945 plan focused on the
improvement of the social conditions of the colonial people and the development of
colonial economic resources for the benefit of the British government and the Nigerian
people; the 1962 plan, driven by American social scientists and the World Bank, placed
less emphasis on public investments but more emphasis on short term economic growth.
Both development plans focused on several sectors of the Nigerian society: education,
medicine, markets, and agriculture. It is almost impossible to study all of these within the
scope of this work. I will narrow my focus to the planning process in general and to
agricultural policy. It was only in the late 1950s that petroleum exploration started in
Nigeria and it took over a decade for the Nigerian economy to become mainly dependent
on petroleum revenues. Before this time, agriculture was the primary revenue generator
for the economy. The plans were to a large extent dependent on revenues from
agriculture for their implementation.
In the second chapter of this dissertation, I will be looking at the planning process
that led to the 1945 plan. I will situate this chapter within the history of colonial
development beginning with the passage of the 1929 Colonial Development Act through
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the passage of the 1945 Colonial Development and Welfare Act. I will pay close attention
to the discussions and negotiations between the Nigerian colonial state and the CO as
they crafted the ten-year Nigerian plan. Having looked at the general planning process, in
the next chapter, I will focus on the agricultural plan and how this plan was rooted in the
agricultural policy that had been operative in Nigeria beginning from the time of O. T.
Faulkner, the director of agriculture in the 1920s. I will credit James Mackie as the
architect of the Nigerian agriculture plan. The development of this plan was besieged by
problems as Mackie and his staff were constantly in conflict with the political officials of
the colonial state. My argument is that these conflicts, which reflect deeply the human
element in the planning, had significant impact on the agricultural plan and its
implementation in Nigeria. I devote the fourth chapter to analyzing a specific agricultural
scheme, the Niger Agricultural Project, Mokwa. The reason I will give special attention
to this scheme is because it was the first capital-intensive mechanized agricultural project
carried out in Nigeria by the British. This project, located in a town called Mokwa in
Northern Nigeria, failed within five years after it was established. In the end, the attempt
to use highly mechanized agricultural equipment to produce high yields and to improve
the living standards of the rural people was unsuccessful. The last chapter of this
dissertation focuses on the transition from colonial-led development to American-led
modernization theory. In this chapter, I will look at how American social scientists and
foundations helped in the designing of the first Nigerian national plan and I will analyze
the problems with that plan. I will argue that development in the early “postcolonial”
period did not mark a break from development in the late colonial period. As a result of
the changing social and political landscape in the world (the cold war and
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decolonization), there was a change in the rhetoric but not in the practice. Thus,
American social scientists and foundations had grand visions and proclamations to
recreate the Nigerian state into a modern one, in the likeness of America. I argue that in
practice, their prescriptions for modernization were no different from the development
policies followed by the British in the late colonial period.
My research looks at development as a historical process; in other words, history
is used as a methodology for studying and understanding development. The word
“development’ means several things to several people and so it is important to define
what I mean by development and agricultural development in particular. Writing on
development, Zymunt Bauman notes that, “The modern mind was born together with the
idea that the world can be changed. Modernity is about rejecting the world as it has been
thus far and the resolution to change it. The modern way of being consists in compulsive,
obsessive change: in the refutation of what ‘merely is’ in the name of what could, and by
the same token ought, to be put in its place.”2 He sees development as rooted in the
Enlightenment period. Michael Cowen and Robert Shenton argue that development arose
in reaction to the Enlightenment. They argue that there is an immanent process of
development which is both constructive and destructive. An example is the expansion of
capitalist market forces. They however make a distinction between this process and the
practice of development which arose as an intentional or conscious attempt by the state to
intervene in those market forces in order to deal with the crises that inevitably occur, such
as the Great Depression or to put it more precisely, the problem of surplus labor due to
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2!Zygmunt!Bauman,!Wasted'Lives:'Modernity'and'its'Outcasts!(Oxford:!Oxford!University!Press,!2003),!

23.!!
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unemployment and underemployment. The state becomes the trustee of development in
order to respond to a perceived lack of the same. Development for Cowen and Shenton is
different from natural progress. They write, “development was the means by which
progress might be ordered but it was not the idea of progress itself.…the idea of
development as an immanent process did not necessarily rest, as did the idea of progress,
upon a conviction that the future would be an improvement upon the past.”3 In the
context of development planning and state directed schemes for improvement, Cowen
and Shenton’s definition seems to be more useful, and therefore, this is the definition I
will use throughout this dissertation. Such schemes were intentional attempts by both the
colonial and “post-colonial” state to bring about both social and economic progress.
This study begins in 1945, which marks the launch of Nigeria’s first development
plan. In 1940, the British parliament passed the Colonial Development and Welfare Act,4
which marked a significant shift in Britain’s policy toward the development of the
colonies. 5 The study ends in 1967 because it was the year that the first Nigerian
“National” development plan was interrupted as a result of the civil war.6
Background
Nigeria, in pre-colonial, colonial and “post-colonial” times has undergone several
phases of development. The exploration of the interior of Nigeria was only possible
because of technological advances. Prior to colonial rule, Nigeria was linked to the world
market through slavery and the cultivation and trade of agricultural products. After the
end of slavery, agricultural products became the major export from Nigeria. The three
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3!Michael!Cowen!and!Robert!Shenton,!Doctrines'of'Development!(New!York:!Routledge,!1996),!7.!
4!Hereafter,!CD&W!act.!!

5!More!on!this!shift!in!the!literature!review!and!also!in!the!second!chapter!of!the!dissertation.!!
6!The!word!“national”!is!in!quotes!because!my!dissertation!questions!if!this!was!truly!a!national!plan.!!
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main exports from Nigeria were palm oil, groundnuts and cocoa. In 1806, West Africa
(which includes present-day Nigeria) provided 150 tons of palm oil annually to
Liverpool. By 1839, Britain was receiving 13,000 tons of palm oil annually, and the main
supply was from the Niger Delta Protectorate. Palm oil supply reached a peak of about
30,000 tons in 1855.7 Palm oil imports continued to be important even after 1885.
Michael Crowder wrote that, “[i]n 1908, exports were valued at £3,094,175 as compared
with £4,320,000 in 1910, whilst the figures for imports were respectively £3,076,309 and
£5,122,000. Exports consisted mainly of palm products.”8 Palm trees originally grew
wild in Nigeria and, for many years, supplied Europeans with oil. In the middle of the
1920s, there was greater competition coming from Eastern Asian and Belgian Congo
palm products. In response, the British government took steps to secure and improve
production from Nigeria and other West African countries.9 To enable an increase in
production, the United Africa Company donated 250 hand press machines that were to be
used by farmers.10
Cocoa was also another major export from Nigeria during the colonial period. It
was introduced into Nigeria at the end of the nineteenth century. It was the major source
of income for many farmers in Southern Nigeria. During the Great Depression, the price
of cocoa fell drastically and many farmers abandoned cocoa farming. In addition, during
this time of economic depression, two diseases infested cocoa: the swollen shoot and the
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7!Philip!Ehrensaft,!“The!Political!Economy!of!Informal!Empire!in!Pre\Colonial!Nigeria,!1807\1884,”!

Canadian'Journal'of'African'studies!6,!3!(1972):!456!
8!Michael!Crowder,!A'Short'History'of'Nigeria!(New!York:!Frederick!A.!Praeger,!1966),!233.!!
9Great!Britain.!Colonial!Office,!Committee'on'Improved'and'Increased'Production'of'Palm'Oil'and'Palm'
Kernels'in'West'Africa.!(London:!HM!Stationery!Office,!1925),!10.!
10!R.!Olufemi!Ekundare,!An'Economic'History'of'Nigeria'1860'–'1960!(New!York:!Africana!Publishing!
Company,!1973),!166.!!
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black pod. In 1944, the British West African governments opened a research institute
called the West African Cocoa Research Institute at New Tafo, Ghana to deal with cocoa
diseases.11 A substation of this institute was established in Ibadan, Nigeria in 1950. Given
that cocoa was a major export from Nigeria, it was important to establish a research
center to study diseases that affected production and to mitigate against them. This
research institute was used for investigations and trials toward improving cocoa
production.
Though cotton had been grown in Nigeria for centuries, commercial cotton
growing only began in the first decade of the twentieth century. This was encouraged by
the British Cotton Growing Association and also some trading firms such as the Messrs.
Elder Dempster & Co. This company brought tons of seeds they bought from New
Orleans to Nigeria to be distributed to farmers.12 Groundnuts were also cultivated in
Northern part of Nigeria. Though it was cultivated in the pre-colonial times, it was only
after 1900 that it became important as a cash crop. 13 The Agricultural Department
distributed groundnut seeds free to farmers.14
The expansion of cash crops production in Nigeria by peasant15 farmers was
important to the British colonial administration between 1900 and 1940 because they saw

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11!Ibid.,!168.!!
12!Bade!Onimode,!Imperialism'and'Underdevelopment'in'Nigeria:'The'Dialectics'of'Mass'Poverty!

(London:!Zed!Press,!1982),!46.!!!
13!Ibid.,!44.!!
14!Ekundare,!!An'Economic'History'of'Nigeria,'168.!!
15!By!peasants!I!mean!smallholder!farmers!who!cultivated!for!their!own!consumption!and!for!the!
markets.!Their!production!was!always!small!scale!and!relied!mainly!on!family!or!communal!labor.!A!
small!number!of!peasants!retained!paid!labor!but!this!was!never!in!the!scale!of!industrial!agriculture.!!
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trade as the instrument necessary for the implementation of its “Dual Mandate.”16 Its
policies were not geared toward the expansion of plantation agriculture. The
administration discouraged the establishment of foreign-owned plantations in Nigeria.17
Anne Phillips in her work, The Enigma of Colonialism, states that, “If colonialism was a
project of capitalist expansion, then in Africa it significantly failed in its task.”18 She
argues that the contradictions of colonial power are rooted in the makeshift character of
British rule. The colonial state was constrained by the local conditions. Initially, the
British wanted to move towards a capitalist market in land and labor, but because of the
resistance and turmoil this stirred up, they retreated. The political weakness of the
colonial state meant that it lacked the power to directly coerce labor and it had to form
alliances with local chiefs “as the only reliable guarantors of labour, which in turn
dictated the terms on which colonialism operated. The recurrent problems of land and
labour revolved around this alliance with chiefs. Free access to land precluded the
formation of a landless proletariat, and was ensured by relations of communal land tenure
which installed the chiefs as agents of political order.”19 This, she argues, curtailed the
power of the colonial state to alienate land for large industrial agricultural plantations.
These local conditions forced the British to take the path of peasant agriculture
development. 20 The stability and security of the colonial state depended on the
cooperation of local rulers and the authority of these rulers rested in the control of land
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
16!The!dual!mandate,!a!phrase!coined!by!Lord!Lugard,!one!of!British!colonial!governors!in!Africa,!

captures!British!imperialism!in!Africa.!It!is!an!imperial!principle!that!the!resources!of!the!colony!
should!be!exploited!for!the!benefits!of!metropole!and!colony.!!!
17!Ekundare,!An'Economic'History'of'Nigeria,!158.!!
18!Anne!Phillips,!The'Enigma'of'Colonialism:'British'Policy'in'West'Africa!(Bloomington,!In:!Indiana!
University!Press,!1989),!3.!!
19!Ibid.,!11.!
20!Ibid.,!11\12.!!
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and labor. This was because of the land tenure system in West Africa. Land was
communally owned and adult males were guaranteed access to the land for farming. In
the same way the local chiefs had power over labor, so did they over land. By allowing
big industrial agricultural corporations to expand, the British would have undermined the
indigenous authority on which the colonial state itself ultimately rested.21 The expansion
of cash crops and trade in West Africa up to the early 20th century was largely a
spontaneous process of the expansion of capitalist market forces. Thus, farmers in
western Nigeria and southern Ghana started the planting of cocoa because they
recognized the market prosperity that this brought. The colonial state’s decision to
consciously block plantation agriculture and large-scale farming in lieu of peasant
farming under the tutelage of local rulers, who would continue to control land and labor,
was an intentional practice of development. The “Dual Mandate” and “indirect rule” in
West Africa is what Cowen and Shenton called a “doctrine of development.”
Between 1940 and 1960, there was a significant change in British policy in
Nigeria that affected agricultural production. The changes that were initiated in the 1940s
stemmed from results of the Great Depression. Prior to the economic depression of 1929,
the colonial government in Northern Nigeria, for example, was able to balance its budget
through revenues derived from agricultural products and tin mining. These two industries
were adversely affected by the depression. European goods were no longer imported and
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
21!The!colonial!state!was!not!as!powerful!as!it!is!sometimes!purported!to!be.!Fred!Cooper!argues!that,!

“the!much!celebrated!policy!of!‘indirect!rule’!in!British!Africa!…!represented!an!attempt!to!make!
retreat!sound!like!policy.”!See!Frederick!Cooper,!Decolonization'and'African'Society:'The'Labor'
Question'in'French'and'British'Africa!(Cambridge:!Cambridge!University!Press,!1996),!11.!On!how!
African!labor!undermined!the!authority!of!chiefs!and!white!administrators!in!Kenya,!see!Bruce!
Berman,!Control'&'Crisis'in'Colonial'Kenya:'The'Dialectic'of'Domination!(Athens:!Ohio!University!
Press,!1999),!61.!!
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the agricultural products were no longer exported, leading to falling crop prices. In his
book, Colonial Meltdown: Northern Nigeria in the Great Depression, Moses Ochonu
argues that the colonial state had to engage in severe economic adjustment policies to
keep the budgets balanced. The colonial state, he argues, did not use a Keynesian
economic model22 as a solution but engaged in strict austerity measures such as cutting
down on public works projects, increasing taxation, enforcing high crop production,
making pay cuts, retrenching workers and introducing protectionist policies.23
In his article, “The Dynamics of Long-Term Agricultural Development in
Nigeria” Carl Eicher argues that three main policy matters were associated with these
changes.24 The first was the establishment of government marketing boards in 1939 and
1940. During World War II Britain took steps to prevent the export of Nigerian goods to
the Germans and their allies and to only allow imports to Nigeria from Britain and its
allies. This made a number of European markets no longer accessible to Nigeria. The US
market was also no longer easily accessible to the Nigerian exports due to insecurity in
the seas and the limits on shipping space. Britain was afraid of the cocoa industry
collapsing, which might thereby lead to political and social chaos in Nigeria. Britain
decided to buy the entire cocoa crop and was willing to incur losses if necessary. This
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was the genesis of government marketing boards.25 At their inception, the marketing
boards had the task of issuing licenses to private firms to purchase locally produced
goods that they in turn sold to the colonial government. Though originally intended to
stabilize prices, they had an unintended outcome in which they evolved into a system of
indirectly taxing agriculture. As Falola argues, “The underpayment to the producers
enabled the firms to make profits and the government to raise money to finance the war
without raising taxes.”26 The contradiction between intentions and outcomes is one that
plagued development throughout the period of colonial rule. This contradiction is
important to my study because the outcomes do not always explain the intentions.
The second policy was the establishment in 1940 of a research system for
studying export crops. Eicher argued that American scholarly research ignored these
centers because of the assumption that they were non-existent before US foundations
helped launch the International Maize and Wheat Improvement Center in Mexico and the
International Rice Institute in the Philippines.27 Before the Green Revolution of the
1970s, many European nations had successfully undertaken systematic attempts to devise
technologies that will lead to improved varieties for the peasant farmers. Jonathan
Harwood states that, “around 1900 several Central European states established plantbreeding stations whose express purpose was to make high-yielding plant varieties as
well as the basic techniques of plant breeding available to the small farmers who
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predominated in those regions.”28 In British colonies, there were agricultural research
centers prior to 1940. After 1940, these were substantially expanded with assistance from
the CD&W Acts of 1940 and 1945.29 Examples of such centers were the Cocoa Research
Institute in Ghana, which was founded in 1938, and the Oil Palm Research Station in
Nigeria founded in 1939. By 1951, these research institutes were expanded and new ones
were established around West Africa. There were a total of ten.
Finally, the British administration instituted a third policy in response to the
depression; the introduction of deliberate government development planning. Each
British colony was asked to produce a ten-year development plan. The plans were to
focus not only on the development of the economic resources of the colony but also to
improve the social conditions of the colonial people. The 1940 and 1945 CD&W acts
stimulated the systematic attempt to develop agricultural production, not just in Nigeria
but in colonies throughout the British empire. The first development plan for Nigeria was
put out in 1945. Though originally prepared during the war years to last for fifteen years,
in light of the 1945 act, it was reduced to ten years. The plan was to last until 1955 after
which the progress of development would be reviewed and a new development plan
would be set in motion. By 1950, it became obvious that planning for ten years was too
long and the ten-year plan was broken into five-year plans. The 1945 plan placed
emphasis on agriculture as the mainstay of the Nigeria’s economy. The colonial state had
a great impact on Nigerian agriculture. However, the initiative to cultivate peanuts, oil
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palms and cocoa came from rural Nigerians, who saw economic advantages producing
these.
By the late 1940s, there was a shift in Nigerian agriculture. The colonial state took
on a direct intervention in agricultural production which before this time had remained in
the hands of peasants but was indirectly supported through research on new crops and
improved varieties. Instrumental to this intervention in Nigeria was the presence of the
Colonial Development Corporation (CDC), which sponsored some development schemes
in partnership with the colonial government. The CDC and the Overseas Food
Corporation (OFC) were founded at the height of the sterling crisis to develop the
economic resources of the colonies. With these corporations, the state was now prepared
to take production into its own hands, using the latest technology and large subvention of
funds. In Nigeria, unlike the agricultural policy of Faulkner and Mackie that insisted on
research and trials before significant changes, the colonial state was now directly
intervening in agriculture without this process. This was the reason for NAP and other
similar projects throughout the British colonies. In Africa, most of these schemes failed
or did not live up to the expectations of the state planners. The failure of these schemes,
and development in general, in this period marked the end of the so-called “second
colonial occupation”30 and the transition of power from the colonial state to indigenous
rule. As this process was unfolding, the US assumed a greater presence in the former
colonial states and most especially in India and Nigeria.
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In the period shortly before and after the independence of Nigeria, the US took on
a special development role. Though British personnel continued to staff Nigeria’s
government and Britain remained the biggest financial supporter of Nigeria, America
more and more had a greater voice in the affairs of Nigeria. American social scientists
and foundations that had the goal of modernizing Nigeria and stemming the tide of
communism midwifed this role. This was not a situation that was unique to Nigeria, but
was part of a global transfer of power from the British to the United States. After the
Second World War and the Suez Crisis of 1956-57, Britain became incapable of policing
the world. America, in the middle of the Cold War, saw the need to stem the spread of
communism. Some sub-Saharan African nationalists became advocates of a socialist
economy and America saw Nigeria as a country that could be used as a model of
capitalism for other sub-Saharan Africa countries. In terms of population, Nigeria was the
biggest African nation and its transition to democracy was relatively peaceful. Larry
Grubbs writes, “Americans led a worldwide chorus of optimists in the early 1960s that
imagined Nigeria as an exemplary nation in the making. A federal system of government,
responsible, ‘moderate’ nationalist political leaders, an expanding free-market economy,
and abundant natural and human resources beckoned observers looking for a model state
in Africa.”31 Encouraged by Arnold Rivkin, the founder of the African Project at the
Center for International Studies (CIS),32 the American government and some foundations,
such as the Ford Foundation, became involved in the modernization of Nigeria. A new
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development plan was crafted for Nigeria and this plan was to last from 1962 to 1968.
Since this plan came about after the independence of Nigeria, it is officially called the
First National Development Plan. This plan was created and implemented with the help
of American social scientists backed by the African Economic and Political Development
Project at the CIS.33 Wolfgang Stolper of CIS played a primary role in the drafting of this
plan. He was dispatched to Nigeria by the Ford Foundation to head the Economic
Planning Unit (EPU) within the Nigerian Federal Ministry of Economic Development.
Stolper was in Nigeria for about eighteen months. After leaving Nigeria, he wrote a book
on his experience designing the Nigerian plan, entitled Planning without Facts. Before
the full implementation of the Nigerian plan could occur, military coups and countercoups erupted that led to many Nigerian leaders being killed, further degenerating the
country into a civil war. The war lasted from 1967 to 1970, causing the interruption of the
full implementation of this plan. The fifth chapter of this dissertation will look at the
work of CIS in crafting this development plan.
Summary Review of Scholarship
From the nationalist perspective, Nigerian development plans have received some
attention. This assessment has often focused on the specifics of the plans and their
implementation. The successes or failures of these plans are judged against the stated
economic goals. The literature on both the 1945 and 1962 plans has measured these plans
based on their economic growth and the impact on the people. Such an approach is not
completely out of place given that these scholars have mostly been economists and their
tendency is to see development in terms of immanent process that can be measured. One
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of such economists was Ojetuni Aboyade, a professor at the University of Ibadan. In his
Foundations of an African Economy: A Study of Investment and Growth in Nigeria, he
looked at the history of the Nigerian economy measuring its growth and identifying the
economic problems that were responsible for Nigeria’s underdevelopment. His book paid
close attention to Nigerian development plans and he offered a new direction to
development planning. He argued that the ten-year development plan instituted by the
British in the late colonial period cannot be properly called a development plan. He noted
that this plan was “more a catalogue of little interrelated proposals with ill-defined goals
and no coherent statement of policy.”34 This argument is one that has been repeated by
some other national economists. They argue that the 1945 plan did not have any
systematic model or guiding principle. What became a plan was an amalgam of different
projects or schemes.

35

Toyin Falola in his book, Development Planning and

Decolonization in Nigeria, is critical of scholars who have dismissed the 1945 plan. He
argues that the 1945 plan shaped future Nigerian development plans as they reflect both
the colonial economic policy “and the country’s intellectual history.”36
The 1962 plan has received a more favorable acceptance by the above mentioned
Nigerian economists albeit not without their criticisms. Their acceptance of the document
as a development plan is based on the fact that economists designed it and grounded it in
targeted economic growth projections. While this strong economic basis for the plan
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earned it acceptance as a development plan, Aboyade found the plan too pragmatic and
technical and believed that it ignored the wider social issues in planning. 37 In his
perspective, development plans need to be tools of social change of which the question of
income redistribution must be a fundamental part of the production system. 38 Both
Okigbo and Ayo argue that the problem with the 1962 plan was the lack of data and
indiscipline in its implementation. Okigbo, who was a contemporary of Aboyade and had
the position of serving as the head of the Eastern Region Economic Planning Unit when
the plan was being drafted, argued that the plans were at best based on educated guess
work because the data collection was poor and the plans did not rest on solid studies.39
The argument that the problem of development in Nigeria is rooted in the
indiscipline and internal problems is one that has been challenged by Jeremiah Dibua, a
Nigerian historian in the United States. He argues that the modernization paradigm plays
a central role in the creation and perpetuation of the crisis of development in Africa. He
does not discount the internal problems in Africa, such as corruption, ineptitude,
authoritarianism, and the patrimonial nature of some states. But these, for him, are not the
cause of Nigeria’s crisis. The crisis is rooted in the attempt to export and plant western
modernization models or paradigms in Nigeria where the socio-cultural realities are
different than in the West. For him, the reason for the failure of modernization inspired
programs in Africa is the paradigm itself and he shifts his analysis from the internal
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problems to the idea of modernization itself.40 Dibua is critical of the 1962 development
plan and the plans thereafter. He argues that development planning in Nigeria, as
evidenced in the 1962 plan and beyond, was a product of “Eurocentric diffusionism.” He
writes that “Eurocentric diffusionism through modernization, which only attributes
history to European societies while denying history or any form of meaningful
autonomous development to African societies, fostered ethnocentrism and false
universalism that negatively affected development planning in Nigeria.”41 Rather than
minimalize the role of the state in development planning, he argues in the book for state
intervention in development.
While these works provide helpful socio-economic and political analysis of the
development plans, they did not see these plans as a historical process. My study
challenges the argument that the 1945 plan was not a development plan. The reason these
authors dismiss the 1945 plan is because the plan did not have systematic economic
projections and statistically measured means of achieving those projections. By focusing
my study on the planning process and not just the plans, what becomes revealing is the
intentional attempt by the state to direct development. The process of planning in the
1945 plan was more involved than a simple amalgamation of projects into a document as
these scholars seem to believe. My work will show a painstaking process of negotiations
that had the intended outcome of ordering Nigeria’s progress not only economically but
also socially. These scholars have also rightly identified some of the problems that
plagued the development plans. However, by focusing on the planning process we gain
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more insights into these problems and become aware of some deeply inherent problems
that the official plan documents do not reveal. For example, it is by studying this
planning process that it becomes evident how the human element mixed with regional
politics transformed the 1962 development plan at the last minute from a five-year plan to
a six-year plan.
Though the literature on development history in Nigeria is sparse, there is a
growing body of works on the history of development and in particular development in
sub-Saharan Africa. My work speaks to some of the themes and issues in this expanding
literature. Some scholars who have looked at development in the postwar period have
argued that the practice and theory of development arose when President Harry Truman,
in his 20 January, 1949 inaugural speech, announced his “fair deal” and set forth a
doctrine that offered a new way to the understanding of world affairs. Truman’s agenda
was in response to the postwar discovery of massive world poverty. Arturo Escobar
argues in his book Encountering Development that the dream that Truman set forth was
not one that was solely created by the United States but it was a “result of the specific
historical juncture at the end of the Second World War.”42 Development was an invention
of the west in the period after the Second World War and it was used as an instrument for
the exportation of western moral and cultural superiority to the Third World and the
imposition of western knowledge and ideas upon these people whom the west treated as
“a child in need of adult guidance.”43
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This view that development was invented in the post-war period has been
challenged by some recent historiography in colonial development. This new
historiography advances the position that development was not a construction of the postwar period but was already present on the eve of the war as an intentional attempt by the
colonial governments to respond to the economic depression of the late 1920s and early
1930s. As Joseph Hodge argues in his book Triumph of the Expert, severe economic
depression and the resultant unrest in the colonies “marked a critical turning point in the
colonial encounter, setting off a far-reaching process of official rethinking and reform
designed to forestall popular discontent and give a new lease on life and legitimacy to the
imperial project.”44 The development discourse of the period after the war in response to
world poverty was not a novel project as the colonies had for several decades made
attempts to harness the resources of the colonies to respond to the poverty of the colonial
period. In the late 1890s, Britain believed in the promise that the African colonies held.
This potential was based on the power emanating from the use of science and technology.
Joseph Chamberlain, who was colonial secretary in 1895, believed that through science
and technology, the state could play a powerful role in the imperial project. Chamberlain
believed that the success of Britain’s trade and industry depended on the opening up of
the colonies and he thus linked colonial development to “social reform at home in an

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
44

Joseph Hodge, Triumph of the Expert: Agrarian Doctrines of Development and the Legacies of British
Colonialism (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2007), 2.!

!

21!

!

effort to unite capital and labor in the cause of empire.”45 His agenda that was focused on
Britain’s interest also could potentially benefit colonial progress.46
Chamberlain’s vision of linking the colonies and the metropole economically was
strengthened as a result of the experience during the First World War. It was important
that the supply of food and raw materials be secured and developing the colonies was
seen as a viable solution.47 What happened in Africa also after this war was that Britain
and France received the former German colonies and they now took on a role of that of
trustee over these colonies. As Hodge argues, the new emphasis on trusteeship created
“new demands for state direction and control in such areas as health, sanitary
administration, education reform, and rural welfare.” 48 This shift gave the scientific
community a new role in empire. Though European scientific societies had been
exploring Africa since the 1870s, but by the 1920s and 1930s, Helen Tilley argues, Africa
became a laboratory in which all kinds of scientific enquiries ranging from medicine,
biology, anthropology or even racial science was tested. Colonialism and science had
entered a realm in which “scientific research was coupled more decisively to imperial
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policy making and colonial development.”49 The science exported to Africa was not just
European science but it was shaped by the colonial context.50
Several regions of Africa in the period before and after the Second World War
would serve as experimental laboratories for colonial policies. For example, in the
Sukumaland region of Tanganyika, the British carried out intensive developmental
interventions in order to curb environmental problems. There were efforts by the colonial
government to conserve land from degradation.51 This was also the argument for British
intervention in the Baringo district of Kenya in the 1930s. As David Anderson shows in
his book, Eroding the Commons, the land degradation this region faced as a result of
overstocking of goats caused the British by the mid-1940s to intervene in development
through rangeland reconditioning schemes by introducing reseeding, rotational grazing
and animal destocking. The impact of these schemes was negligible. Baringo was “both a
symbol of the essential need for colonial intervention in African land husbandry and a
testing ground for colonial ideas on how reform should be implemented.”52
These experimental attempts on development in Africa were not always
successful. They sometimes met with local opposition. Part of the reason was that these
development efforts were objects of social engineering. The control of resources was
being shifted from the people to state institutions. Planning itself was used as a means of
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constructing the state and bringing the people under state control.53 Alden Young makes a
compelling case for this goal of planning development in his 2013 doctoral dissertation.
The creation of a centralized development process in the late colonial Sudan led to
finance officials asserting their authority over economic development throughout AngloEgyptian Sudan. He writes, “Finance officials expanded their supervisory powers by
mandating that all economic projects begun after 1946 needed to demonstrate that they
would contribute to the economic development of the entire territory. In the process,
finance officials were able to impose the idea that the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan was the
principal unit of economic management.”54 In several instances, the people resisted the
attempt by the state to reorder their societies. In the case of Sukumaland, the opposition
from the people paved the way for the nationalist party, the Tanganyika African National
Union. In Baringo, the Tugen people resisted British policies and Daniel arap Moi, who
would later become the second president of Kenya was one of those who resisted British
development policies in this district. In some cases, the opposition of these schemes
forced the colonial governments to restructure the scheme. For example, the massive
irrigation scheme launched by the French in the 1930s in Mali was reshaped by the
Malian farmers. Monica M. van Beusekom in her book, Negotiating Development,55
shows how the French had intended this project to aid in the cultivation of cotton, the
African farmers were able to change this crop to rice. For her, development was
negotiated between the Africans and the French, though she would not go as far as to
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saying that this was a negotiation of equals. Her work exposes the difference between the
ideology and the practice of development. The French ideology was that of social
evolutionism and it was championed by the French experts. In practice, the Africans
negotiated with the colonial experts and were able to modify the project.
Though several development policies of the colonial governments were resisted
by Africans, many of these policies were continued in the period after independence. The
new ruling elites saw these projects as a means of transforming their modernist
aspirations into reality. In Mozambique, the Frelimo government, which had spent
several years condemning Cahora Bassa, a dam project undertaken by the Portuguese,
changed their position when they came to power six months after the dam was completed
and Mozambique gained her independence. The new government now claimed that the
dam would play a critical role in economic development and prosperity.56 In some cases,
the new African leaders created replicas or resurrected schemes that had failed during the
late colonial period. A good example is the Volta River Project to build Akosombo Dam
started by President Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana. The Gonja Development Scheme had
failed during the late colonial period.
The story of late colonial development in Nigeria shares common traits with what
was going on in these other African colonies. Like some other colonies, Nigeria was also
a test case of both scientific experimentation and social engineering. This literature is
very important in my analysis of colonial development, most especially in the fourth
chapter of my work in which I look at a specific development scheme, NAP. Also,
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development in Nigeria was a negotiation, albeit an unequal one between the Nigerian
people, colonial government and Colonial Office. The contribution of my work is that it
details the debates and discourse that shaped the plans. By going into the details of these
discussions, it becomes obvious that development planning was a learning curve for the
British. They did not have it all figured out.
The goal to develop the colonies and sustain empire was thwarted by some other
problems that Britain was facing. In the late colonial period, Britain was struggling to
hold onto most of her colonies amidst a rising tide of nationalist movements. She
embarked on development not as an act of benevolence, but as a strategy for preserving
and revitalizing empire. The Second World War was an economic disaster for Britain and
there was an effective transfer of power in world affairs to the United States. The
presence of the US in world affairs, most especially in developing nations, became more
visible. This, as I will argue in this dissertation, was motivated by two factors: US
interests in making these nations align ideologically with her and the cold war. Such an
alliance with these nations had economic interest for the US as new markets were being
opened for US goods. America’s version of development is what has come to be known
as modernization. The concept of development is broader than what modernization
represents. As I have defined it in this work, it is an intentional act by the state to guide
social, economic and even political progress. Modernization on the other hand was a
historical process in which the economic, political and social structures and institutions of
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a traditional society were updated to achieve modernity and this modernity represented
what was obtainable in America and most of Western Europe.57
Some scholars such as Nils Gilmans have argued that modernization theory was
invented by American social scientists in the decade after the Second World War. He
argues that at the heart of this theory was the goal of re-creating post-colonial states into
the image of America. The theorists saw the problems in Africa, Latin America and Asia
as problems that existed in the early years of the United States. They passionately
believed that through socio-political and economic development, these nations would
resemble the United States. In their view, the United States “could and should serve as a
developmental model for the rest of the world.”58 For Gilman, modernization was an
invention of the United States in response to postwar challenges and opportunities. David
Ekbladh challenges this view and pushes the origins of modernization to the pre-war
period. He argues that in the 1910s and 1920s, there were already emerging new ideas of
development that coupled modern applied technologies with the new social sciences.
Though these ideas originated from outside the US, they had strong adherents in
America. 59 Ekbladh ties development to the ideological struggles of the twentieth
century: liberalism, communism and fascism. The intervention by the US in world affairs
was part of an ideological struggle over whose “ideologies were best suited to deliver the
benefits of modern life.”60 The ideas that would later be termed as modernization were
not just invented in the period after 1945. Neither was modernization theory created by
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the Cold War. These ideas worked their way into Cold War policies.61 Michael Latham in
his 2011 book, The Right Kind of Revolution, agrees with Ekbladh on the pre-1940s
origin of modernization. He argues that the American modernization that emerged had its
basis in the thinking and of Woodrow Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt. He writes that the
concern of these two with “the deeper, structural forces at work in world politics, and
their commitment to a broadly internationalist vision linking U.S. security to the global
environment, profoundly shaped the way that later policymakers tried to understand and
respond to the impact of decolonization in the Cold War period.”62 What Latham does in
his book is to show how modernization was deployed across different regions of the
world in the late 1950s and early 1960s.
The American vision of modernizing the world was unleashed on different parts
of the world, India, Tanzania, Nigeria, etc. In the 1950s, American social scientists and
policy makers came to view India as a model for the rest of the developing world. The
reason was because of India’s “democratic government – led by Westernized,
noncommunist elites …. Its plans to raise citizens’ standards of living through
industrialization, state-led planning, and ‘community development’ held out the hope that
other largely rural ‘underdeveloped’ nations could also escape a world of subsistence.”63
In line with the ideology of modernization, these social scientists believed that India’s
development vision captured the power of liberal democracies and free market capitalism
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to lift people from poverty and give them modern lives.64 Like India, modernization was
brought to Nigeria by American social scientists that were in search of a model state for
Africa. Discerning in Nigeria the kinds of democratic and economic values they saw in
India, they believed Nigeria was “an exemplary nation in the making.”65 Instrumental to
the project of modernization in Nigeria was the first National Development Plan that was
crafted by American social scientists associated with CIS. In his article “Bringing ‘The
Gospel of Modernization’ to Nigeria: American Nation Builders and Development
Planning in the 1960s,” Larry Grubbs explores the impact of two American academics,
Arnold Rivkin and Wofgang Stolper, on Nigeria’s economic planning. Their planning
had predicted an economically prosperous, democratic and unified nation-state that
would become a model for other African nations, but this failed. They helped draft and
implemented the first Nigerian National Development Plan, and five years into the plan,
Larry Grubbs argues that “Nigeria’s economy remained locked into neocolonial trade
patterns, corruption blossomed, and ethnic conflict and political opportunism culminated
in a bloody civil war from 1967-1970. Nigeria entered the twenty-first century with a
staggering external debt, widespread poverty, and painful dependence on the West.”66
Grubbs believes that the crucial part played by Stolper and Rivkin in this nation building
mission is the reason why personalities, specific institutions and the political context
must be included in the new history of development. My work will expand the roles that
these individuals together with CIS, played in the first Nigerian national development
plan.
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Modernization’s failure was not limited to Nigeria. By the 1970s, it had become
obvious that the billions of dollars that had been poured by the United States into
developing nations had not created “mini-American” nations. As Ekbladh states: “Statist
programs, planning, and the large-scale transformation that had characterized
modernizations heyday were viewed with a jaundiced eye.”67 He believes that this was as
a result of modernization’s association with “Cold War thinking, ethnocentrism, and
cultural imperialism.”68 Amy Staples, in her book The Birth of Development,69 links the
failure of modernization theory to the over reliance on technical experts rather than the
innovations of the local people. There was the false notion that foreign experts recruited
into the poor country would be able to use their technical expertise to transform the
country. Some of these experts often ignored local knowledge; they believed that they
knew best what was good for the people. The fifth chapter of this work, which looks at
modernization in the Nigerian context, shows how the reliance on foreign planners mixed
with some other local Nigerian conditions led to the failure of this ideology.
Significance of the Research
The field of development and modernization history is growing. Many of the
works in this field are focused on Asia, Latin America, Southern Africa and Eastern
Africa. Not many people have looked at West Africa as a whole and Nigeria in particular.
As the review of scholarship above illustrates, when this region has been studied, the
focus has been on economic development as a spontaneous process that economists and
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other social scientists can study and measure, rather than development as an intentional
practice that states try to make happen, that has a history we can study and analyze and
learn from. My work uses history as a methodology to study development and
development planning in Nigeria during the late colonial and early “postcolonial” period.
This approach has not really been applied in the case of Nigeria. This work will offer a
new perspective on the planning process and both the human, political and ideological
sides of the planners.
Another significance of this research is that “postcolonial” African history is a
growing field and more work needs to be done in the area. Given that the majority of
African countries gained their independence only in the last sixty years, it is only now
that most primary official sources are becoming available for researchers. Also, in
“postcolonial” Nigerian history, Britain is no longer the only factor, but the United States
as the new world power becomes a major factor. The role of the United States in the
“postcolonial” development of Nigeria has been largely ignored by historians who write
on Nigeria. My study will look at the role that both the United States and Britain played
in using multi-year planning as a tool for development in late colonial and post-colonial
Nigeria. Like the British, the US interest was not solely an attempt to stem communist
influence. The US was interested in forging economic ties with Nigeria that would in turn
be beneficial to it.
My work will make a major contribution to scholarship by bringing together two
sets of literature: the literature on late colonial development and the literature on postcolonial Africa. This is important because it will help to shed light on the transition
between British-led colonial development and American-led “postcolonial” development.
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By looking at planning in the late colonial period and planning in the early “postcolonial” period, my work will show areas of continuities and discontinuities in the
planning process between the two periods and will reveal the ideologies that drove the
planners. It will also show how regionalism coupled with ethnic biases affected the
development process. Rather than placing the problem of underdevelopment solely on
corruption, this study will show that there were other factors that impacted negatively on
development. These are development ideology, human resources, financial resources,
international experts/indigenous knowledge.
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CHAPTER TWO
PLANNING DEVELOPMENT IN THE LATE COLONIAL PERIOD

Introduction
The developmentalist state of the 1940s was one that held promising hope not
only for the colonial governments but also for the Africans who became deeply involved
in it even before they acquired power.70 Planning development and implementing the
plans involved a series of negotiations between the metropole and the colonies. In the
colonies, the state and also the nationalist leaders, farmers, workers and petty
bourgeoisie, shaped the colonial plans. This was true of the 1945 Nigerian development
plan in which a series of negotiations took place between Nigeria and the CO. At heart
was the question of who should design and control development planning. Sidney Caine,
who was in charge of colonial development policy at the CO, argued that this form of
planning should be controlled from the CO because the local colonial governments “did
not have the time, and in many cases the experience and expertise, necessary to carry out
the daunting task of continuous, systematic planning.” 71 While Caine’s view of a
metropolitan approach to development was under consideration, some other senior staff
of the CO believed that it was important to bring the local colonial governments to the
planning process because they had a better understanding of the local circumstances. In
order to bridge the gap between what was happening in the metropole and colonies, it
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was decided that a planning section should be created within the CO and there should be
a buildup of technical staff at the CO that would make regular visits to the colonies and
provide them expert advice. Also it was decided that regional development organizations
be created and the territories should set up planning councils or committees that would
carry out long-term planning.72 In this chapter, I look at how the 1945 Nigerian plan
came to be. I argue that the metropolitan-centered development mission favored by Caine
was limiting to development in Nigeria because the colonial administration in Nigeria
was the one that had to implement the plan and it knew better the needs and limitations of
the local conditions. The colonial state was under the critical purview of Nigerian elites
and the local press and this factor helped to limit and shape the development agenda of
the state.
I also argue that the Nigerian colonial officials were well intentioned in their
attempt to carry out development in the colony. They had given serious and considerable
thought to development in the colony and had setup institutions of development from the
district level through the provincial level to the central level. These institutions were
setup to generate ideas that would help to develop the colonies and also to help identify
schemes that would be most beneficial. Also, as a sign that the colonial state was well
intentioned in its goal of developing the colony, the Nigerian officials saw agriculture as
a key to the economic success and so at the beginning of the plan’s implementation, they
wanted to invest heavily on agriculture through extension and colonial personnel in order
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to stimulate production and generate revenues which would help to sustain the plan
beyond ten years.
Despite the strengths of the 1945 plan, I argue in this chapter that it had serious
limitations and shortcomings. One factor that affected this plan was that it was not well
funded. The CO had grossly underestimated the financial resources that were needed in
order to achieve the level of development that they had envisioned. The figure that both
the CO and British Treasury agreed upon for development of the colonies was at best an
educated guess. Two reasons were responsible for this: planning was still very new and
they had not devised a way of measuring effectively needs and outcomes. The second
reason was because Britain did not have the financial resources as it was emerging from
the Second World War and was undergoing reconstruction and reinvestment. And the
other important factor that affected the planning process was the lack of involvement of
Nigerians in the planning bodies that were set up and in the government services, such as
the development officers. At the heart of the colonial state was racial bias. This prevented
Nigerians, who could have served in different capacities, from directly promoting
development. This systemic racism that clouded the colonial state hindered progress both
in the development and implementation of the plan.
Colonial Development Before 1929
Prior to the Great Depression, Britain was engaged in some form of development
in the colonies. The person who put imperial development on the table was Joseph
Chamberlain. When he became S of S for the colonies in 1895, he was aware of the fact
that some tropical colonies were decaying while others were thriving. He believed that
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the key to the restoration of Britain’s power, wealth and prestige, which he feared were
waning, was imperial union and development.73 He was also aware of the fact that plenty
of resources would be needed in order to maintain and defend an empire so big as that of
Britain. The solution to this problem was the need for “prosperous and contented subjects
within all parts of the empire, Crown colonies as well as dominions, which were capable
of raising sufficient revenues, both to contribute to the defense of their territories, and to
generate sufficient investment capital to set their domestic economies on a path of selfcontinuing growth.”74 Chamberlain’s vision was that imperial funds should be made
available for the development of the colonies both for the betterment of the colony itself
and the empire as a whole. His efforts were constantly fought back by the Treasury,
which saw it as an anathema to spend imperial funds in the development of the colonies.
The view obtainable at the time was that the colonies needed to develop themselves
economically through private capital.
Though Chamberlain had placed colonial development on the table in the late
nineteenth century, it was only by the 1920s that attempts were made at institutionalizing
colonial development. Early in the 1920s, L. S. Amery, who was the Parliamentary
Under-secretary of State for the Colonies, and Lord Milner, who was the S of S,
championed colonial development. They saw the economic development of the colonies
as the only answer to Britain’s economic problems. After the First World War, Britain’s
debt was rising greatly and it cost £210 million to service that debt annually. There was
need for fresh sources of revenue in order to reduce the burden of taxation that was going
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to be placed on industry and the investment class. A corollary benefit to this was full
employment for British workers.75 Amery argued for the “extension of tariff protection
with imperial preferences and the sustained funding of empire settlement programs.”76
However, the Treasury ministers and officials opposed Amery’s views on colonial
development. These officials argued that money invested in the colonies by way of
development would never be recovered. Nevertheless, the CO pushed its plans. The
policy at the time was that colonial development aid should be in the form of loans rather
than grants.77 The struggle between the CO and the Treasury was so fierce that in 1928,
Amery then S of S, sent a letter to Stanley Baldwin, the prime minister, in which he
wrote, “Four years bitter experience have convinced me that any attempt to help the
employment situation here by accelerating Colonial development is hopeless as long as
matters are left to the Treasury, which is at bottom against all expenditure, whether on
development or on anything else, and whose powers of obstruction are infinitely greater
on an Imperial subject than on a domestic issue where there is constant parliamentary
pressure.”78 This was the period shortly before the Great Depression.
The 1929 Colonial Development Act
During the Great Depression, the economic importance of the empire was
heightened. Empire was seen as a “safety cushion during hard times, a domain to be
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isolated from global economic competition in the interest of Britain.”79 Prior to the
economic depression, the colonial state in Nigeria, for example, was able to balance its
budget through the export of agricultural products and tin mining. In the 1920s, half of
Nigeria’s exports were palm products.80 The depression affected both the agricultural
industry and the mining industry. World demand for primary products fell by 50 percent,
which led to falling prices for exports. Price reductions had a devastating impact on the
economy of Nigeria and the colonies that were primary producing economies. L. J. Butler
writes, “the price paid to Nigeria’s palm-oil products dropped by almost 80 per cent
between 1928 and 1934, and the total value of Nigerian exports fell from £16,927,000 in
1928 to £8,560,000 in 1933.”81 The depression also affected imports. European goods
were no longer imported in the same quantities that they had been imported before the
depression. The revenues of the colonial state that were derived from custom duties on
imports and exports, as well from the taxation of Africans through the hut and poll tax,
dried up. The limited revenues acquired through export trade were used to pay debt
charges. The local governments could not get help from London because colonies were
expected to be financially self-sufficient. The implication of these factors was that
colonies like Nigeria did not have the revenues to develop their territories. Most
important for this study, two major problems were emerging at this time: the
unemployment in Britain and the lack of development that was taking place in the
colonies.
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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It was thus not surprising that these imperatives found expression in the first
attempt to institutionalize colonial development in the form of the 1929 Colonial
Development Act. The act was a public works program with the aim of alleviating the
problem of unemployment in Britain. As the 1929 elections drew near, there was pressure
on Winston Churchill, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, to support the policy of colonial
development as the Conservative Party would be severely criticized by the opposition
parties for doing nothing to reduce unemployment. While Churchill, a former S of S,
dismissed the CO’s pressure, by May of 1929, Baldwin “included Amery’s
recommendation of a colonial development fund and advocated the extension and
expedition of development policy in Africa, but in accordance with a cabinet decision he
left open the question of the machinery for the administration of the fund.”82
However, Baldwin’s government suffered defeat in the elections and had to resign
on 4 June 1929. The Labour Party, which formed a minority government, had
campaigned on the platform of tackling the problem of unemployment. The colonial
secretary of Labour’s government, J. H. Thomas, was an enthusiastic supporter of the
idea that colonial development would alleviate unemployment in Britain. Amery found
an ally in Thomas and drew his attention to a Conservative Party proposal, which called
for the creation of a development fund. The Labour Party picked up this proposal and
quickly turned it into legislation.83 The CO under Thomas defined what they considered
an acceptable colonial development fund scheme. Stephen Constantine writes: “Since the
purpose of the scheme was to induce colonies to undertake works, with which they would
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otherwise not at present burden themselves, in order to accelerate the revival of industry
at home, it was essential that there must be an element of free gift to the territory. This
should take the form of a contribution of the whole or part of the interest on a loan for a
certain number of years.”84 The Treasury remained skeptical of the value of this scheme
in reducing unemployment. Nevertheless, Thomas on 24 June 1929, requested the CO,
the Treasury, and parliamentary counsel to prepare a bill. This bill was complete by 26
June 1929. The bill moved fast through the parliament and received the Royal Assent on
26 July 1929.85
The resulting 1929 Colonial Development Act was a failure. It failed primarily
because of poor planning and limited funding. Only £1 million was available annually to
fund the ten colonies that were part of the scheme. Between 1930 and 1940, Nigeria
received about £330,000. Of this amount, “£114,450 (or 34.7 percent) was granted to pay
interest on loans for the construction of the Minna-Kaduna railway, £51,000 funded the
organization of ground facilities for air services, and £95,000 facilitated research and
treatment of sleeping sickness. Agriculture received £3,400 to encourage mixed crop
farming and another £1,500 on tsetse fly research, while the rest went for other small
expenses.”86 True to its intention, it was a job program for the British and not an act that
brought about any significant development for the colonies. £330,000 for a colony the
size of Nigeria was a paltry sum. This act is in stark contrast to the 1945 legislation that
saw the approval of £55 million to Nigeria for a ten-year period.
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Planning Development, the 1940 Act
The economic depression that started in 1929 created deplorable conditions in the
colonies. As the depression deepened, the social and economic conditions in the colonies
were getting worse rather than better. Joseph Hodge writes that, “Deteriorating conditions
in the colonies, critics charged, were evidence of years of complacency, neglect and
exploitation. New attitudes were taking shape that by the end of the decade would usher
in a far-reaching process of colonial reform, symbolized by the passing of the Colonial
Development and Welfare Act of 1940.”87 These social and economic conditions led to
unrest and riots in the colonies and questions were asked in the metropole about the
conditions in the colonies. The attempt to find solutions to the conditions in the colonies
formed the backdrop of the 1940 act. Unlike the 1929 act, the word “welfare” was now
added. The significance of this was that colonial development now had as part of its
mission, the improvement of the social conditions of colonial people. The 1940 Act
marked a major shift in colonial development policy. With this act, the British
government placed importance on tackling the problem of colonial poverty. Thus, this act
emphasized welfare provisions over economic development. Alleviating colonial poverty
became a major goal designed to inoculate Britain from the United States’s critique of
colonial rule. It is important to note that despite the fact that this act was intended to be
more humanitarian than mercantilist, measures that would bring about economic
development were still promoted at the insistence of the Treasury. Treasury’s argument
was that economic development would enable colonial governments to provide essential
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social services. Butler argues that this idea did not please many at the Colonial Office.88
Unlike the 1929 act that allocated only £1 million annually for the development of
colonies, the 1940 act allocated £5.5 million annually for the colonies. Of this amount,
£500,000 per annum was allocated solely for research in the colonies.89
The Governor of Nigeria, Sir Bernard Bourdillon, was excited about the passage
of the 1940 Act. He had been instrumental to the vigorous debates that were taking place
in the CO on the nature of the Act. He had sent a long dispatch to the CO blasting “the
established notions of financial self-sufficiency and damned the Colonial Development
Act [of 1929]for its inefficacy. He lamented the problems of poor territories like Nigeria
which, were burdened by debts, could not raise enough extra local revenue to meet the
interest on new loans or to face the recurrent expenditure which development works often
entailed.” 90 Bourdillon concluded his dispatch by requesting that development loans
should be granted by London on reduced interest rates and the development of the
departments of agriculture, forestry, veterinary, geological survey and co-operatives be
fully financed by the Imperial Government.91
His excitement is understandable because this was the first time that the British
imperial government committed substantial financial aid to the colonies for their
development and welfare. He had long disdained the philosophy that the colonies had to
be self-sustaining. He wasted no time promoting the legislation among his officials and
asking the various Residents of the provinces to submit proposals for development. Not
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much guidance was given on how to proceed. The Residents in turn asked for statements
of needs from the departments, district officers, etc. These initial proposals were
ambitious and not very well planned.
It was only after the CO established the Colonial Economic Advisory Committee
(CEAC) in September of 1943 to advise the S of S on development in the colonies that
guidelines were written on how to proceed with development planning. These guidelines
encouraged the formation of economic advisory committees in the colonies.92 In August
of 1943, the Nigerian colonial state established the Advisory Committee on Economic
Development and Social Welfare. This committee, which was headed by T. HoskynsAbrahall, had its first meeting on August 5, 1943. The committee assisted in coordinating
the different proposals that would later form the bulk of the ten-year development plan.
Besides this committee, which was headquartered in Lagos, there were other committees
that worked at a more local level. Provincial development committees were present in all
twenty-three provinces of Nigeria. These committees were comprised of both official and
nonofficial members. The official members were heads of departments while the
nonofficial members, who were mainly Nigerians, were chosen by the Residents to
represent the different interest groups. 93 The role of the provincial development
committee was to “coordinate the activities of the various departments, reduce the
workload of the Resident in matters relating to the Colonial Development Fund, make
suggestions on projects and prepare schemes on its own initiative.”94 The provincial
development committees were not at the bottom of the bureaucracy. There was still
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another level below. This was the divisional development committee. The District Officer
usually chaired this. Members of this committee included “a few high-ranking chiefs, the
District Officer, and senior officers of the Health, Agriculture, and Public Works
departments. The divisional development committee also involved interest groups, such
as the Christian missions, foreign firms, and a few educated elites.”95
This bureaucratic structure was in place by the end of the Second World War, and
most of these committees had submitted numerous proposals to the advisory committee
in Lagos with the hope of benefiting from the 1940 CD&W act. The development plan
that arose after the passage of the 1945 Act had its foundation in the proposals that the
advisory committee had received prior to 1945. Much of the thinking embodied in these
plans stretch back to the 1930s when the colonial state started thinking seriously about
development in response to the depression. The state experimented with different things
such as mixed farming and extension services, as a way of increasing productivity and
raising revenues. One can rightly argue that these ideas were now crystalized into
development proposals during wartime. During the war, the implementation of the 1940
act was suspended and the colonies had to wait until the end of the war in 1945 when the
act was revised and substantially enhanced to £120 million. The development proposals
that were formulated during wartime by the provincial committees were not based on any
carefully thought out long term development strategy. This approach changed with the
1945 Act. The plans were prepared at the departmental level and then subsequently
coordinated. This is how the plan was put together: “Each department had accordingly
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been asked to put up a ten-year plan based on what it considered to be essential
development in its own sphere. In order that there should be no departmental
competition, no department except the Public Works Department was allowed to know
the financial implications of the other departments’ plans. There had been no question of
allowing each Department a percentage of a given figure. The proposals were then coordinated and modified as necessary.”96
The original development proposals for the postwar that the Nigerian government
sent to the CO in 1944 laid out plans for a fifteen-year period. Initially, the plan was to
last for ten years beginning from 1945, but this was changed to a fifteen year period
because the authors feared a shortage of staff in the post-war period and saw the necessity
of building each service gradually, thereby leading to a longer completion period.97 While
the CO accepted the Nigerian development plan of fifteen years in principle, it made
clear that the CD&W Act as envisaged could only cover ten years. The Nigerian plan was
to be divided into three sections, each lasting for a period of five years. The CD&W
funds would cover the first ten years of the program but the last five years would be
dependent on assistance from the CO.98 This preliminary plan of development covered
three main areas: capital works, government services, and economic development.
Projects that fell under capital works were water supply, roads, telecommunications,
electricity, and the improvement of African housing. Development projects that were to
be carried out under government services were the expansion of medical, agricultural,
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veterinary, forestry, research, and social welfare services. For economic development, the
emphasis was placed on the provision of adequate marketing services covering as many
Nigerian products as possible.99
This plan did not place much emphasis on economic development. The writers of
the plan were not unaware of this weakness. The Nigerian planners believed that it was
important to have some basic social services in the plan without which it would be
difficult to have a good economic plan. F. E. V. Smith, the development secretary in
Nigeria, argued in a meeting with the Treasury in London on 9 November 1944, “The
fundamental necessity was not so much development as welfare and spectacular
development could not be looked for until the basic necessities of life had been provided;
when this was done the productive capacity of the people as a whole could be improved
and could be absorbed into some form of economic development.”100 Sydney Caine101
and the Treasury, on the other hand, wanted a greater emphasis on increasing production
and economic growth. Caine argued that development in the past was found through
private individuals who were economic prospectors. In the future, this was not going to
be possible because of conditions of taxation and control of capital markets. This meant
that the state had to undertake the role of economic prospectors. He wrote, “If it is going
to do that effectively and intelligently, it must develop machinery for doing the economic
prospecting which was formerly done by large numbers of private persons acting on their
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own account.”102 Caine’s view of development was one that was mainly economic in
character.103
What was at stake here was the clash of development ideologies. Smith’s view
was based on the basic needs ideology, which was championed early on in colonial
development policy by Chamberlain. In order to unleash the productive capabilities of the
colonial period, it was important that the populace be provided with basic needs. If the
people were contented and prosperous, then you could require more from them, which
could contribute positively to the economy. On the other hand, Caine’s view was that the
foundation of development was economic growth and productivity. Through these,
resources are produced that allow the colony to invest in social services such as
education, health, etc. The question is, what comes first: welfare or development? For
Caine, it is development and for the Nigerian officials, it was welfare. Caine’s view of
development was narrow. Without a strong educational and health system, you cannot
have a strong economic system. His views did not take into consideration the long-term
economic development of the colony.
The 1945 Act and Development Planning in Nigeria
The period after the Second World War was an important phase in British
colonialism in Africa. The war interrupted the implementation of the 1940 act. As the
attention of London turned toward the war, colonial development as envisaged by the act
was suspended. This period marked the rise of the decolonization movement and the
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beginning of what has been called the “second colonial occupation.” This “occupation”
was an attempt to stem the tide of decolonization by improving social services for the
colonial people and also as a way to improve the economy of Britain that had been
devastated by the war. The Second World War left a devastating impact on the economy
of Britain. The war had affected both colony and metropole not only economically but
also socially and psychologically. While there was social unrest in the colonies, Britain
also had to find a way to deal with her economic problems at home. London turned
toward the colonies for its economic salvation. It was believed that if the resources of the
colonies were extracted, these would be good for Britain’s economy and also for the
colonial people. However, if Britain was to hold onto her empire, it was important for the
colonies to be developed.
During the war, there were plans for parliament to update the 1940 CD&W act.
The Nigerian colonial state was also envisioning ways for updating the development
proposals that they drafted in light of the 1940 act. Governor Arthur Richards, in May of
1943, set up a central committee called the Advisory Committee on Economic
Development and Social Welfare. This committee had as its chairman, the chief secretary
to the government. Other members of the committee included the commissioners of each
of the three regions, the financial secretary, the director of medical services, the director
of education, the director of agriculture, the director of public works, the chief
conservator of forests, the commissioner of labor, the director of veterinary services and
three members of the Legislative Council. This committee met in August of 1943 to plan
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postwar development in Nigeria. At their meeting, they came up with a seven point
agenda for development:
1. The settlement of ex-soldiers. This was to be undertaken by the development
branch in conjunction with the department of labor.
2. Rural land planning and development. The focus here was land utilization and
degradation; land settlement and irrigation. This was to be handled by the
provincial committees.
3. Economic development of livestock. The directors of agriculture and
veterinary services were to form a sub-committee to work on this.
4. Urban land planning. Work had already been done on this in Lagos. It was to
be expanded colony-wide.
5. Mineral development. This was already part of the war effort and they
believed that all that was possible was already being done.
6. Secondary industries. This subject was already being taken up with the
Resident Minister.104
7. The examination of all works and schemes proposed by any department of
government. The task of the development organization was to take all the
different programs of postwar reconstruction and prioritize them and advise
on applications for CD&W grants.105
Governor Richards also established a development committee in each of the 23
provinces of Nigeria. The officials in Nigeria were excited about development in the
colony and they wanted the machinery of development in Nigeria to be ready once the
new act was passed. F. E. V. Smith was in charge of the development department and
Governor Richards had plenty of confidence in him. The development department had
the responsibility of conveying instructions from the central government to the chief
commissioners and provincial committees and also providing them with assistance and
information. The governor sent the first development proposals that would fall under the
new act to London on the 22nd of September 1944. These were sent to the S of S,
Colonel Oliver Stanley, to enable him discuss them with his advisors in preparation for
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Smith and H. E. Walker’s visit to London.106 Governor Richards’ confidence in Smith
and his eagerness to begin development in earnest under the new Act is seen in his letter
to the S of S. He wrote: “Mr. Smith has been instructed that he has my full authority and
a free hand to discuss and modify the proposals in any way necessary in order to reach
agreement with your advisers, and I trust that it will be possible for him to return with a
sufficiently definite approval of these plans for action to be taken locally at the earliest
date.”107
This was the beginning of a long journey in planning in Nigeria for the 1945 act.
The rest of 1944 and most of 1945 would be spent in development planning. On the 30th
of September 1944, the Resident Minister, Noel Hall, sent a letter to the S of S endorsing
the preliminary outline for development emanating from Nigeria. He considered the
general framework of the plans as being sound.108 Meanwhile, Smith and Walker arrived
London and several discussions were carried out with officials at the CO. By the 20th of
October 1944, discussions had reached a point in which certain decisions needed to be
made. Seven issues arising from the meeting needed to be decided upon. The first was the
approval in principle of the outline development plan and the revised rough estimates; the
second was an agreement in principle that Nigeria would receive £27 million during the
period between 1946 to 1956; the third was the approval of the general principle that the
CD&W vote would service loans collected by Nigeria for development during the years
covered; the fourth was on the provision of £375,000 from the CD&W vote for the period
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from 1944 to 1946 to enable initial preparations in anticipation of the main schemes
being approved; the fifth was approval for the establishment of a development
commission; the sixth was agreement for the hiring of development officers to begin
immediately and that their salaries be paid by the CD&W vote; and the seventh was
agreement on the establishment of a department of commerce and industries which would
help to foster and finance local industries.109
A meeting was held on the 25th of October 1944 to discuss the Nigerian
development proposal and to make a decision on the seven issues raised above. The S of
S, who was present at the meeting, did not think it was necessary to discuss in details the
development proposal since Governor Richards was arriving in London soon. He saw it
necessary that the proposal be discussed in details when the governor was present in
London. The S of S was impressed with the general design of the development
framework and wanted it to be crafted comprehensively. Frederick Pedler,110 however,
felt that there was a difficulty in justifying the allocation of £27 million for the ten years
to Nigeria. His reason for objecting was based on the total amount that was available for
development in all the colonies. At this time, the S of S was planning to ask for £150
million for development. This amount for Nigeria constituted 18% of the total allocation.
Given the size of Nigeria and its significance to the empire, that amount was not too big.
As the S of S rightly pointed out to him in justification of the sum, Nigeria represented a
third of the colonial empire. The S of S also agreed that an application should be made
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
109!Minutes

of a meeting held at the Colonial Office, 20 October 1944, TNA: CO 583/271/4. !

110!Frederick!Pedler!worked!in!the!finance!department!of!the!Colonial!Office!at!the!time!of!these!

negotiations!on!the!Nigerian!plan.!Before!this!current!position,!he!was!British!Economic!
Representative!in!Dakar,!Senegal.!!

!

51!

!

for the provision of £735,000 to cover the initial preparations in anticipation of the main
schemes. The meeting also discussed the proposed appointment of a development
commission. The reason given for the necessity of the commission was that it would
secure continuity of policy. It was argued, “The existence of a statutory body would
ensure that changes in policy were not lightly made with every change in tenure of the
higher offices of Government. The Commission would also be able to watch over the
transition of policy into action and to ensure that continuity was also maintained in spite
of changes at lower levels. There would be the added advantage that a commission would
possess

the

standing

and

authority

necessary

for

dealing

with

the

Chief

Commissioners.”111
In the event, the S of S expressed doubts about the appointment of a statutory
board. He did not find the continuity argument convincing. The members of the
commission would be as subject to change as individual government officials. He also
had questions about the relationship between this commission and the chief
commissioners. This was because recent constitutional proposals from Nigeria favored
regional decentralization. The commission proposed would actually create centralization
and not decentralization, thereby causing bureaucratic bottleneck. He also argued that
creating such a board would lead to Nigerians clamoring for unofficial representation and
this would be impossible to meet because it was believed at the time that no Nigerian was
capable of seeing the interest of Nigeria as a whole. Sir George Gater112 also thought that
creating such a commission outside of the secretariat would create administrative
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difficulties. The reason he gave was that it was impossible to separate new development
from existing services. It was decided at this meeting that a decision should not be made
but that the issue should be further discussed with Governor Richards. The final point of
discussion concerned the appointment of development officers. It was agreed that they
should be appointed on a short-term basis without any promise of permanent appointment
to the administrative service. 113 Though the local administrators knew better the
circumstances which they operated under, the metropolitan government was attempting
to make the decisions. It is however important that they deferred to the arrival of the
governor in London for some decisions to be made. In this way, they wanted to take into
consideration the governor’s own viewpoint. This was in line with the earlier decision to
bridge the gap between metropole and colonies.
With the arrival of Governor Richards in London, a meeting was held on 6
November 1944, to discuss Nigeria’s preliminary development plan. The S of S was
pleased with the preliminary development proposal from Nigeria and he “fully approved
the general design of the Nigerian scheme which he thought was excellent. It was much
better to prepare a comprehensive framework on those lines within which detailed
schemes could be co-ordinated subsequently than to continue to submit un-correlated
small-scale schemes for individual projects.” 114 The development plan that Nigeria
submitted and was being discussed, required an assistance of £55 million to cover the
fifteen-year period. When it was concluded that the CD&W Act would only cover a tenyear period, the financial cost of the plan was readjusted after discussions between the
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CO and Smith. The S of S gave a general approval for the sum of £27 million from the
CD&W vote. Nigeria was to finance a further £8 million through loans. The loans were
expected to cover projects that would become self-supporting. The £27 million approved
also included the annual charges on the loans covering the initial five years. The projects
for which a total of £35 million was approved were projects that were to be financed
through the CO. Nigeria was also to make a substantial contribution to the development
of the colony through its own funds. Nigeria was to finance development in the areas of
ports and marine, inland water transportation, postal service, police, labor, part of the
geological survey, some administrative service, housing of African staff, pensions of
African staff, accounting, audit and African clerical services needed for the program.115
The goal was that at the end of the ten-year period, Nigeria would be in a position to
continue to fund the recurring commitments that the development program created.
Though the S of S gave an approval of the general outline of the Nigerian plan,
Governor Richards wanted more. He sought the approval for the publication of the
general scheme as soon as it was possible. The S of S agreed with him and said it was
important for this to be done as soon as possible because he considered the Nigerian plan
“as a model for comprehensive outline development schemes.”116 The S of S, however,
told the governor that approval couldn’t be granted at the present time because he had not
settled with the chancellor of the exchequer on the amount that would be made available
in the CD&W Act. He also left open the possibility that the Nigerian plan could be scaled
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down if the act did not make available the sums he had envisaged. It is important to note
that all these discussions were taking place prior to the 1945 Act. The S of S was
planning to ask for £150 million for development in the colonies for ten years. As we will
see shortly, he could not secure that amount from the Treasury.
The question of a statutory commission that would oversee development in
Nigeria was also a topic of discussion at the meeting with the governor. In the October
meeting, a decision was put off awaiting the governor’s arrival in London. Prior to the
meeting, the governor discussed the matter with Gater, who expressed doubts about the
value of such a commission given the administrative difficulties it may cause, but who
had also left open the possibility of a coordinating machinery that would oversee the
schemes. Governor Richards came to an understanding with Gater at the 6th November
meeting in the S of S’s room that he was prepared to drop the idea of a statutory
development commission. What he would rather have asked for was that there should be
a development secretary who should be in charge of the whole development program and
also a central coordinating committee that would have as its chairman the development
secretary.117 All of this was new to both London and Nigeria, but it is also obvious that
the governor and his officials had been thinking about this for awhile and were looking
for an efficient way of carrying out development in the colony. The governor wanted a
statutory board and the CO officials were concerned about the bureaucratic bottlenecks it
may cause because Nigeria’s constitutional development at this time had favored
decentralization. At the same time, it was important to have a coordinating machinery in
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place so that the plans were not disparate and there was unnecessary duplication and
wastage. Though the governor did not get his statutory board, which would have been
bestowed, with more authority, he was willing to accept a committee with a lot of
authority vested in Smith, his development secretary and trusted ally.
African Labor and the Color Line
One of the major components of the Nigerian development plan was the
appointment of development officers. Governor Richards saw them as an essential part of
the program. Smith thought that without them, it would be impossible to carry out
development work in the provinces. While there were provincial development
committees already in existence, the governor felt that there was need for development
officers whose job it was to work out the plans and also to see to their execution. These
officers, who were to be appointed on a temporary basis, were to fill in the gap that the
administrative staff could not. As envisioned by the Nigerian colonial state, they had
principally four functions: 1. To relieve administrative and technical staff of their routine
duties; 2. To help with fieldwork in connection to local planning and execution of
development schemes; 3. To supervise the execution of development schemes under
directions of the local administration or technical officers; 4. To train African staff in the
duties of development officers.118 The need for these development officers arose because
in the post-war period, there was going to be a dearth of manpower in Nigeria. In a
memo, the Nigerian colonial government argued thus for the need for development
officers:
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
118!Ibid.!

!

56!

!

…the administration lacks the resources in manpower under present conditions
to deal with the vast amount of subordinate work, both in planning and the
execution of plans, which will be required. It is already over twenty-five per
cent down on its established strength and will be further heavily depleted at the
end of the war when large numbers of officers are due to retire.…It is clear
therefore that it will take a considerable time after the war to bring the
administration up to its necessary strength, even without taking into account any
extra requirements for the development programme. It follows that, if adequate
staff is to be provided in the immediate post-war period for the subordinate
work on the planning and execution of development schemes, it will be
necessary to resort to some other method of recruitment for the administrative
service on a permanent basis.119
It was easier to fill the temporary positions of development officers than it was to
fill the positions of administrative and technical staff. The net was to be cast wide to
recruit the 100 development officers that were needed. Given that the war had not ended,
Nigeria believed that it was going to be impossible to recruit these men immediately.
However, they needed to recruit about 35 men immediately and they looked to the United
Kingdom to recruit these men. There was a general agreement between the CO and the
Nigerian officials on Nigeria’s request for development officers. The only area of
concern was the title of “development officer” which they agreed that it was not an ideal
one, yet they had not been able to come up with another title that may be attractive
enough for good men to be encouraged to apply for the position.120 The qualifications for
a development officer were set very low. What the Nigerian government was looking for
in development officers were men of “good background and intelligence, with initiative,
honesty and the ability to follow single instructions.”121 In Smith’s earlier memorandum
to the CO, he had given the qualifications outlined for a development officer as “a man of
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good background, preferably with a liking for a country life, but not necessarily
possessing the full academic qualifications which would be required for permanent
appointment.”122 It is important to note that Africans were not under consideration for the
position of development officers. Though the qualifications were low, Africans were not
a major consideration. This was acknowledged in the memorandum thus: “This work
should properly be very largely entrusted to Africans, but at present there are exceedingly
few suitably qualified Africans available.”123 Were there really too few Africans who
could meet these basic qualifications? The designed compensation and benefits package
clearly had the Europeans in mind. The answer lies in the pervasive racial color bar that
was indicative of the colonial state. Many of the Europeans who were about to be
recruited into this cadre of service also lacked the prerequisite qualifications. There was
an agreement by the CO that Nigeria should cast the net as wide as possible and that the
development officers recruited should be of a variety of types. The intention was that
some of these officers would be absorbed into the administrative service, and the
government was willing to provide them the financial assistance they needed in order to
obtain the academic qualifications for administrative service.124
This was a choice that was not given to the Nigerians. Nigerians with a basic
education could have been recruited and trained to obtain the qualifications necessary for
service. However, the plan was that the European development officers would teach the
Africans the duties of development officers and then eventually hand over responsibilities
to them at the end of their ten-year temporary appointment. Given how low the criteria
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was for those to be appointed development officers, one would think that there were
many Africans who were qualified for the positions from the start. The goal was to recruit
one hundred development officers and because of the war, they believed it would be hard
to find enough people and they wanted 35 people at the beginning of the plan’s
implementation. It is inconceivable that, in 1945, Nigeria did not have one hundred
people or even 35 who were from good backgrounds, intelligent, could take initiative,
were honest and were able to follow a single instruction. The job of a development
officer did not require any advanced degrees. By the early 1920s, there were many
Nigerians who had certificates from colleges and were teaching or engaged in other
occupations. The idea of the British officials was also to bring in development officers
from the rank of those who had served during the war with the West African troops. The
British officials did not see fit to recruit some of the Nigerian troops who had fought
alongside the British during the war and demonstrated their patriotism through their
willingness to die in battle. Some of these returning troops would have been the most
ideal candidates for the job of development officers. Yet, no serious debate or
consideration was given to this fact. That the British officials in Nigeria opted for
Europeans was not because of the dearth of suitable candidates for the position of
development officers in Nigeria. It was, rather, part of a racial ideology that claimed that
the African was incapable of the most basic tasks such as following a single instruction.
The European, who was probably not as educated or as intelligent as the African, was
soon to be given the job in which part of his duties would be to train the African in the
most basic tasks which the African could carry out without any education or assistance by
the European.
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The systemic racism that was inherent in the colonial state created a paradox for
colonial development. While the development plans encompassed some ideas that could
have potentially done a lot of good for the colonies, the racial limitations of colonial rule
incapacitated these plans and hindered them from becoming successful. By limiting and
under-utilizing human capital, the colonial state was invariably undercutting the
fundamental key to sustainable development. In light of the historical trajectory at this
time, the decolonization movement that was in its early years and Britain’s desire to hold
onto the colonies, colonial development became a contradiction. The nexus of colonial
development was the empowerment of the people in the colonies to realize their full
potentials and that the colony be self-supporting. However, if the colonies achieved this
potential, there would be no need for the expert services of the colonial state. The
question then becomes, is it possible to have colonial development without selfdetermination? It was the attempt to maintain this balance that made the colonial state to
limit and restrict the development of the local human resources.
Development and Insufficient Financial Resources
The meetings and negotiations that were held between the Nigerian officials and
the CO officials were in anticipation of the Cabinet accepting to increase the funds for
colonial development. In November of 1944 Colonel Oliver Stanley, the S of S,
submitted to the Cabinet a request for a substantial increase of funding for colonial
development. Stanley’s appeal to the Cabinet was couched in terms of the future of the
empire. In his view, the development of the colonies would determine Britain’s future in
regards to its empire. The colonies did not only contribute substantially to the war but
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they were now needed to help Britain’s economic recovery. This was the wrong time for
Britain to give up the colonies. The only way that Britain could sustain its empire was to
carry out the work of social and economic development. Stanley argued that the war had
two effects on colonial policy: “on the one hand it ‘increased our awareness of past
deficiencies in our administration,’ whilst on the other hand it greatly raised the
aspirations of the colonial populations for improved conditions, especially amongst those
who, ‘in one branch or another of the Armed Services, have been enjoying a standard of
living to which they have never been accustomed before [and] have travelled thousands
of miles from their villages.’”125 The Nigerian soldiers that were returning from the war
were going to face deplorable social conditions back home. Before the war, development
work had been mostly neglected in Nigeria and it was necessary that substantial
investments be made for the development of the colony. For example, during the
economic depression of the 1930s, the small numbers of staff were further cut and
services had been so reduced that they were “more or less care and maintenance basis,
with the result that development even at the slow pace which had become customary in
colonies was practically eliminated.”126 The second problem Stanley anticipated was one
that would play out in India in a major way. Most of the soldiers who had served in the
war returned home to the same conditions they had left and having enjoyed a better
standard of living in Europe while in service started agitating for freedom from British
rule. As Yasmin Khan writes, “Troops housed in one camp twenty miles from Delhi, ‘had
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become accustomed to a new standard of living in Germany….some had the conviction
that they were coming to a free India’ and others wrote to the newspapers.”127
Stanley’s proposal for extensive development in the colonies had a dual function:
the improvement of the lives of the colonial people and the maintenance of the empire.
To achieve this, he requested £150 million and an extension of the Colonial Development
and Welfare Act for another ten years, the period from 1946 to 1956. Given the economic
hardship that Britain was experiencing, the chancellor of exchequer would only agree on
£10 million a year, plus an additional £1 million a year for research, making the total sum
£110 million over ten years. Stanley argued that the colonies were worth the investment
and that Britain would benefit either directly or indirectly from colonial development in
the form of exports. He believed that Britain needed the Commonwealth and Empire if it
hoped to play a major role in world affairs. Winston Churchill, who was the Prime
Minister, agreed with the chancellor of exchequer and the Cabinet decided that Stanley
and the chancellor would have to work out a compromise. In December of 1944, they
reached a compromise of a total sum of £120 million over ten years with a maximum of
£17.5 million to be used in any one year.128 As Havinden and Meredith argue, there was
no rationale for Stanley requesting £150 million or accepting £120 million. Given the
economic circumstances Britain was in, these figures to the CO seemed like what Cabinet
would be willing to approve.129
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If Stanley wanted to carry out a strategic policy of social and economic
development of the colonies, as he seemed to portray in his statements, asking for £150
million and accepting £120 million even before the needs of the colonies were clearly
laid out was akin to putting the cart before the horse. The most sensible approach would
have been to let the colonies draw up their plans within broad financial guidelines and the
CO would study these plans, restructure them, cost them and then make a request to the
Cabinet for the money needed to execute the plans. The CO was requesting for only £150
million for the development of the colonies when the Nigerian plan alone amounted to
£55 million. At the end, Nigeria received the £23 million from the fund, but that was
insufficient compared to the social and economic needs of the colony. Due to limited
financial resources, development was concentrated mostly in the urban areas. The rural
areas were only marginally touched. The plan did not invest heavily in capital intensive
projects such as building a nationwide electricity grid. For example, for the first five
years of the plan, only £355,000 was earmarked for electricity. If you fast forward to the
1962 plan, Kainji Dam electrical project alone received an allocation of £68.1 million.
This one project was higher than the total cost of the 1945 development plan. Thus, in
addition to the racial biases and limitations of the colonial state, insufficient financial
resources were a major bottleneck to the success of this plan.
Bureaucratic Structures and the Exclusion of Africans
The agreement on the amount dedicated to colonial development by the Cabinet
paved the way toward the passage of the act by the parliament. The act was passed by
parliament in April of 1945. With the passage of this Act, the different British colonies
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were now asked to submit Ten-Year Development Plans. This was the first time there
was a more systematic long term planning on the development of the colonies. Nigeria
was way ahead of the other colonies in the drafting of its plan. In late 1944, it was agreed
that there was no need for the creation of a statutory development board in Nigeria.
However, on 6th March 1945, Governor Richards sent a letter to the S of S informing him
that he had set up a new bureaucratic agency, called the Central Development Board.
This board had the responsibility to consider, coordinate and recommend all development
projects to the government. He wrote, “Its main function will be to deal with overall
development and to be the clearing house for recommendations coming forward from the
Provincial Development Committees through the three Area Development Advisory
Committees in order to ensure that a reasonable series of priorities should be set up for
the whole of the territory.”130
Richards’ proposal for a development board was one that met with some
criticisms in London. D.J. Parkinson at the CO wrote a memorandum on March 13, 1945
in which he disagreed with the arguments advanced by Richards for the new board. In his
proposal, Richards explained that he used the title of “Board” for his new central
organization rather than the title of committee to distinguish this organization from the
area and provincial committees and also because of the function this group would play.
Parkinson disagreed with this reasoning. He wrote, “it appears from the explanation of
the Board’s functions, as described in the saving telegram, that they bear practically the
same relation to the Area Development Committees as the functions of the latter do to the
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Provincial Committees; and if the central organisation is in fact the topmost of a
hierarchy of committees, the introduction of a new name would seem more confusing
than otherwise.”131 The function of the new board was not different from that played by
the area development committees. It would have been more appropriate to retain the title
of committee since people were already familiar with the role played by the area
development committees. The governor was attempting to grant this new organization the
kind of authority that the committees did not have.
Parkinson’s case against this new board was not at all altruistic. He argued that by
publicizing the names of this new board, there would be an immediate demand for
African unofficial representation. Membership on this board, as envisioned by the
governor, was not to include Africans. The governor’s reasoning was that there were no
Africans capable of viewing Nigerian interests as a whole. This argument was an insult to
the Africans because it reduced them to tribalists who could not think in their own
national interest. This argument would prove itself erroneous when later on the different
regions of the country came together and fought to end colonial rule in Nigeria.
Parkinson was not convinced of the governor’s rationale for excluding the Africans.
While he conceded that the argument might be true, it was not sellable for several
reasons. First, two Nigerians were already on the Executive Council of Nigeria, on
whose advice the governor legislated for Northern Nigeria. The second reason this may
not convince Africans was because supplemental expenditures in excess of the ordinary
estimates had to be passed by the Finance Committee of the Legislative Council that had
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African representation. He argued, “if it is possible to arrange for the unofficial element
in the Legislature to exercise control over the ordinary expenditure of the colony, it
should also be possible to arrange for the Legislature to exercise control over
development expenditure, which in the future is going to form a very considerable
portion of the colony’s budget.”132 Since the governor had already publicized the names
of the members of the board in connection with the statement on development, Parkinson
thought the damage had already been done but left open the possibility of further
discussion with the governor when he returned to London in the summer of 1945. This
memorandum was shared with O.G.R. Williams, Gerald Creasy, Sydney Caine and J.B.
Williams. O.G.R. Williams agreed with Parkinson that the damage was already done and
there was not much more to discuss. The others agreed also with him, and the board stood
as conceived by the governor.133 This is a case in which the governor arm-twisted the CO
to follow his bidding. By publishing the names of the board ahead of any consultation
with them, he forced them to accept his decision.
The creation of this new board ushered in a new bureaucratic structure, one that
was different from the structure in place since 1943. There was no longer a central
advisory committee. This committee was replaced by the area development advisory
committees. There were three of these committees and their task was to screen the
recommendations made by the provincial committees and to advise the chief
commissioners. The three committees were located in the three regions of the country:
the Western Region, the South-Eastern Region and the Northern Region. Governor
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Richards created the central development board, which was not much different from the
central advisory committee. The only difference was that Africans were excluded as
members of this committee, although the governor offered a different rationale. The
reason he gave for omitting Africans was that it would be difficult for the central
advisory committee to have regular meetings given that African representatives from all
parts of the country would be represented. It would take time for them to travel and be
present at these meetings. For the governor, this would render the work of the committee
ineffective because the committee may not have to meet as regularly as it should.
Parkinson disagreed with this reasoning. He said, “I do not see that it should be any more
difficult for an African unofficial to get down to Lagos than for the Chief
Commissioner.”134
Given that there was now one central development board that had the authority to
determine which development projects received funding and which ones were rejected, it
is worth asking who were the members who made up this new board? This board had the
development secretary as the chairman, the three chief commissioners of development,
the financial secretary and the director of public works. None of the six members of this
powerful board was a Nigerian. As stated earlier, the governor’s reasoning for excluding
Africans from this board was the difficulty of choosing Africans that could represent the
interest of the different parts of the country. In order to do that, it would mean Africans
from the Northern region would also have to be appointed to the board and because of the
distance, it would be difficult to summon them to meetings at short notice. The solution
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he proffered to address the question of African participation in the development planning
was to increase their presence at both the provincial level and district level. At this time,
the total membership of the provincial development committees was 467 and of these,
only 80 were Nigerians, who were non-official members. The reason for the small
number of Nigerian members was due to the fact that the committees were made up
mainly of official members and there were no senior African officials. Official members
were chosen because of “the necessity for having the technical advice which only these
Government officers are able to provide.”135
The argument for a few African members in the provincial development
committees is not a convincing one. By 1945, there were numerous Africans who had
acquired education in Europe and America and had returned to Nigeria. Examples were
men like Nnamdi Azikiwe who studied in the United States and returned to Nigeria in the
early 30s and was newspaper publisher and Herbert Macauley who had studied civil
engineering in England in the 1890s and had a brief stint working for the colonial state in
Lagos. The growing distaste of these two men with colonial rule and its exploitation of
Africans forced them to cofound the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons, a
nationalist movement that fought for Nigeria’s independence. Besides these western
educated elites, there were some Africans that were locally trained in different technical
skills and were also trained as teachers. A broad section of the African populace could
have been engaged in these development committees in order for them to represent the
interest of the local people. That the Africans were not involved in larger numbers on
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these committees shows how deeply engrained still was the colonial ideology of
European superiority. The lack of presence of Nigerians both on the area development
committees and on the central development board shows that despite Governor Richards
rhetoric that he was interested in more Nigerians being actively part of the development
planning, he did not want them to be able to make majority decisions on the projects that
they felt would be more beneficial to them. One may erroneously argue that the colonial
state should have made the determination on the projects since they were administering
and paying for them. This argument is not plausible because the projects were not a
handout from a generous “mother nation” to Nigeria. A substantial part of the projects
was paid for with Nigeria’s money and the loans that were subscribed for the projects
were collected in Nigeria’s name. Between £10-11 million was to be contributed to
development from Nigeria’s revenues and £16-17 million borrowed by Nigeria. The
CD&W fund was to account for £25 million of the expenditures for development. Given
that Nigeria was paying for a substantial part of the projects, a cross-section of Nigerian
people ranging from the western educated elites to teachers and peasant farmers should
have been given more seats in the development table to determine what projects they may
find the most beneficial to them. This point cannot be overemphasized because it is a
problem that continues to plague development planning both in Nigeria and other subSaharan African nations. Usually, it is the foreign nation that determines what projects it
believes the country needs in order to improve living conditions and the economy. These
projects usually require the recipient country to provide a percentage of the cost of the
project. In this way the country was made to pay for projects that were not of immediate
priority to it. Today, remnants of equipment can be found throughout rural Nigeria from
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the many abandoned schemes that were imposed upon the local people by outsiders who
believed the schemes were going to bring about development in these rural communities.
Approval and Funding of the Plan: Caine Vs. Nigeria
The Nigerian colonial bureaucracy set up by Governor Richards prepared the plan
that was submitted to London. In the initial discussions with the CO on the Nigerian plan,
the focus was on getting approval for the different projects that would become part of the
plan and also getting approval for the general framework of the Nigerian plan. It is
important to note that at this time, there was no single document that contained the whole
plan of development for Nigeria with all the different projects. There were several plans
that dealt with different departments such as health, agriculture, forestry, veterinary
services, roads, and so on. In July of 1945, the Nigerian plan received a general approval
from the CO. The letter of approval read, “We are in general agreement with the main
outlines of the revised plan, which provides for a total expenditure over the ten years
ending March, 1956, of about £56 million, of which total it is proposed that sums of the
order of £16 million should be found from Nigerian revenues, £17 million from the
proceeds of public loans, and £25 million from grants and loans under the Colonial
Development and Welfare vote.”136
Though a general approval was given, due to the requirements of the CD&W Act,
Nigeria still had to send to the CO for approval schemes that had received prior approval
for shorter periods and that now had to be extended for the ten-year period. Such schemes
from Nigeria fell under the plans for agriculture, veterinary, health, forestry and roads.
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The governor and the development secretary wanted to present the Nigerian plans to the
Nigerian Legislative Council in November of 1945. They wanted to present the different
plans in installments as “Sessional Papers” because they felt that waiting to present one
large volume containing all the different schemes might be indigestible to the members.
Since the plans had between 20 and 25 major schemes in them, their strategy was to issue
two or three plans confidentially each week. Smith was seeking for approval of the
pending major schemes and also permission to release the plans in installments.137 The
request to submit the schemes in installments was agreed by the officials at the CO. A
telegram was sent to Smith saying, “We entirely agree that descriptions of approved
schemes may be communicated to members of Legislative Council as they are ready and
not be kept back till full development plan has been finalised. We should be glad to have
up to 6 copies of each sessional paper as these are issued.”138 While Smith was given the
approval to present the plans as sessional papers, what he did not receive was approval
for the major schemes. Meanwhile, Governor Richards was on leave and G. C. Winteley
was appointed as the officer administering the government. In September, Winteley sent
a telegram to the CO requesting for the approval of all the schemes because they could
not draft the full ten-year plan without first having the approval of the schemes. His
argument was that the members needed to receive the full plan with the total financial
implications by the first week of November at the latest, if the members were not to
accuse the government of stampeding the council with financial issues.139
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In a meeting held on 24 September 1945 at the CO, the outstanding applications
for health, agriculture, forestry, veterinary service and roads were discussed at the request
of Winteley and Smith from Nigeria to have the schemes approved. Several points were
raised during the meeting. The applications that were submitted by Nigeria did not have
identifiable schemes. It was felt that by approving these applications, the CO was signing
away very large grants to Nigeria, creating a later difficulty of identifying which services
the money was being used for. The members present at the meeting felt that it was more
preferable to have grants go to specific projects. The five applications sought for a grant
of £7.5 million over ten years. In the agricultural application, for example, £750,000 was
allocated to “other charges.” Members present at the meeting had concerns about this.
Another issue raised was the payment of European staff by the CD&W grants and the
payment of African staff by Nigeria. At the end of the ten-year period, that was going to
create a problem when, suddenly, the Nigerian government would assume the payment of
these European staff. That would place severe stress on the Nigerian budget. Caine’s
opinion at the meeting was that CD&W grants toward the expansion of staff should be
given in the form of a percentage. The Nigerian budget assumes a percentage of the cost
while the CD&W grants assume the other part. Over the years, CD&W’s grant
percentage would be gradually reduced so that by the end of the ten year period, Nigeria
was paying for the entirety of the staff. In this way, the Nigerian budget would not
suddenly be hit by a heavy recurrent expenditure for staff. This procedure had already
been followed in a scheme that had been approved for Jamaica.140 A draft letter was
prepared to be sent to Smith informing him that the schemes would be framed on a
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percentage basis. The draft letter was first to be approved by others present at the meeting
and also shared with the Treasury for their views.141
Meanwhile, Governor Richards had returned to Nigeria and he sent a telegram to
the CO reiterating the urgency in approving the outstanding schemes. He wrote, “Unless
outstanding schemes can be disposed of at once, so that writing of draft full plan can
proceed immediately, there will be insufficient time for this draft to be sent to you for
approval and to be put in print by the first week in November, which I consider to be the
latest date for the circulation to members if the Legislative Council is to meet on 10th
December.”142
What neither the governor nor the development secretary were aware of was the
fact that there were discussions in the CO as late as September about changing the
procedure for funding the Nigerian plan. Given that Richards and Smith had discussed
extensively with the CO and had even revised the plans according to their requests, he
was anxiously expecting an approval so that he could present the plans before the
Legislative Council. The proposal on awarding the grant on a gradual percentage basis
was changing everything late in the game. Parkinson was very critical of this decision. He
felt that there wasn't enough time for Mr. Smith to recast and re-submit five of his most
important schemes. He had only one month before the date he was supposed to present
them to the members of the Legislative Council. He also argued that the agricultural plan
that drew much of the criticisms was first submitted on the 27th of June 1944 and was
fully discussed with the CO agricultural adviser. After further discussions with the
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development department at the CO and also the Treasury, it was revised and resubmitted
in July. The same was true of the forestry plan which was revised and re-submitted on 13
of July 1944 and the medical plan that was also revised and re-submitted. Parkinson felt
that Smith was expecting an approval with only minor modifications. Sending the draft
letter radically changing the way grants were going to be given for the development plans
was going to come to him as a rude shock. Parkinson found the arguments for funding on
a graduated percentage basis unconvincing. He pointed to the earlier approval of
development officers and preliminary expenditure on medical and health services which
had provided for an expansion of staff with funds entirely from the CD&W grants
without any objections. He also did not see any practical advantages for the graduated
percentage as the agricultural plan, for example, only called for a steady expansion of
staff combined with proportionate increase of expenditure on other charges. Parkinson
wrote,
We do not object either to the total expenditure proposed for agriculture, or to
the total amount to be provided from C.D. and W. schemes, or to the object on
which the money is to be spent. … Our objection is to the way in which it is
proposed to apply the C.D. and W. assistance. But even if the whole of the
expenditure was met from C. D. and W. Funds in the early years, the money
thereby saved to Nigeria would only have to be devoted to meeting the
increasing deficit in the later years, as the C. D. and W. assistance tapers off,
and at the end of the ten year period Nigeria would presumably be in exactly the
same position financially as if the assistance had been provided as originally
proposed.143
Parkinson recommended that Nigeria must be clearly advised on what they needed to do
and the advantages of the new proposal.
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Sir George Gater, while not disputing the wisdom of the new proposal, agreed
with Parkinson’s view that the new proposal was going to be a shock to Smith and may
evoke a tremendous outburst from both Smith and the governor. Like Parkinson, he
argued that the agricultural scheme was discussed with the agricultural adviser, Dr.
Tempany, and revised to his approval and full support. It was also discussed with the
representatives of both the Finance and Development Department and the Treasury and
no objections were raised. Given the process this went through, Smith would have
grounds for complaint. His suggestion was that the Nigerian plan should be accepted as it
stood with provisions for some additional safeguards as regards expenditures of money
from the CD&W fund.144 On 11 October 1945, the S of S sent a letter to Governor
Richards granting approval for the basic proposals for the outstanding schemes. He,
however, informed him that modifications have been made to the precise form in which
the assistance was to be given and also that there would be variations in the distribution
of the funds between different services and over different years. Caine was to
communicate the details of these modifications to Smith.145
On the 10th of October 1945, Caine sent a letter to Smith informing him in detail
of the procedural changes that were to be adopted in regards to the Nigerian plans. His
letter anticipated the reaction that might come from Smith. From the outset, he informed
Smith that although they had talked about the development plans before, they had to take
another careful look at the applications. The reason for this, he wrote, was because of the
magnitude of Nigeria’s development plans in relation to those of the other colonies.
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Given the scale of Nigeria’s plans, it was only prudent that the details of the schemes
should be looked at carefully. Two major applications that Caine picked on were
agriculture and forestry. These two had something in common. In both these areas, all the
grants requested from the CD&W funds were for emoluments and recurrent charges in
connection to the expansion of staff. While Caine believed that the funds requested for
these applications were acceptable, he did not think that the method proposed for the use
of these funds was the right one. He found two main difficulties with this. The first was
that this amounted to handing a blank check to Nigeria, and this would not be a
fulfillment of their responsibility to Parliament. The second difficulty he had was with
Nigeria suddenly assuming these financial responsibilities at the end of the ten years
when CD&W grants would have run out. He believed that this would create great
difficulties then. To resolve these two difficulties, Caine suggested two solutions:
The first is that C.D. & W. grants towards recurrent charges in these two
applications (agriculture and forestry) ought, as far as practicable taper off
towards the end of the ten year period, so that the transference of the residual is
less burdensome. (This need not affect the total assistance, but only its
distribution in time). The second is that the C. D. & W. assistance might be
given not to cover the full cost of the salaries and incidental charges for certain
classes of new employees, but to cover a proportion, of the cost of all the new
staff required for the development of these departments.146
Caine went on to suggest to Smith that these two schemes, together with all new
applications for grants that involve the expansion of staff be amended so that the grants
would only go toward a percentage of the staff salary while the rest would be assumed by
the colonial state. The percentage should be graduated over the ten years period with it
peaking in the middle years and then beginning to drop toward the tenth year. At the end
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of the tenth year, Nigerian revenues should be paying fully for the staff. The amount of
assistance agreed with Smith was not changing, what was changing was the procedure on
how this assistance was going to be given.
While Caine’s argument may sound logical, what it did not take into
consideration was the economic power that came from investing such large sums in
agricultural development at the initial period. Caine’s main issue was distinguishing
between “productive” and “recurrent” costs. He did not think that CD&W funds should
pay for recurrent costs, because this was unsustainable and thus would create dependency
on London. He wanted the colonial state to cover such costs. The colonial government
was not attempting to shift recurrent costs to London. It wanted to front load resources
and build up its agricultural extension services and hire colonial personnel to help
stimulate agricultural production and generate the revenues that would be needed by the
state to continue and expand development for many years. Expanding agricultural staff
was a pathway to expanding agricultural production. At this time, the main revenue of
Nigeria came from agricultural production. Unlike many other colonial regions, Nigeria
did not have large-scale industrial agricultural production. It was mainly peasant
agriculture. This system, by its very nature, required plenty of agricultural staff if
production was to increase. This is because you need extension staff who would train the
rural people on how to expand production through the use of fertilizers, improved
varieties and irrigation. What Nigeria was trying to do was to front load resources. The
expansion of staff had the potential to expand production which would have placed
Nigeria at a better economic position to absorb the staff at the end of the tenth year
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without placing undue burden on Nigeria’s budget. This was one of the strengths of this
plan.
African Agency
Though Africans were not well represented in the decision making process with
regards to this development plan, they still shaped this plan through the pressure that they
exerted on the colonial state. Smith responded to Caine five days later, arguing that
radical changes to the way assistance is to be provided would create difficulties. He
wrote, “We have gone on the principle of maximum assistance in the earlier stages,
expecting that taxability of the people would increase as the plan develops.”147 The
expansion of production by the peasants meant more revenue from the government
through taxes. Nigeria was not then in a financial position to provide the kind of
assistance that Caine was requiring of them. By adopting Caine’s position, Nigeria had to
borrow more money because it could not further tax the people. To borrow more money,
she would have to look to London and, because of the post-war economic crisis and the
pressure on the Sterling, it was highly discouraged to borrow in London. Smith stated that
he faced a political problem, which Caine may not have understood. He had to deal with
the African unofficial members of the Legislative Council as well as the African press
that was very critical of the moves made by the colonial government. In his letter to
Caine, Smith informed him of some of the local political factors he had to deal with. He
wrote:
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the local press is already stating that the development plan is merely a means of
manipulated use for money intended for the benefit of Dependencies to find
jobs for more Europeans. As in the early stages, we shall have to use many
Europeans to implement the plan until the training of Africans has been suitably
increased, you will appreciate the difficulties I shall have in introducing the plan
and getting it passed if we have to deal in vague terms. In fact, we may very
easily lose the present confidence of the Council completely in such
circumstances, as Unofficial Members will be heavily bombarded by the press
on the racial aspects, which are now becoming very pronounced.148
It was in the interest of the Nigerian colonial state to be seen rapidly developing
the colony. There is no doubt post-war development was a genuine attempt to develop the
colonies, though not completely altruistic. At this time, it was even difficult to find
technical officers such as irrigation engineers, from Britain. The colonial officials were
looking to find technical officers and development officers from Canada. What is also
true is that Africans were not given the opportunity to receive the kind of training that
they needed to assume the positions that they were now attempting to fill. Though
Africans were not involved in the negotiations between the CO and the colonial state,
their opinions were taken into consideration and the state had to appear to be acting in the
interest of Africa. Africans trained at the Yaba College of Technology were provided a
secondary education that did not qualify them to assume these special opportunities. That
was an opportunity that was missed. The racial undertones in the press were a reaction to
the many years of colonial rule in which Africans were not given an opportunity to take
leadership in their own destiny. Nigerians agitated for more control through trade
unionism and the national press such as the West African Pilot. The Trade Union
Congress of Nigeria (TUC) founded in 1943 published a quarterly bulletin called The
Nigerian Worker, and it demanded for the representation of labor unions in the
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Legislative Council. In an attempt to capture the plight of the Nigerian worker and
convert it to positive action, the TUC called for a general strike in 1945.
This strike, which had a strong support from the NCNC linked the nationalists
struggle with the labor movement.149 The strike created grave doubts in many Nigerians
if the intentions behind its economic plans were well-meaning. Falola states that many
“derided the Ten-Year Plan as a bourgeois document. … The plan was interpreted as a
design to exploit Nigerians, an afterthought to justify the transfer of wealth out of the
country, and admission of guilt that the people had been cheated. In their own campaigns
for attention, the politicians among the intelligentsia warned the masses not to expect any
positive outcome from the plan.”150 This was the reality that Smith and Richards faced in
Nigeria. The trade unions and the nationalist movements such as the NCNC, the Nigerian
Youth Movement and the Zikist movement were becoming more involved in the public
sphere and while they embraced the idea of development, they tried to use it to demand
for rights.151 As one Nigerian, J. K. Ladipo, the managing director of a mill at the time,
wrote to the Chief Secretary of Government (CSG): “In the days of our forefathers the
farmer was the life of the country, to-day he is a poor man, and the clerk, who draws his
salary from his sweat, is the richer and better man comparatively speaking. And yet often
times you have the courage to ask us to ‘go back to the land’. Undoubtedly in order to
become poor. … as far as I can see it is no business of the Secretariat if Nigeria is in debt,
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as long as the officials can be paid out of loans from the outside world and they can retire
when the time is due leaving us, the Nigerians to foot the bills afterwards.”152
This was the sense of frustration that the Africans felt and the one the Nigerian
officials had to deal with. Flooding Nigeria with so-called experts that were going to be
paid with Nigerian revenues or loans borrowed in the name of the government of the
colony was a hard sale. The British government committing the money ahead to pay for
the expansion of staff would show their commitment to developing the colony. It also
would quell the criticism that development in the colony was only a jobs program for
Europeans paid for with Nigerian revenues. This is because Nigerian tax payers would be
footing the bill. Smith concluded his letter to Caine in very strong terms. He wrote, “In
these circumstances, and after all the discussions which have taken place, I trust that you
will not show such lack of confidence in local administration of development as to
remove local discretion, which is essential to its satisfactory and proper implementation.
Any vagueness on your part will be a serious hindrance, and it is obvious that we shall
have to take the Council and Local Administrations fully into our confidence to get the
plan approved and to ensure that it is properly put into effect.”153
Caine responded assuring Smith that there was no lack of confidence in the local
administration. London’s concern was not to tie Nigeria down on a very rigid plan of
development when they cannot foresee future circumstances. He offered Smith language
to present to the Legislative Council. He wrote, “Indeed, I think it might help in
presentation to council if you took the line that Government is not asking the Legislature
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to commit itself at once to all details over a long period ahead but is submitting a general
plan on which the Council can give a broad approval now while leaving scope for all
concerned, including the Council itself, to suggest modifications as parts of the plan
come up for approval in precise form.”154 Caine’s plan was not more flexible than the
Nigerian plan. In fact, the Nigerian plan was more flexible. The biggest problem Caine
had was that by approving the Nigerian plans without having the details of expenditures
for every scheme, it amounted to giving Nigeria a blank check. The officials in Nigeria,
on the other hand, wanted the flexibility by not tying themselves to too much specifics on
the expenditures of the schemes. Caine was undercutting his own argument by claiming
flexibility. At the heart of this was a dispute on who controls the development planning
process. This was basically a struggle between the colonial state and the CO.
The Rift Between Colonial Office and Nigeria
The disagreement between Caine and Smith opened a rift between the CO and
Nigeria. This was not surprising as some in the CO had warned that Smith and Richards
may not take the changes kindly. In light of the correspondences between Caine and
Smith, Richards decided to hold off releasing the plan to the Legislative Council until he
was able to reach an agreement with Caine. He offered some revisions to the Nigerian
plan to meet the demands of Caine. For example, in the last four years of the plan, the
CD&W vote would only provide for 4/5, 3/5, 2/5 and 1/5 of the recurrent charges in
agriculture, veterinary, forestry and health schemes. The governor, however, raised an
important problem that may arise with regards to staff. The fear was that he might have a
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problem engaging good staff for only a short term. He needed assurance from the S of S
that assistance would continue beyond five years so that staff would be aware of
reasonable prospects for ten years employment. Another area of much difficulty was in
the recruitment of engineers. Given the scarcity of engineers, it was important to enter
into as long as possible agreements with them. Governor Richards then demanded
approval of his requests.155
In the CO, there were discussions about the Nigerian plans and J. B. Williams
even wondered if Richards’ conception of development planning was the same as that of
the CO. He disagreed with the approach Nigeria was taking as regards to their
applications. He was critical of the governor’s conception of development planning. He
wrote, “Our own conception has been that colonies should draw up a broad overall plan
of development which should be considered by the Secretary of State’s advisers and
approved with or without modifications and then detailed schemes covering particular
pieces or work should be submitted within the plan and approved separately.”156 The
governor and Smith had a different conception. Though they had received a general
approval for a comprehensive plan from Nigeria, what the governor wanted to do was to
place individual schemes before the Legislative Council. This was where the
disagreement lay. In Williams’ view, individual schemes with their expenditures still had
to be approved by the CO, but the governor wanted a blanket approval covering the
schemes for which the expenditures had not been discussed and approved by the CO.
Williams found it inappropriate to grant the governor approval to spend £23 million in
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ten years without showing the specific schemes and their costing. This meant that neither
the governor nor the development secretary would need any more authority from either
the S of S or the Legislative Council to spend the money for the next ten years. He
doubted if this procedure of giving the governor unfettered access to Nigeria’s allocation
was in accordance with the conditions that were laid down by the CD&W Act. That act,
he wrote, “lays down that the authority for expenditure is that the Secretary of State
should make schemes with the concurrence of the Lords Commissioners of the
Treasury.”157
Williams also responded to both the criticism of Parkinson and Gater that these
schemes had been discussed and revised with the governor and Smith. He wrote, “The
understanding in my mind then was that we were being asked to approve merely the
comprehensive plan as a whole and that individual schemes could be gone into on their
merits and if necessary remodeled, nor was it clear that there was any particular urgency
to approve schemes covering the whole of the ten years. It was certainly not clear to me
at that time that the Nigerian Government wished to lay schemes in cut and dried form
before the Legislative Council.”158 While being sympathetic with the views raised by
Williams, Caine believed that not giving an approval in principle to the Nigerian plan
meant going back on their word. He disagreed with Williams that the procedure to be
followed by Nigeria would be outside of the scope of the Act. Another important point
made by Caine was that they were still experimenting with planning. He wrote, “we must
recognize that we are still feeling our way towards the kind of procedure which will
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enable due account to be taken of long-term planning without holding off all action until
the ideal plan is produced, which may take years.”159 Frank Stockdale160 agreed with
Caine that the Nigerian plans had gone too far to attempt to begin a new procedure.161
The point raised by Caine about those involved feeling their way toward the appropriate
kind of procedure is an important one when looking at development planning in this time
period. No one had the crystal ball on how to develop the colonies. Though some form of
development had taken place in the empire for years, this was the first attempt at longterm development planning. Those who were fashioning these policies were not
themselves experts with many years of experience in development planning. They
themselves were learning on the job, attempting to respond to development problems in
the colonies.
In the chapter, I have focused on the conversations that went on concerning the
Nigerian plans in order to shed light on the process of decision-making. At the end of the
day, the individuals involved at the CO could not decide on how to respond to the
governor of Nigeria. In one sense, they wanted to approve in principle the schemes that
were already discussed with the governor and the development secretary of Nigeria. On
the other, they did not want to give Nigeria authority to spend CD&W funds on these
schemes without detailed examination and approval of such schemes by the S of S. The S
of S wanted schemes emanating from the colonies to be fully examined and vetted by
London. The approval sought by Nigeria did not allow that because the governor did not
have full details on the schemes in question. Sydney Caine’s view was that an urgent
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meeting needed to be held to resolve the problem. The problem this meeting sought to
resolve was whether the previous correspondence with Nigeria constituted a commitment
that could not be broken or whether “it is now desired to re-examine the whole position,
in which case, of course, a suitable explanation would have to be given to the Governor
with the direct authority of the Secretary of State.”162
This meant, the decision was moving from the civil servants to the politicians and
there was a new Labour government in power and a new S of S that were very supportive
of development and wanted it to happen rapidly. At this time, Arthur Creech Jones was
the Parliamentary Undersecretary of State for the Colonies and George Henry Hall was
the S of S. When Creech Jones discussed the matter with the officials concerned at the
CO and with the S of S, he came to the conclusion that the previous S of S, Oliver
Stanley, had already made a commitment to Nigeria and the Nigerian plans were drafted
based on that commitment. It was the decision that the Nigerian plans should be approved
in principle. Based on this, a telegram was to be sent to Nigeria informing the governor
that the S of S had approved in principle assistance toward the big schemes in question.
He was also to be informed of the CO’s flexibility in reviewing the annual estimates of
the schemes and modifying them if necessary, based on the circumstances of the time.
Creech Jones felt that there was need for adequate technical advice and this was to be
emphasized in the telegram to be sent to Nigeria.163
As a result, the S of S wrote to Governor Richards on 23 November 1945
informing him that he was prepared to approve assistance in principle to the schemes. He
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insisted that the approval was based on the condition that annual estimates must be
presented and he reserved the authority to review the schemes and modify them if so
needed. This, he argued, would allow for flexibility. He wanted Richards to make clear to
the Legislative Council the fact that he reserved the right to modify the approved schemes
after annual reviews. He also insisted on the importance of using adequate expert advice
on all schemes in which experts were not already available. In response to Richards
concern about development officers, the S of S said, “The fact that scheme has not been
approved for whole period of their service should surely cause no more uncertainty in
minds of officers concerned than fact that funds for salaries of ordinary Colonial
Government employees are voted annually and not for a whole period of their careers.”164
Agreement was reached between Nigeria and London and the governor was ready to
present Nigeria’s development plan to the Legislative Council.
On 8 December 1945, Governor Richards sent a confidential letter to the S of S
informing him that that he would be placing the Ten Year Plan of Development and
Welfare before the Legislative Council on the 12th or 13th of December. Together with his
letter were six copies of the plan. The copies of the plan included were meant for
distribution to the London press such as the Times. A vote was not intended to be carried
by the Legislative Council on the plan. The intention was for a motion to be taken to refer
the plan to a select committee that consisted of both unofficial members of the
Legislative Council and a few official members that were directly concerned. The select
committee had the task of considering the proposals in detail when they sat in January of
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1946. Together with the plans sent to the S of S was a summary of the plan that was to be
distributed to both the local press and the international press. This one page summary
mentioned broadly the different schemes that would be carried out in the first paragraph.
The second paragraph mentioned that a suggestion had been made that a board be
established for the purpose of providing the means of financing approved schemes of
local development. The last paragraph discussed the cost of the plan. The plan was
estimated at “£55,000,000, of which £23,000,000 will be provided under the Colonial
Development and Welfare Act, £16,000,000 to £17,000,000 will be raised by loans, and
the remainder progressively found from Nigerian Revenues.”165
The plan was presented before the Legislative Council on the 13 December 1945.
A resolution was unanimously adopted by the members of the Council thanking His
Majesty’s Government for the generous contribution of £23,000,000 for the development
of Nigeria. The resolution read, “That this council accords its deep sense of appreciation
for the very generous allocation to Nigeria of £23,000,000 from the money provided
under the Colonial Development and Welfare Act and requests that His Excellency the
Governor should convey to H.M. Government and the people of the United Kingdom,
through the Secretary of State, the (?gratification) and thanks of this Council, as
representing the people of Nigeria, for this most generous and important contribution to
the development of this country.”166
The governor sent the resolution as a telegram immediately to the S of S. When
you study this plan in question in more detail, however, there are three things that are
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conspicuously missing from the plan. The plan did not include agriculture, veterinary,
forestry and medical schemes. The reason for the absence of these schemes was because
they had not received full approval. They had only been approved in principle. The plan
only included schemes that had been approved fully by the CO. The reason the plans had
not received full approval was because they were not ready. The next chapter will shed
light on why the agriculture plan was not ready.
On 24 December 1945, Smith sent to the CO estimates of those schemes that had
not received full approval. Of particular interest to this research was the agricultural
scheme. The proposal called for the establishment of a 250-acre experimental farm in
Yola, Adamawa province. This farm would be used to test local and introduced crops
such as cereals and roots. A small number of animals were also to be kept there for draft
purposes. Another experimental farm was to be established in Maidugari. This farm was
to be about 300 acres. The goal here was to experiment with dato palms with the view of
introducing them in the Bornu province. These two farms were to be the headquarters of
“touring Agricultural officers for the districts concerned who will be able to carry out
further experimental and expansion work in the outlying area based upon the results
obtained on these two farms.” 167 Part of the proposal was also to experiment with
livestock such as cattle and poultry.
Some of the agricultural schemes that were to be introduced in the northern region
of Nigeria required a good drainage and irrigation system. The problem at this time was
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finding an irrigation engineer to bring to Nigeria. The proposal called for the appointment
of an irrigation engineer with wide experience who would tour Nigeria, training special
officers on the extension of irrigation and drainage work. It was proposed that £10,000 be
allocated for this work. This would include the salary and buildings. Given the
topography and geography of Nigeria, it is surprising that the plan only called for one
irrigation engineer. Any serious agricultural scheme in Nigeria would require a lot of
irrigation and drainage work. Nigeria has two seasons: the raining and dry season. During
the dry season, the soil becomes very hard as a result of lack of water. In order to plant
crops, you have to be able to channel water to the property. During the raining season,
some parts of Nigeria are prone to floods. The rivers overflow and wash away the crops.
The water around farmlands has to be channeled properly to avoid the farms being
flooded. The irrigation engineer that the proposal suggested was not to be brought in on a
full time basis. He was to do one or two tours of duty training others. The writers of the
proposal were overly optimistic that a few days of an engineer in a location would be
enough to train the local officers on all they would need to know about irrigation and
drainage.168
Though Smith had submitted the estimates to Williams at the CO on the 24th of
March, the four plans were not yet officially submitted to the S of S by the governor. On
the 31st of December, Governor Richards submitted them officially to the S of S. He
wanted an approval before the estimates were to be presented to the Legislative Council
in February of 1946. The estimates only covered the period of 1946/1947. In these
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estimates, forestry received £18,140; agriculture £61,040; veterinary £48,050 and
medical and health services £102,610.169 Given the economic importance of agriculture
to Nigeria, one would have expected that agriculture would receive the greatest
allocation. In a sense, there was a financial bias toward agriculture. Many reasons
account for this. Most of agricultural cash crops from Nigeria were not produced on big
commercial farms. Peasants cultivated them. In fact, at this time, there were no large
colonial agricultural schemes. Most agricultural schemes were mainly for research and
experimentation. The second point to consider is also that the CD&W Act did not only
emphasize economic benefits but also the welfare of the people. Medical services at this
time remained very scarce and the mortality rates were high. It was important to commit
more resources to combat diseases and to provide medical services.
On 25 February 1946, the CO sent a letter to the Treasury including the estimates
of the Nigerian plan and informing them of the general approval in principle of the
Nigerian plan.170 The CO was willing to have further meetings with the Treasury on the
plan. Three days letter, the CO again wrote to the Treasury requesting a general approval
of the Nigerian estimates to enable the governor to have this information before the
opening of the Legislative Council in Nigeria on 11th March. 171 The morning of this
second letter, Serpell and Marnham had talked briefly about the Nigerian plan as
Marnham references the conversation in the letter. Approval in principle was given by the
Treasury while it continued throughout 1946 to work with the CO on modifications to the
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Nigerian schemes.172 On 9 March 1946, the S of S granted approval of the estimates and
informed the governor that he may have to deal with some details later, particularly
certain salaries. 173 Richards did not find any problem with later changes after the
Legislative Council had approved estimates. He pledged that these could always be
carried out by administrative control of expenditure.174
While the estimates presented by Governor Richards were under consideration by
the CO, the Nigerian Legislative Council approved the “Ten Year Plan of Development
and Welfare for Nigeria” that had been presented to it in December of 1945 and referred
to the select committee. This committee met in January and presented their report to the
Legislative Council on 7 February 1946 and the council unanimously accepted the report.
The resolution read,
Be it resolved: That this council adopts the Report of the Select
Committee appointed to consider the Ten-Year Plan of Development and
Welfare for Nigeria set out in Sessional Paper No. 24 of 1945 and
approved the Plan as amended by the Select Committee and recommends
its acceptance as the general development policy of the Government of
Nigeria for the next ten years, subject to periodic review of details in the
light of experience and the inclusion of such additional schemes as may
prove to be necessary as the result of unforeseen circumstances.175
The last part of the resolution provided the flexibility that the S of S needed in order to
make adjustments to the plan. Richards was happy with the fact that all the unofficial
members commented on the desirability of the plan. The positive response of the
unofficial members was important to the governor because he was afraid these members
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would be very critical of the plan and also incite the Nigerian press against the plan.
Richards said that throughout the debate every unofficial member took part and they saw
the plan as “a thoroughly constructive piece of work and a clear indication of the desire
both of His Majesty’s Government, through the generous allocation to Nigeria … to
ensure that this country should be developed as rapidly as possible.”176 For Richards, this
was a big win and he could not wait to share the Nigerian plan with all the colonial
governors.
Conclusion
By focusing solely on the correspondences and discussions between colonial
officials in Nigeria and London, this chapter reveals certain problems with development
planning in the late colonial period. The British had an idea that they wanted to develop
the colonies but they did not have a coherent plan on how to go about it. They had to rely
on a makeshift of ideas that originated from the colonies or the ideas that the colonial
officials in London made. After asking the colonies to draw up these plans for a ten-year
period, about halfway through the plans, the CO asked the colonies to revise them to fiveyear plans because it was difficult to plan for a ten-year period. It is easy to look at the
failure of these plans and question the intention of the British to truly develop the
colonies. My research shows that the 1945 development plan was a genuine attempt to
develop the colonies. The failure to rapidly develop Nigeria was not as a result of bad
intentions but to three factors in particular. These were ingrained racial ideologies that
either consciously or unconsciously manifested themselves in decision making; the two
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different concepts of development between the CO and the colonial state leading to
bureaucratic wrangling; and the lack of financial resources available. As I have shown in
this chapter, there is no doubt that the British were not completely altruistic when they
embarked on this development agenda. They needed to hold on to the empire and they
wanted colonial resources to help them with their economic problems. However, plenty
of the schemes that were carried out were geared toward the social benefit of the people.
The relative dearth of financial resources that were available in this period also hampered
development. Just coming out of the war, Britain was crippled financially and did not
have huge financial resources to put into the colonies.
This study also shows that though Nigeria had to put up a substantial amount of
its own money for development, they had a limited voice in what schemes and projects
were carried out. Though a few Nigerians served as unofficial members in the Legislative
Council and in the development committees, they did not have a vote. One only hopes
that their ideas during the discussions were considered. The attempt by the European
officials in Nigeria to be the custodians of development was in line with the civilizing
mission that the colonial officials had. Inherent in that ideology was the notion that
Europeans were superior to Africans and their attitude was patronizing toward the
Africans. There was the notion of Britain’s “trusteeship” over Nigeria. This ideology held
that the African could not determine his or her own future. This future had to be created
for him or her by the Europeans. The Europeans saw themselves in a trustee role in which
they determined both the future and the pace at which Africans would reach that future.
The idea here was that, the Europeans knew better what was good for Africans. The
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African had no role in deciding what he felt was good for him. He was not granted the
choice between a school and a borehole. If the European felt the borehole was better for
the African, he had to accept it. This meant that both the designers and implementers of
development were mostly European.
The third problem is the bureaucratic wrangling that existed between the CO and
the colonial state. This slowed the process and caused the plan to be rushed toward the
end. Though agriculture was the core economic factor of this plan, it did not receive the
attention that it deserved. At the time that the Legislative Council in adopted the plan of
development for Nigeria, there was still no complete agriculture plan that had received
approval from the CO.
All three continue to exercise interest. This dissertation is interested in
agricultural policy because agriculture up until the early 1970s remained the foundation
of Nigeria’s economic production. The success or failure of the 1945 plan was to a large
extent dependent on the success of the agricultural sector. Thus, in the next chapter, I will
look at agricultural policy and planning in Nigeria.
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CHAPTER THREE
Planning Agricultural Development: The Mackiean Policy, 1936-1945

Introduction
This chapter focuses specifically on agricultural planning in the period shortly
before and after the Second World War. Agriculture was the mainstay of the Nigerian
economy and if Nigeria was to successfully fund its own part of the development plan
and continue the work of development beyond 1955, it had to have a strong agricultural
program. Though agriculture was expected to provide most of the revenues for the
ongoing development of the colony beyond the years of the plan, the agriculture sector
did not experience any preferential treatment in the planning process. In fact, at the time
that the ten-year development plan was presented to the Legislative Council in December
of 1945 and its subsequent approval in February of 1946, the agriculture plan with its
detailed schemes/projects had not been approved because the CO was insisting on
Nigeria providing detailed allocations for the different agriculture projects and schemes.
For example, out of the £1,597,630 that was estimated for the agriculture plan, £750,000
was allocated to “Other Charges.” This meant the money was not going to any specific
scheme or project. The CO saw this as granting the governor of Nigeria a blank check.
The agriculture plan was not ready due to the cautious and conservative approach of the
agriculture department in Nigeria and also the dysfunctional relationship that existed
between the agriculture department and the political department.
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In this chapter, I argue that agriculture development in Nigeria was clouded by
conflicts and contradictions. The Mackiean policy insisted on careful research and field
trials before farmers were asked to change their methods. This approach was cautious and
conservative and did not radically change the social and political systems that were
associated with African farming. The policy attempted to build strong relationships with
the local authorities and also to decentralize agricultural development. However, this
policy was also fraught with problems. This cautious approach to agriculture
development meant that the policy could not respond to colonial agriculture needs in
periods when high production was expected. This policy was also blinded by the color
line as it failed to incorporate the local knowledge produced by the farmers. The focus
was on the agriculture knowledge produced by the department through research and field
trials. Indigenous farmers who had better awareness of their environments were excluded
from the production of knowledge. The policy was also doomed to be unsuccessful
because it was attempting to change the farming system without radically changing the
social-political system upon which both peasant agriculture and the colonial state rested.
For the work of development planning to be successful, both arms of the colonial
government needed to work well together. This was not the case in Nigeria. There were
two visions of development and these centered on power and control. Who had power
and control over development policy in the regions or provinces? The political staff such
as the Residents who worked with the African authorities saw themselves as the
employees of the African authorities and restricted how much access the technical staff
had to the local administrations. This chapter chronicles the rocky relationship Mackie
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had with the political department. At the end, the governor moved toward centralization,
wrestling power from the director of agriculture and handing it over to political staff who
may not have been knowledgeable about agricultural services. I argue that this was
detrimental to agriculture development and that this was responsible for Mackie’s sudden
resignation from the Nigerian service as he was frustrated with a perceived
marginalization of the agriculture department by the governor.
The Nature of Colonial Rule in Nigeria
To understand the relationship between the agriculture department, the
administrative department and the native authorities, it is important to discuss the
structure of the Nigerian colonial state. The challenge for the technical departments in the
1930s was that they had to work through the political officials assigned to the provinces
and districts. They did not have direct access to the local authorities and the Mackiean
policy sought to change this, not by radically changing the socio-political order but
finding a way of working within this policy. The colonial state structured power in such a
way that the colonial officials controlled the local authorities and these African leaders in
turn, controlled the people. This was in line with the principle of indirect rule that
Governor Frederick Lugard had introduced across the colony after the 1914
amalgamation of the Northern and Southern Protectorates. Indirect rule was created to
maintain order and stability, and not change, which was necessary for development. Sir
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Hugh Clifford, the immediate successor of Lugard, argued that it slowed the rate of
progress.177
Though the central administration which was based in Lagos controlled the
different departmental activities after the amalgamation, it was remote to the people it
was supposed to govern.178 The people’s daily experience was with the local authorities.
The north and south were administered by lieutenant governors and these reported to the
governor-general who reported directly to the S of S. In 1939, the south was divided into
nine provinces and ten years later, the north was divided into twelve provinces.
Regionalism was instituted in 1939 with the south being divided into West and East
Regions and the north forming the third region and these regions remained in place till
the independence of Nigeria in 1960.179With the institution of regionalization, each of the
three regions had a chief commissioner and these reported to the governor. The different
provinces in the regions had a Resident and these reported to the Chief Commissioners.
Below the provinces were the districts which had a district officer or DO as they were
called. The emir or chief was the political head of a district. It was this bureaucratic
structure that Mackie had to deal with in the 1930s.
Captain James Richard Mackie
No other person had as great an impact on Nigeria’s agriculture in late
colonialism as Captain James Mackie. He served in the agriculture department of Nigeria
for 24 years before he retired in February of 1945. After a career in the military and at
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Reading University, he was appointed as Superintendent of Agriculture on the 7th of
September 1921. His first post in Nigeria was at Moor Plantation. The Director of
Agriculture at the time was O. T. Faulkner. In order for him to gain varied experience of
the agricultural conditions in Nigeria, Mackie was later assigned to Ilorin, which is in
Western Nigeria, and then to Yandev, which is in Northern Nigeria. After seven years of
service in the Nigerian agriculture department, he was appointed Deputy Assistant
Director of Agriculture. Only six months after assuming this position, he was named the
Assistant Director of Agriculture. His promotion in the Nigerian service was rapid and in
most cases he received his promotions over those who were more senior to him. During
his farewell party, the African staff wrote in their speech:
Barely seven years after your appointment you were promoted Deputy Assistant
Director of Agriculture, and the following year, that is six months after your
first promotion, you were appointed Assistant Director of Agriculture, in each
case superseding more senior officers. Those in-born qualities of which you are
so remarkably possessed and of which you early gave evidence when you were
serving as a Superintendent of Agriculture received adequate recognition when
it was necessary for Mr. Faulkner to relinquish his appointment as Director of
Agriculture, and you were considered, throughout the whole Colonial
Agricultural Service, to be his fittest and worthy successor on the 31st of
October, 1936.180
Though loved and respected by the staff in the agriculture department and the African
authorities,181 he found himself constantly in conflict with the administrative/political
officials. It was these conflicts that drove him to early retirement from the Nigerian
service. Though a great patriot of the British Empire, he fought for better conditions for
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African staff in his department. I see his agricultural policy as being fourfold - the
training and education of African agricultural officers; the expansion of research and
experimental farms; close collaboration with African authorities and the expansion of
mixed farming. His agricultural planning before and during the war was influenced by
this view. The purpose of these policies was to expand agriculture production in Nigeria
that would not only help Nigeria but, more importantly, the British Empire. He was very
passionate about these goals and this passion was in most occasions the source of the
conflicts between him and the administrative officials in Nigeria.
Elite Mediation and Agricultural Development
At the time of Faulkner’s retirement from the Nigerian agricultural service in
1936, no one in the agricultural department was a better replacement for Faulkner than
Mackie. They had collaborated very well together and were pioneers in the investigation
of agricultural systems used by peasants. They wanted to understand peasant cultivation
and they paid particular attention to local knowledge. Joseph Hodge writes that, “The
greater attention Faulkner and Mackie gave to local agricultural practices reflected, in
part, the phenomenal growth of peasant commodity production of both food and cash
crops, not just in tropical Africa but throughout much of the colonial empire in the early
decades of the twentieth century.” 182 In order to effectively understand peasant
agriculture and build upon it for the expansion of production, they saw the need for
working closely with the African authorities. Though this approach was peasant friendly,
it was restricting and limiting to development. The reason is because they were
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attempting to expand peasant production through innovations without making dramatic
changes to the social structure and farming organization. Thus, they sought the
cooperation of African authorities in this quest. This approach, adopted by Faulkner and
Mackie to the development of agriculture, was similar to the policy of indirect rule
introduced earlier by Lugard.
By applying this policy to the development of peasant agriculture, Mackie was
using some form of elite mediation as a key to development. By advocating a policy that
limited dramatic change in the colony, Mackie was either consciously or unconsciously
accepting the assumption that the peasant farmers were insusceptible to change. This is
one of the unfortunate assumptions ingrained in colonial rule.183 Mackie’s assumption
was that Nigerian peasants were inept to change and this was not the case. As I have
shown in the first chapter of this work, the adoption of cocoa farming in western Nigeria
was the initiative of the peasant farmers who saw the economic benefits of cultivating
cocoa. This notion of peasants ineptitude toward change in agricultural practices had a
negative impact on the planning and development of agriculture as the planners were
more interested in policies that would enshrine the status quo rather than upstage the
system toward better results.
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As Assistant Director of Agriculture, Mackie wrote a memorandum in August of
1930, outlining a scheme for the extension of agricultural development by engaging fully
the African authorities. This scheme, which was accepted by Faulkner and promoted
vigorously by Mackie, deserves close study and analysis. Mackie’s scheme was intended
to build a close working relationship between the department and the political officers in
order for the department to effectively carryout extension work. The relationship between
the officers of the agricultural department and the political officers that worked with
traditional administrations was a rocky one. The staff of the agricultural department was
prevented by the political staff from working directly with the emirs and their officials.
The professional department officers were treated as enemies and as outsiders and thus
should be kept as far away as possible from the African authorities. The political officers
distrusted the technical officers having a close official relationship with the African
authorities. Though the political officer drew his salary from the government, he saw
himself as an official of the African authorities while at the same time treating the
technical staff as government officials who should not exercise any role in the
administration of African affairs.184
There were two reasons advanced by the political officers as to why the
department staff should not play any role, not even an advisory one, to the local
administration. The first reason was that the local administration was young and delicate
and had to be protected. They saw the presence of the technical department staff as
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interference from the outside.185 This interference, they believed, would force the African
authorities to move at a pace that they were not capable of at the time. The question then
is, did the African authorities need protection from the political officers? For the colonial
state, this was an attempt to maintain stability. The principle of indirect rule in Nigeria
was geared toward maintaining the status quo of a traditional African bureaucracy. As
Harry Gailey argues, this form of rule was “simply to the advantage of the chiefs and the
people to accept the ‘indirect’ form of government since it did preserve intact some of
their laws and practices, and retained for the chiefs the right of low-level decision
making.”186 The African authorities in the colonial state were instruments used in the
colonization of the people. The role of the Residents or appointees to these authorities
was to make sure that their rule conformed to the dictates or expectations of the colonial
state. For this reason, they saw the direct access of the technical department staff to the
rulers as interference in a bureaucratic structure of the colonial state. The agricultural
department under Faulkner and Mackie respected traditional cultivation methods and felt
they only needed the opportunity to provide technical advice to the African authorities
toward expanding production. Expanding production was not only good for the colonial
state but also good for the Africans. This view of careful technological intervention in
peasant production rested on the assumption that peasant production was stagnant
because of lack of innovation in the practices and the technical departments had a
solution to this problem. By carefully introducing best farming and innovative practices
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to the farmers, a significant expansion would occur in production.187 It is important to
state that it was not just the agricultural department that the political officers were against
interfering in traditional administration. They were against other departments as well. By
doing this, they restricted the indigenous rulers and their officials from having unfettered
access to the advice of the technical experts.
The second reason, according to Mackie, for the prevention of the technical
departments’ staff from playing a role in local administration was that political authorities
believed the technical departments were “trying to undermine the influence of the Native
Administration by creating enclaves which were independent of it.”188 At issue here was
the colonial state’s goal of maintaining stability by subjecting all the people within the
umbrella of the African authorities. They did not want the people whose livelihood and
economic means were independent of the authorities to challenge the political structure
that was now being maintained by the state. This policy, like the one on land tenure
earlier discussed in the first chapter of this work, was geared toward maintaining the
stability of the state.189 For these reasons, the political officials were vigorous defenders
of the local authorities. Apart from the goal of maintaining stability in the state was also
the unbridled desire for power and control. The political officers, who were often less
experienced than the experts from the departments, wanted to exercise control over the
African authorities. They did not want to see their own positions being undermined by
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the African leaders who may go directly to the technical experts for advice in the
different things. Mackie stated that though agriculture was the staple industry of Nigeria,
“practically nothing is spent by Native Administration in trying to encourage it, and
although every political officer has some little pet scheme for the development of
Agriculture in his own particular Emirate the assistance of Agricultural Officers has with
few exceptions never been welcomed, presumably because the Political Officers feared
that they might gain too much influence with the Emirs etc.”190 Though the political
officers were not technical experts in the sense of the officers from the technical
departments, they were experts in their own way. Many of these officials often spent
several years working in the same district or village and with the same emir or chief and
had a good grounding in the language, culture and knowledge of the local people. Though
they may not have known their science as the experts from the technical departments,
they knew their natives. While the lack of consultation and inclusion of agriculture
officers in the local schemes led to the failure of some of these schemes, it is also true
that the arrogance of scientific men who thought that their ideas were the most rational
and that local practices were primitive and backward also contributed to the failure of
many schemes.
Mackie’s proposal was intended to change this frosty relationship between the
technical officers and the political officers and also form a closer working relationship
with the traditional administration without making the political officers feel threatened.
He saw the role of the agricultural department officers solely as that of offering technical
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advice to the African leaders without meddling in the affairs of the administration. This
was an unrealistic expectation because it was impossible to change the African farming
system without affecting the political affairs. The reason is because the farming system
was closely linked to the political system. The land tenure system which the British had
supported from the early years of colonization vested authority in the hands of the local
rulers. The farming system could only be changed to an extent because the policy of
indirect rule limited the possibilities for change. To radically change the system and
increase production, the power over the control of land and labor had to be removed from
these local authorities, which would invariably create cracks on the foundation upon
which the colonial state rested. The contradictions of this colonial policy was the reason
that by the 1940s, colonial developers and planners began to move toward using educated
elites and capitalist farmers as intermediaries rather than continuing to collaborate with
traditional rulers.
Mackie’s proposals were not fundamentally changing the status quo but
enshrining it in a new collaborative form. In his memorandum, he laid out six proposals
toward changing this relationship. He proposed that they should start an experimental
farm under the authority of the local administration. The emir’s agricultural adviser’s
headquarters would be located on this farm and would be responsible for demonstrating
improved methods of farming and providing extension and later on, a place for
agricultural development. Mackie thought that Katsina Emirate would be the most
suitable place to start but did not feel strongly about this decision. He emphasized the
point that the role of the agricultural official was purely advisory and so would not
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assume responsibility over the farm. He wrote, “the executive officer in charge of the
farm and all its staff should be Native Administration officials, paid by the Native
Administration and responsible to the Emir and his council.” 191 This proposal was
necessary to placate the political officers who might feel that the agriculture department
staff was trying to usurp their power and gain control over the local administration. The
agricultural officer assigned to the farm reported on technical matters to the Assistant
Director of Agriculture just as he would in government owned farms. It was the
responsibility of the executive manager of the farm to send accounts and reports directly
to the emir and his council and not to the Assistant Director of Agriculture. Mackie also
proposed that the farms owned by the local administration would not perform
complicated scientific experiments but would follow the pattern of demonstration farms.
The conduct of scientific experiments would be restricted to government owned farms.
He saw a future in which these farms would become farm schools where people would
come to learn improved methods of farming.
The emphasis for both Faulkner and Mackie was an understanding of African
systems of agriculture. Any attempt by the technical officials was meant to improve the
production of the locals. For this reason, they were very careful in asserting that the farms
they established hand in hand with the African authorities must be demonstration farms
rather than farms that would carry out complex experiments. Whatever was shown in
demonstration farms had to be tried and proven to improve the production of the farmers,
without this, the farmers may not adopt the methods. What they were offering was a new
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perspective to agricultural expansion in Nigeria and the rest of tropical Africa. While this
policy was peasant friendly, it was also colored by racial attitudes. This philosophy was
paternalistic and racist in the sense that it created a two tier structure: the European
scientists in the technical departments would conduct the scientific trials and research on
stations owned by the government and the local farms were only for demonstration
purposes and for the dissemination results. This discounted the ability of the locals to
produce knowledge. They had to be reliant on the Europeans as the producers of
knowledge. From this viewpoint, the Africans had no science and their knowledge was
backward. They were placed in a situation in which they can only be receivers of
knowledge and not producers of knowledge.
Some of the officials who had previously worked with peasant farmers had
displayed arrogance of the highest magnitude, accusing the peasants of being deprived of
any good knowledge of farming or order. African farming systems such as bush fallow
rotations and intercropping were alien to the British and thus they considered them
unproductive. This bush-fallow system was similar to crop rotation practiced in Britain
but in the case of Africa, the plots were allowed for several years to return to natural
vegetation. This was different from the British approach in which during the fallow
period, grass and legume were used to restore soil fertility. Thus, to those used
agriculture in Britain, the African system was a mess.192 Farmers in West Africa were
castigated as “for ‘wasteful’ burning of vegetation, ‘merely scratching the surface’ of
their soils, ‘failing’ to plough deeper, lazily mixing their crops in an arbitrary and
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unhygienic manner.”193 George Howard Jones, an agricultural officer in Nigeria in the
twenties, wrote a book challenging these assumptions. In describing the West African
farmer, he wrote,
… there seems a reason for everything. The plants are not growing at random,
but have been planted at proper distances on hillocks of soil arranged in such a
way that when rain falls it does not waterlog the plants, nor does it pour off the
surface and wash away the fine soil: the stumps of bushes and trees are left for
the yams to climb upon and the oil palms are left standing because they yield
valuable fruit: and although several kinds of plants are growing together, they
were not sown at the same time nor will they be reaped together: they are rather
successive crops planted in such a way the soil is always occupied and is neither
dried up by the sun nor leached out by the rain, as it would be if it were left bare
at any time.194
Jones made the point that Europeans should be cautious and thorough before they pass
any judgments on the Africans. He said that the African method of farming and the
farmer’s outlook is so different from the European that the latter might be tempted to
dismiss it as foolish. He said the Europeans made the same mistake in India. He argued,
“In assessing native agriculture, then, we have to guard against condemning native
methods merely because they offend European temperate agricultural principles, and in
addition we must be prepared to grant that there may be reasons for his peculiar methods
of which we know nothing, even after we have considered them as carefully as we can
with our present knowledge of tropical agriculture.”195
Growing up among peasant farmers in rural Nigeria, I beg to agree with Jones’
observation. In a typical planting field, the Bette people of Cross River State would have
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hips with yams planted. The hips are made in such a way that the land would not suffer
from erosion. Depending on the soil, the hips have to be of a certain size. This is
knowledge perfected over many years. Four hips were crossed with wooden sticks to
allow the yam branches to grow on those sticks. In some areas, each yam hip had a long
stick planted on it to allow the branches to grow on that stick. This allowed the yam
tubers to receive the sunlight they needed for proper growth. Apart from yams planted on
the hips, other staple food crops are also planted: maize, cassava and round peas. Corn
takes about three months to be matured for harvesting. It is planted alongside the yams
immediately. It would be harvested early before it becomes an obstacle to the growth of
the yams. Cassava was also planted as soon as the yams were planted. It took longer to
grow than the yams. It was usually harvested a year after the yams had been harvested.
The round peas were also planted alongside the other crops. The reason was that they
needed a stick to grow on and since the yams needed sticks for their branches to grow on,
they could share one stick. These crops are not planted without order. Local knowledge
built up over several years convinced the people that they could plant all these crops
alongside each other on one piece of land and still acquire a bountiful harvest. There are
two reasons why this approach is important: labor and land conservation. A bountiful
harvest is a relative measurement. For a big agro-farmer in the midwest of the United
States, the output of most of the Bette farmers would be considered a miserly and not
worth depending upon. The reason is because he considers farming a business from
which he should derive as much pecuniary benefits as possible. For the Bette traditional
peasant farmer, a bountiful harvest means something entirely different. It means
producing enough food to feed his family, as well as a surplus to market to pay his taxes
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and make his communal financial contributions. His agricultural production is influenced
by labor. Given that the peasant is not an industrial agriculturalist, he wants to be able to
maximize his family labor. The number of people within the family or a village unit often
determines the amount of production. As Goran Hyden argued, “Peasants are essentially
self-sufficient and self-reproducing, either within the context of the household or the
village. In other words, each unit of production is separated from each other, they are
socially independent, united by no social division of labor, and depending on no other
unit for their conditions of reproduction.”196 Due to the independent nature of peasant
production and the family as the primary economic unit of production, labor had to be
maximized. Thus, many peasant farmers embraced polygamy and had many children as a
secure source for labor.197
A good example given by Faulkner and Mackie in their book, West African
Agriculture is the introduction of American cotton to Southern Nigeria. Southern
Nigerian farmers were unwilling to adopt the new crop variety even though it would have
provided a better yield than the local cotton variety. The reason they refused to adopt it
was because it entailed clearing a new piece of land and growing it as a sole crop. This
was extra labor that the farmer did not have, because it was a family economy where
labor was principally provided by family members and even where wage labor was
present, it was very limited or some of the farmers could not afford it. It made more sense
to him to continue to grow his own cotton, which could be grown on the same land with
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other crops, yielding a fair return. When the farmer was provided with an improved
variety of the native cotton, he immediately adopted it because he could grow it alongside
other crops.198 The reason the Bette peasant farmer has four crops in the same piece of
land is because it saves him the labor of clearing another piece of land. Would he acquire
a better output if he had each of the crops planted separately? Probably he would.
However, the problem of labor would make him less inclined to do that.
The understanding of African methods was of great importance to both Faulkner
and Mackie. Take for example, the Bette farmer’s choice to plant several crops in the
same piece of land. This is necessary for the conservation of land. The Bette farmer
traditionally allowed a piece of land to fallow for about five to six years before they
returned to it to plant. This period was even longer when there wasn’t pressure on the
land as there is today. Colonial officials often erroneously made the argument that
tropical African peasants had no respect for land and they destroyed it shifting cultivation
or bush fallow farming. This system of farming which was prevalent in West Africa
involved farmers slashing and burning a piece of land, cultivate it for a few years and
then move on to another piece of land. Colonial officials thought that this system was bad
because it was “exploitative, untidy and misguided.”199 In their thinking, natural forests
were constantly being destroyed in order to find virgin soil for cultivation. 200 For
example, the Kenyan settler businessman, Major E. S. Grogan testified to the 1933 Kenya
Land Commission that, “the African people, have never established a symbiotic
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198!O.!T.!Faulkner!&!J.!R.!Mackie,!West'African'Agriculture!(Cambridge:!Cambridge!University!Press,!

1933),!11.!!
199!Richards,!Indigenous'Agricultural'Revolution,!50.!!
200!Ibid.!51.!!

!

113!

!

relationship with land. They are, in the strict scientific sense, parasites on the land, all of
them.”201 This was a bold statement from someone who was ignorant of Africans’
generational relationship with the environment and land.202 This was an argument that
was often made during the early period of colonial rule. One criticism that was often
made was that, African practices caused soil erosion. Helen Tilley devotes a fair portion
of her book, Africa as a Living Laboratory, to show that African agricultural practices for
the most part were not as destructive of the land as some of the European settler farmers
and colonial officials had claimed. Most of the failure in crops was not the result of what
Africans were doing wrong but was the fault of the tropical soil that was not as fertile as
had been initially assumed. Tilley writes, “In a discussion of the causes of soil erosion at
the second conference of colonial directors of agriculture in 1938, C. J. Lewin of
Northern Rhodesia remarked that the papers presented showed that, contrary to popular
opinion, ‘erosion was almost invariably due primarily not to the native but to the
European who had introduced tillage in certain areas and had encouraged the production
of economic crops.’”203 While this is debatable, what is important to note is that in the
most part, African practices were not as destructive to land as it was claimed. The
argument that shifting cultivation is destructive to land when there is limited land and
rapid population growth has recently been challenged by recent studies. In a case study of
Machakos district in south-east Kenya, Tiffen, Mortimore, et.al write that the colonial
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government in the 1930s had deep concerns about land degradation and had ambitious
plans to curb it. The solutions to the problem rested in one of the false assumption that
population growth was harmful to the environment because it meant fewer trees. They
argue that when there is population growth in agricultural areas, there is a change that
takes place in the farming and incoming systems. They write, “Farmers can adapt by
innovation and investment and can develop new sustainable systems, but government
policies can either impede or assist this process.”204 Even though the population of this
region had continued to grow, erosion had also continued to reduce. This reduction was
not as a result of changes in the cropping system by improvements in terracing.205 Many
of those who engaged in scientific research in the 1930s were voices of moderation,
calling for the application of some of the best practices of the peasant farmers. The
director of the Ugandan agricultural department, for example, recommended the
incorporation of African customs into “regional policies, particularly in terms of crop
rotations and soil protection measures.”206 This change in attitude resulted from research
and closer observation of African agricultural practices.
A fair share of African historiography today dismisses the role that European
scientists played in colonial Africa. These European scientists are accused of being
“oriental” toward African practices. These scientists have been accused proffering
solutions to problems that they did not understand because of their lack of understanding
of African environments and their dismissal of African practices as being backward or
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primitive. While there is some evidence of these problems, it is also true that colonial
science played an important role in the imperial project. Most of these scientists spent
several years working in Africa or in other colonial states and they shared their research
with one another through scientific journals and conferences. Some of these scientists
may have moved regularly, “but they nevertheless accumulated experience and
knowledge of particular issues, and their careers demonstrated a professional continuity.
… Such scientific officials also drew on a wider range of experimentation and
information than they could generate from their own research or from their particular
colonial contexts. They shared information through correspondence, scientific journals,
conferences, and government agricultural publications.”207 Most of the interventions that
took place during the colonial period were experimental and so the outcomes were
unpredictable. The experimentation and networks forged by these scientists helped to
provide the foundational basis for understanding African environments and diseases.208
These networks of knowledge and trans-continental colonial experience formed the basis
for the understanding of Nigeria’s agricultural practices. Faulkner brought knowledge
acquired in India to Nigeria and this was instrumental in his work in the agriculture
department. Faulkner and Mackie were willing to share their own experiences of Nigeria
agriculture, which they had paid very closed attention to for many years by writing a
book on West African Agriculture to educate colonial officials assigned to both the
administrative and agricultural departments in West Africa. 209 They felt that an
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understanding of West African agricultural practices would enable the official to be less
judgmental, less arrogant and more successful in their work. This book became so
significant that it was included “in a list of books of ‘first importance’ for Malcolm
Hailey to read when he assumed the role of director of the African Research Survey in
1933.” 210 Given the degree of knowledge that African farmers possessed, it was
important that the European approaching an African farmer must do so with humility. He
should not be so arrogant to think that he knows what is best for the peasant and that his
own methods are superior to those of the peasant. Faulkner and Mackie argued that it is
not surprising that the African farmer is suspicious of the advice that is given to him by
the European. He is suspicious because “His own methods have been evolved and
adapted during many generations, so that they suit local conditions and also suit his
economic position, his social arrangements, his psychology and his tastes. It will
generally be found that by them he obtains a maximum return from a minimum of
labour.” 211 In their view, the European official must take all those factors into
consideration as he tried to introduce a new crop to the native farmer or when he asked
him to change his methods. They were not against the introduction of new methods or
new crops, after all they successfully implemented mixed farming in Northern Nigeria.
What they called for was research and experimentation of crops before they were
introduced to the African farmers. One may ask, if the African farming is so well adapted
to the local environment and meets the farmers needs, why does it need to change?
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Faulkner and Mackie believed that the local practices could be improved upon or
changed if necessary to improve production. In some cases, this meant improved seed
varieties or other methods of improving soil fertility.
Wartime Agricultural Planning
With the retirement of Faulkner in 1936 and the appointment of Mackie as the
Director of Agriculture, agricultural development in Nigeria continued in the same
trajectory it had taken since the 1920s. Mackie had worked closely with Faulkner and
they both shared the same vision for agricultural development in Nigeria. The early years
of Mackie’s leadership of the department were spent planning in anticipation for the war.
Mackie demonstrated great vision and foresight in this direction. Even before the circular
was sent from the CO to the agricultural departments of the colonies instructing them to
begin reorganizing and planning for wartime, Mackie had already taken the initiative.
While the governor was still looking at agriculture in Nigeria from a business point of
view, Mackie was raising an alarm that Nigeria’s position as an important source of raw
materials in time of war was being overlooked. In a memorandum to the Chief Secretary
to the government (CSG), he wrote:
The possibility of war cannot even now be overlooked and in such an event it
should be noted that Nigeria could if properly developed supply almost every
product which can be grown in the tropics; and moreover of the large tropical
colonies she is nearer to England than any other. By speeding up the shipping
services she could easily be brought to within 10 days of England and the sea
route could be made comparatively safe. It seems to me therefore that the
Agricultural development of Nigeria is a matter of vital importance to the
Imperial Government, especially as she would not herself require supplies
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which are needed elsewhere for the prosecution of the war, for she could if
necessary become self supporting for greater bulk of her needs.212

Mackie was attempting to position Nigeria for wartime supply of raw materials and this
was an important strategy. The other big British colonies such as Kenya and India were
closer to the combat zone than Nigeria. Ghana which was also in the west coast of Africa
and closer to London than Nigeria was a smaller colony and had a population of less than
4 million in 1939. For Mackie, the size of Nigeria and the potential the colony had could
not be ignored. Nigeria’s strategic importance during the war and Mackie’s goal of
developing agriculture had as a primary goal, the exploitation of Nigeria’s resources for
the benefits of Britain.
Mackie wanted to have a strong department that would be capable of supplying
what the imperial government needed during the war. In February of 1939, he sent a
letter to the governor inquiring if officers of the forestry and agriculture departments
would be released for military service in the event of war. This question was important
because he was interested in seeing how the department staff could be reorganized in
preparation for war. He did not want production to be affected by the absence of these
officers.213 The CSG responded that as a general rule, officers of these departments
would not be released for military service. The reason was reached because of the
importance those two departments played in the provision of adequate supplies of raw
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materials.214 Mackie was not just satisfied that the staff of the departments wouldn’t be
released for military service. He wanted to be sure that the work in the two departments
would be recognized as a major contribution to the war. He wrote again a few weeks later
to the CSG, “…it will not be a very satisfactory position for us unless we can feel assured
that the work we are doing is essential for the successful prosecution of the war. To those
of us who are fit for military service and are quite prepared to take such service, merely
carrying out our peace time duties would be a very severe trial.”215 It wasn’t that Mackie
was willing to abandon his agricultural post to rejoin the military to fight the war. Mackie
was making a larger point. To a great extent, Mackie was using the pretext of the war to
further his agenda of expanding the department’s services. Not doing that at this time of
great demand meant that he was wasting his time. Thus, he felt that if the department was
not going to be given an expanded role, then it would be better for him to join the
military than to work in the department. Mackie never felt satisfied with the support he
got from the political officials. This feeling would follow him throughout his tenure in
the department. To buttress the point he was making, he continued in his letter: “I
therefore feel obliged to ask whether the Government proposes to take any preparatory
steps to ensure that we shall be in a position to increase production rapidly, and whether I
may receive some indication of the products which Nigeria will be called upon to supply
and whether the Government anticipates that in the event of war Nigeria will have to be
self supporting as far as its own food requirements are concerned.”216
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Of interest to him was the rapid expansion of agricultural production and without
that, the department was not making a substantial contribution to the war. Food
production would have to be enough not only for export but also for local consumption.
Mackie said that four assumptions must be made as they think about agricultural
production at this time: the war would likely break out in about a year at a time when
there would be partial drought in some parts of Northern Nigeria; shipping would be
dislocated in some months and it would be difficult to rapidly receive foodstuff in large
quantities from elsewhere; Europeans left in Nigeria would have to serve for two or three
years without leave; and finally, that the Mediterranean sea route might be closed and
there might be an urgent need for Nigeria’s surplus products at short notice. If his
assumptions were correct, he argued, then it was important that throughout Nigeria, there
should be reserves of foodstuffs. He wanted this to happen immediately before the war
broke out. He also wanted the welfare of the Europeans serving in Nigeria to be seriously
taken into consideration. If the war meant that Europeans would have to undertake longer
tours of duty in Nigeria, then in order for them to remain fit, he argued, there was need to
provide them with some essentials which Nigeria can provide. He wrote, “Thus if
transport existed and preparation was made beforehand it would be possible to ensure
that most Europeans situated within reasonable distance of the railway at any rate could
be supplied with fresh milk, meat, and fresh vegetables from the North and fruit and fish
from the South. Such amenities would do much to maintain them in a good state of
health.”217
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Mackie had been thinking about the contribution of the agricultural department as
soon as the drumbeats of war were sounding. He understood the agricultural geography
of the world and he knew what could be obstructed by the war and which colonies would
be able to make substantial contributions. For him, Nigeria was in a strategic position to
provide the wartime agricultural supplies to the imperial government and also to be selfsufficient in some things that Nigeria imported. Nigeria at this time imported rice and
sugar. He believed that Nigeria could be self-supporting in these two. He argued that
Nigeria’s climate is suitable for the cultivation of rice. And also, Nigeria just as India,
could be self-supporting in crude sugar such as the gur type. Nigeria grew sugar canes
and people mainly ate the canes. The production of sugar cane could be expanded. What
would be needed was simple crushing machinery and a boiling apparatus like those used
in India. Mackie also believed that oil seeds, such as groundnuts and cotton, could be
rapidly expanded insofar as the department was properly organized for this expansion. At
that moment, the department could not carry out such rapid expansion because of the
dearth of supervisory staff. Staffing was viewed as one of the primary obstacles to
agricultural development in this period. It was not only the European staff that was
inadequate, but the African staff was inadequate as well. Mackie devoted a lot of time
proposing ways to ameliorate this problem. He wrote, “An adequate staff is essential
whether to improve Agriculture in peace time or to develop production rapidly in war
time. At the present time our African staff is totally inadequate for either, and unless it is
increased rapidly as possible I have no hesitation in saying that Nigeria will not be in a
position to pull its weight in the event of war.”218 Mackie saw his proposals as being very
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important and wanted the colonial government to act on them. He even suggested that the
governor could draw from the Nigerian reserve to begin the implementation of his
proposal and then discuss reimbursement with the Imperial Government later.
In July of 1939, Mackie received a response from the CSG. He was told to
organize his staff on a war basis so that, in the event of a war Nigeria, could facilitate
maximum production of materials that will be of service to the United Kingdom. He was
to report such a plan to him. The CSG’s letter can be interpreted as either a gross
misunderstanding of Mackie’s last letter, or he was just playing along with the director.
Mackie had suggested that the men in the departments of agriculture and forestry would
opt for military service if their work in the departments was not an essential contribution
to the war. The CSG’s response to that was, “…while his Excellency [the Governor] fully
realises the Agricultural Officers would be anxious to participate in active military
service in the event of war, he considers that they would be contributing their share of
national service in a greater degree by increasing to the maximum extent the output of the
raw produce of Nigeria.”219 As I have argued earlier, what Mackie and his staff needed
was the support of the governor and the officials, support that was not always prevalent.
Whatever the intentions of the governor, Mackie found the CSG’s letter reassuring. He
was reassured by the stated intentions of the governor that the agriculture department
would be offering national service by increasing to the maximum extent Nigeria’s
agricultural produce. This Mackie saw as a statement of support by the governor. With
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this assurance, Mackie set to work to produce a policy and reorganization plan for the
agricultural department.
In October of 1939, Mackie presented his policy to the CSG and to his senior
agriculture officers throughout Nigeria. In his memo he made the point that if Nigeria
must maintain maximum production all efforts must be made to make sure that the
fertility of the soil is maintained. To do this, he argued that the basis of their efforts must
be mixed farming220 in the Northern region of Nigeria and work on green manuring and
compost making in the southern region.221 Faulkner and Mackie had long championed
mixed farming in Northern Nigeria. In their book West African Agriculture, they devoted
a chapter to discussing mixed farming in Nigeria. Their idea of mixed farming they
wrote, was “one in which every farmer owns cattle of his own, say two bullocks and one
or two cows, together with his usual head of sheep, goats and fowls. He would keep his
cattle in a pen and supply them with bedding, thus making farmyard manure of the
highest quality all the year round. His bullocks would be used for ploughing, thus solving
the labour problem; and his cows would breed calves and supply him with milk for his
family or for sale.”222 They believed that such a system of farming was going to lead to
the prosperity of the farmer and the country as a whole. They were even surprised that
such a system had not been introduced into the country long before. There were two main
problems why mixed farming had not been widely adopted. The first problem was the
fear of epidemics such as Rinderpest. About three fourth of cattle were wiped out when
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there were epidemics.223 Another problem was the cost of keeping cattle and the product
output that resulted from the farm animals. It was expensive to feed the animals and in
some cases there wasn’t substantial cleared land available for cultivation.224 Faulkner and
Mackie had tried mixed farming among a small group of farmers and they saw
tremendous results. Farmers who adopted this system of farming saw growth not only in
the amount of land they cultivated but also better yields. Farmers who were cultivating
only three acres of land could now cultivate ten or twelve acres because the bullocks
would help with plowing and enough manure was produced for the fields.225
One major problem with mixed farming was that of finding a suitable type of
plow. Not only did the plow have to be suitable technically, it also had to be affordable
because the African farmer had little or no access to capital. Several attempts that were
made in the past by European missionaries and administrative officers failed because the
type of plow chosen was unsuitable. Faulkner and Mackie felt that there was now a
solution to this problem. What was needed was a double-breasted ridging plow. These
plows could be made out of wood and cold be easily made by the village craftsmen. They
wrote, “The wooden ploughs now in use can be made locally for less than £1. 10s. 0d.,
and they do quite satisfactory work. They have been used exclusively for all the
ploughing on our experimental farms for the last three or four years, and those native
farmers who have tried them have been well satisfied.”226
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The approach in the southern region, on the other hand, was not mixed farming
but green manuring to which they also devoted a chapter of their book. Unlike the north,
land was very scarce in the south and there had no cultural tradition of keeping cattle.
The north had vast lands that the cattle could graze in. The southern part of the country
was already practicing shifting cultivation. Faulkner and Mackie thought of green
manuring as the best solution in the south. They defined the practice as “the process of
growing a crop simply for the sake of turning it all into the soil as a manure. The plants
grown for this purpose were usually one of those belonging to the leguminous family –
the family that includes beans, peas and clovers. The plants of this family have the unique
property of collecting nitrogen directly from the air through the agency of bacteria which
live in nodules on their roots.”227 The reason this system was more ideal in the southern
region was because of the heavy rainfalls. The rains washed and leached the soil of its
vital nutrients such as nitrogen. Experiments that were carried out for about ten years
showed that the use of green manuring would maintain the fertility of the soil. They
wrote, “The crops obtained at Ibadan now, after ten years of rotational green manuring
and cropping, are as heavy or even heavier than were obtained from newly cleared bush;
and they are heavy and very quick-growing crops by any standard.”228 Mackie’s proposal
in the memorandum that mixed farming and green manuring should be used was thus
based on several years of investigations and experimentation.
In Mackie’s opinion, the policy which he laid down in his memorandum was
going to place Nigeria in a stronger position than it had been before the Second World
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War. The first goal was to achieve food self-sufficiency. The first step in carrying out this
policy was to make sure that each part of the country was as self-supporting as possible in
the staple food crops, and if it is not self-supporting, there must be distribution channels
available to quickly and easily move supplies from one area to the next. Not only should
the country be self-supporting, but also there should be reserves to draw upon in the event
of any emergency such as a drought or a partial failure of crops. The amount in reserves
had to be documented to give clear knowledge of what was available to be used in the
event of an emergency. He also made the point that in areas where cocoa was the main
crop cultivated by the farmer, each farmer must be able to produce enough food for
himself and his family. He wanted to avoid a situation where farmers put all their
resources into cash crops and thereby had to import food. This was an important measure
to reduce as much as possible buying foods from other areas that could have gone into
reserves. Large parts of Western Nigeria relied solely on the production of cocoa. If they
were not to cultivate the food needed for their family consumption, it meant they had to
purchase food from other farmers thereby creating a problem with the policy of each part
of the country being self-supporting. The policy of being self-supporting in agriculture
was thus extended to even individual families.
The second important step was that of making sure the produce and foodstuff that
was previously imported would be produced locally. This was important because during
wartime, shipping was bound to be disrupted in certain regions of the world. The
agricultural officers were to try to produce this imported produce that was suitable to
their climatic conditions. He summarized the duties of the agricultural department during
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war time as those of being ready to help the imperial government with the production of
crops that it may request; to ensure that Nigeria is self-supporting in foodstuffs that it
usually would import; and finally to do what it could to make West African colonies as a
whole self-supporting. 229 Mackie was convinced that his policy would stimulate
industries in the manufacture of native products such as “sacks, baskets, rope etc.”230
These two objectives that Mackie set out to accomplish: being self-supporting in food
and the production of crops for Britain were potentially conflicting, since concentrating
too much on one would take away from the other.
Mackie’s planning had anticipated the needs of the Imperial Government during
wartime. By the time the S of S had sent a proposal to the agricultural departments
advising them on what to do, Nigeria was well ahead with its own plan. Thus, in response
to a circular from the colonial government stating the S of S’s proposal, Mackie wrote: “
I think it is safe to say that we in Nigeria have anticipated the Secretary of State’s
proposals and I think that every important point mentioned in his circular is dealt with in
my circular memorandum .…We have indeed gone rather further than merely to carry out
the instructions to the letter, for we are also considering proposals for assisting the
African to take a greater share in the processing of his own crops and the development of
the internal trade in food stuffs.”231 The major points in the S of S circular were that the
colony should expand its production capacity and that the whole British colonies in West
Africa should be self-supporting.
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A faithful son of the empire, Mackie wanted to make sure that he and his staff in
the agricultural department made an essential contribution to winning the war by
producing sufficient quantities of produce and foodstuff as His Majesty’s Government
may need. As the war started, Mackie became disappointed that nothing much was
requested of Nigeria. Though he acknowledged that their first duty was to be as selfsupporting as possible, he also felt that they had a duty to supply Great Britain with the
tropical produce it needed. It is important to note that Nigeria was struggling with the
policy of being self-supporting at this time. Rice, for example, was not produced in a
large enough quantity to stop importation. R. R. Glanville,232 who was an expert on rice,
toured some of the northern parts of Nigeria and reported that it was possible for Nigeria
to be self-supporting in the production of rice if a special survey of the rice area was
made and an officer was available to work on rice in the area. Mackie was not in a
position to provide an officer for such work. As previously mentioned, having enough
staff remained one of the major challenges that agricultural development faced during
this period.
Moreover, Mackie and his officers were disappointed with their work because the
raw materials they produced in large quantities were not needed by the Imperial
Government. The different types of oilseeds they produced – palm, groundnut, beneseed,
etc. were all not in need. The only demand that had been made of them was the
Cameroon Banana that was produced in the Cameroons. There, efforts had been
intensified to meet the demand. Nevertheless, it was too early in the war for Mackie to
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start feeling disappointed that Nigerian produce was not needed for the war. It was in
April of 1940 that Mackie was expressing his disappointment, a very short time after the
break of the war in Europe. Mackie himself recognized that he was probably a little too
impatient. In a letter to the CSG he wrote, “We must still assume that the war will be a
long one and there is still time to make preparations even if they may take some time to
carry out.… I therefore beg to suggest that a definite enquiry should be sent to His
Majesty’s Government asking if there is any product which is likely to be required.”233
His goal at this point was no longer to plan for the immediate needs but also to start
planning for what the future needs of the empire might be. He also thought about some of
the products that might be needed. He wrote, “I have heard unofficially that there is a real
shortage of fibres of various kinds, and I note that Keyna [sic] has been asked to grow
flax. We have never tried to grow flax, and so far jute has not done well in Nigeria, but
we can grow sisal, ramie, or sun hemp. Similarly we can grow cotton. If any of these are
wanted we could undoubtedly push up production quite quickly if seed supplies were
available.”234 What would undoubtedly remain a major hindrance to fulfilling any of
these plans would be finding the adequate staff needed to carry out this work. For
Mackie, Nigerian agriculture could not carry on normally as during peacetime. It must
make a useful contribution to the war and its contribution was not militarily but
economic. This contribution, in his opinion, was not one only made by the agriculture
department but was Nigeria’s contribution to the war. He went on to suggest that “if
officers could be spared for military service now that they are not required for this
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
233!Mackie!to!CSG,!10!April,!1940,!Mackie!Papers,!RH:!MSS.!Afr.!S.!823.!!
234!Ibid.!!

!

130!

!

purpose a few officers could be spared for Agricultural service.”235 For him, these
officers need not have any agricultural training. They could help with office work to free
up agricultural officers from such duties or they could help with some preliminary work
that did not require any agricultural expertise.
However, Mackie felt a sense of non-co-operation from some of the
administrative officials. He had a long list of grievances, which he put in a letter to be
sent officially to the CSG, Hoskyns Abrahall. He had misgivings about letting such a
letter be filed officially and he attached it with a private letter to Abrahall. In his private
letter, he expressed his feelings that he was not allowed to pull his weight in Nigeria and
felt that he would be useful in other colonies or even back in England to help with the
war. He reiterated that other members of the agricultural department shared his feelings
as well. He wrote, “I should hesitate to write like this if it was merely a personal matter
but all my officers feel the same. Also, it is not a new thing. The whole history of my
Department since 1921 shows that almost every scheme which involved work among the
farmers has been opposed or obstructed. As far as the North is concerned, in present
conditions I can see no point whatever in putting up schemes for the Colonial
Development Fund, for I know that I should not be allowed to carry them out.”236 Mackie
saw his policies as being opposed by the political department. Given that agriculture was
the staple of the Nigerian economy, it was not a good sign that the director of agriculture
felt that his work with the farmers was opposed and obstructed. It was a situation that was
not conducive to solid agricultural development. The level of frustration he and the staff
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felt was so severe that he was not willing to submit schemes to be funded by the Colonial
Development Fund. In order for his department to work effectively, he believed that there
needed to be a change in the organization of the colonial state. Though he was feeling
frustrated, he did not want to leave Nigeria because in his words, “I like the country and
the people and am most anxious to do something for them.”237
Mackie’s problem did not stem directly from the governor or the CSG. The
difficulties he faced came from other administrative officials and most especially from
the chief commissioner of the Northern Province. Some of his grievances were that when
he wrote to the colonial government in April requesting preparation for the war, it took
about three months before his letter was even acknowledged. When he requested the
appointment of a marketing officer, it took over a year before one was appointed and it
required the backing of the cocoa marketing committee. He was also frustrated with the
fact that even though they were at war, the activities of the department were still
governed by the financial secretary’s ruling that “there must be no expansion of work and
that I must not make work in order to give members of the African staff increased
responsibility.”238 There was a proposal by the governor to increase the production of
wheat flour and the agriculture department submitted a scheme for this proposal.
However, it took more than six months before it was approved. Correspondences kept
bouncing between the central secretariat, the northern secretariat and the agriculture
department. While the scheme faced the bureaucratic red tape, the wheat crop had
ripened and there was no machinery available for milling it. The chief commissioner of
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the Northern Province also held up the proposals for ordering sugar cane crushers. It took
the intervention of the governor for the approval to be received. Mackie’s proposal for
the storage of food crops was also denied. The chief commissioner of the Northern
Province would not approve the proposals for the storage of groundnut seed and was
asking to be supplied with evidence that the soils of Kano were deteriorating. Mackie’s
proposals for making Nigeria self-supporting in potatoes was also returned by the chief
commissioner of the Northern Province, informing him that what was wanted was expert
advice and not “restrictive regulations.” 239 The same commissioner obstructed the
proposals for the production of rice, and the governor had to intervene. These
obstructions had so much impact on Mackie that he was willing to transfer to a smaller
colony on a smaller salary or work under someone else temporarily as a result of the war
if he was deemed to be the problem. He was convinced, however, that he was not the
problem, but it was the organization. He wrote, “But whatever may be my shortcomings I
do feel that there is also something wrong with the system of Government which permits
of such delays and obstruction and I am fortified in this opinion by discussions I have had
with Administrative Officers in both Secretariats and in the Provinces, many of whom
feel as I do.”240 His feeling that Nigeria was not taking the war seriously, he argued, was
shared by many Europeans who were in Nigeria and that the unnecessary red tape and
paperwork that existed during peacetime was also continued during wartime even though
there was a need for things to be done at a faster pace. Mackie’s request was that
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immediate steps should be taken to review the organization and to put Nigeria on a war
footing.
Sometime between the 29th of May and the 18th of June, Mackie had a meeting
with the governor. We can only assume that the governor had a conversation with Mackie
about the letter he sent to Hoskyns Abrahall. This assumption is based on the fact that on
the 18th of June, Mackie sent a circular to his officers in the agriculture department and he
referenced a recent meeting with the governor. The governor informed him at the meeting
that for the duration of the war, the primary work of the department should be the
production of foodstuffs. He also said that the governor had assured him that his
administration will assist them “in this work to the fullest possible extent.”241 Feeling
very optimistic about the support of the governor, Mackie in June gave his officers the
free hand to carry out the work of expanding food production. He wrote, “I wish to give
officers a very free hand and hope that everyone will use his own initiative. Each officer
should formulate his own local proposals, discuss them with the Resident and then put
them into effect. If however difficulties or obstructions are encountered I must be
informed at once. The great thing is to get work done.”242
Not only was Mackie motivated by the words of the governor, he was now
motivating his officers to get work done. This was necessary at a time in which there was
low morale in the department. Without the meeting with the governor, Mackie would not
have had the confidence to give this directive to his officers. When he instructed them to
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report to him immediately should they encounter difficulties or obstructions, he was
counting on the support of the governor to intervene. Mackie again in this memorandum
reiterated the policy of the department that each province should be as self-supporting as
possible and there cannot be over production of essential services. To commit his officers
to what was the most essential of their duties, the production of more foodstuffs, he
ended the policy in which the officers had to send in a monthly report. This was a
bureaucratic step that took more time away from the officers’ work. What the officers
needed to submit monthly was the statement of expenditure. For the regular monthly
report, they were no longer obliged to submit it. However, they were to keep him
informed of their work progress and to report to him only when they have something
important to report.243
Three days after Mackie sent the memorandum to his officers, he met with the
CSG and he had a new demand. He wanted one man to be put in charge of food
production to carry out any policy that was being decided by the governor. He expressed
his willingness to serve under such a person but there is no doubt that Mackie would have
been disappointed if such a position was created and he was not placed in charge of it.
Later that same day, the governor met with Mackie and proposed to make him the
Director of Food Production (DFP) in addition to his position as Director of Agriculture.
Mackie’s idea of this new position was different from that of the governor. Mackie
wanted a position of authority but the governor had intended it to be just a title without
any portfolio as a means of drawing attention to food production. When the governor
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communicated his intentions to Mackie, Mackie requested for more authority, and the
governor told him he was going to discuss the position further with the CSG. Almost one
year after Mackie was named to the position, the governor did not grant him any powers.
In May of 1941, Mackie wrote to the CSG: “The duties of the post of Director of Food
Production have never been defined and up to the present time I have never been asked
for or been given any special powers. I have no authority to co-ordinate the food
production work of the Agricultural Department with that of the Veterinary Department
and schemes put forward by the Veterinary Department are still treated as if the latter was
a completely watertight compartment.”244 The Governor had made clear to Mackie that
he did not want to attach any powers to the position. It seems to me that telling him he
was going to discuss with the CSG and get back to him was a simple way of ignoring
him.
Mackie used this letter to the CSG to make a case for why powers should be
granted to the DFP. He argued that the Conference of Directors of Agriculture in 1938
had stressed that you cannot separate supply from production and that each colony should
appoint a Director of Food Production and Supply with ample funds at his disposal.245
Mackie continued: “If I am to carry out the functions of the Director of Food Production
as envisaged by this Conference, and to make the effort required of us I must now ask for
more staff; and more authority to co-ordinate the efforts of everyone engaged in the work
of food production is essential if every available man is to pull his weight with the
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greatest possible effect.” 246 Mackie’s proposal was to create some form of an
amalgamation between the agriculture, veterinary and forestry departments. The CO had
also been moving in this direction by expanding the Advisory Committee on Agriculture
and Animal Health to include Forestry and then Fisheries. What Mackie was asking for
made practical sense but it was politically toxic. It made practical sense because these
departments would have been more effective if they coordinated their work. More often
than not, these departments were always in conflict with each other. He was in fact
asking for the heads of those departments to now be under his own authority. Perhaps if a
neutral DFP was appointed and the directors of all three departments were under his
control, his proposal may have had a fighting chance, but to bring the other departments
somehow under his own control was too risky a move that neither the CSG nor the
governor were prepared to make. What the CSG asked him to do was to submit what he
considered to be the functions of the DFP.247 On the 10th of June, 1941, Mackie wrote the
CSG a confidential letter with a description of the functions of the DFP. Mackie
suggested six duties of the Director of Food Production:
1.
2.
3.

4.

He was to be the sole channel through which all requirements for
supplies would pass through.
He was to administer all funds meant for the development of
production and allocate such funds to the department that would carry
out the work.
He was to collaborate with the Food Controller on schemes that
increased production and to authorize such schemes without subject to
any other authority as long as those schemes conform to the policy of
Government.
To co-ordinate the work of food production to make sure there is no
waste or overlapping.
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5.
6.

To locate work where it is of most permanent value for the country.
To see to a smooth flow of supplies.248

On the 21st of June, 1941, the governor directed the CSG to circulate a document
defining the duties of the DFP. Mackie’s suggestions were almost accepted verbatim.
Even most of the language was maintained in the circular. Instead of six duties, only four
where stated in the circular. The sixth duty in Mackie’s letter was combined with the
fourth. What was conspicuously absent was the first duty that Mackie stated in his letter.
The governor did not grant that authority to him. In my view, the reason is because he
wanted the respective departments to still maintain some level of independence and
authority. This factor was very important to the governor and he made it clear at the end
of the circular that the DFP was not going to interfere with the normal duties of the
departments. The circular said, “His Excellency wishes it clearly to be understood that
this definition of the Director of Food Production’s duties in no way implies any
interference with the normal functions of Departments but is directed solely to ensure that
development should not be hampered by administrative delays and that the limited staff
of qualified officers available may be employed to the greatest effect.”249 The DFP had
no authority to assign the different officers of the technical departments. That was the
responsibility of the director of their department. If the DFP needed a technical officer for
any specific purpose, he had to arrange it with that department head and the CSG. The
governor’s approach was a middle way toward dealing with what could have been a
potential disaster. In one way, Mackie got what he wanted and in another way, the other
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department heads maintained authority over their departments. If you look closely at the
defined duties that the governor gave Mackie as the DFP, the position could be aptly
described as a “toothless bulldog.” Most of those duties were those he was already
carrying out as the director of the agriculture department.
What is important is that Mackie was satisfied with his new position and he felt
he was making a difference in food production. What continued to be a major problem to
the execution of his work was the dearth of staff. In order to increase production, he
needed agricultural staff to help him in this work. This he believed was not only urgently
needed during wartime but also for the post-war period. The agricultural staff helped with
the supervision of the African farmers. He argued that increased production could only be
achieved through three principal means: stimulating the African farmer to put forth more
efforts; using Europeans to develop more government estates; and allowing firms to
develop estates.250 In the case of Nigeria, the first option was the best. Peasant cultivation
had been the staple of Nigeria’s economy. Mackie did not think that it was good policy to
divert European staff to government estate development when peasant production had not
reached its peak. There were vast areas that still needed an agricultural officer and there
wasn’t any to provide. Allowing firms to develop estates was one means that he did not
want to consider because it was a controversial one. Unlike some other British colonies in
Africa like Kenya, Nigeria did not have private estate production. In the early years of
colonization, this option was resisted and part of the reason was because of the Nigerian
system of land tenure.251 When Lever Brothers, a British firm wanted peasant land to be
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
250!Mackie!to!CSG,!18!April,!1942,!Mackie!Papers,!RH:!MSS.!Afr.!S.!823.!!
251!See!Anne!Philips,!The'Enigma'of'Colonialism,!59\79.!

!

139!

!

appropriated to the company for plantation agriculture, Governor Hugh Clifford
responded by addressing the Nigerian Council in 1920, telling them that,
… agricultural industries in tropical countries which are mainly, or exclusively,
in the hands of the native peasantry a) have a firmer root than similar enterprises
when owned and managed by Europeans, because they are natural growths, not
artificial creations, and are self-supporting, as regards labour, while European
plantations can only be maintained by some system of organised immigration or
by some form of compulsory labour; b) are incomparably the cheapest
instruments for the production of agricultural produce on a large scale that have
yet been devised; and c) are capable of a rapidity of expansion and a progressive
increase of output that beggar every record of the past, and altogether
unparalleled in all the long history of European enterprises in the tropics.252
Though Clifford’s argument claims that the reason for denying the introduction of
plantation agriculture is the productive character of peasant agriculture, the ultimate
reason was the controversy over land and labor that plantation agriculture was going to
create and this was bound to wrestle the authority upon which the colonial state rested.253
Mackie had not foreclosed on the idea of developing government estates in the near
future. His thinking around such estates was for the post-war period. He felt that such
estates could be parceled out to some of the returning soldiers to cultivate under the
supervision of a European agricultural officer. He wrote, “I should like to see for several
of these estates started before the war ends both in the N.Ps and the S.Ps., for even if they
are planted up with permanent crops which take several years to grow into bearing I am
sure that there will be a demand for our produce for several years after the war ends.”254
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With all of this, what Mackie needed to execute his task of increasing production
was more agricultural staff. These were not forthcoming from the CO even though the
demand was made. Mackie’s assumption was that he was not getting these staff because
the CO did not value the potential of Nigerian agriculture. I do not think he was correct in
such thinking. This was a time of war and a time of extraordinary difficulties. Most of the
young men had entered the military and it was not only Nigeria that was vitally important
to the empire in terms of production, but other colonies as well. Yes, Nigeria was a big
colony with agricultural potential but it did not have a monopoly to all production.
Agricultural officers had to be shared with other colonies as well. What however is
important is the passion Mackie had for the development of agriculture in Nigeria and
how he desperately wanted the Nigerian colony to make significant contributions to the
war through her produce. Mackie’s work during this period was very important to the
development plan. Some of the ideas he developed at this time became the bedrock of the
1945 agricultural plan of development.
Reorganizing the Departments
As stated above, the policies that Mackie developed in the period shortly before
the war and the agricultural plan to expand production he drafted during that time was
instrumental to the 1945 plan that was submitted to the CO. When Mackie submitted this
earlier plan, he did not hear back from the CO. He felt that his plan was being ignored.
As the CO requested a more detailed agricultural plan from Nigeria in 1944, Governor
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Arthur Richards255 invited Mackie and the other two directors of the departments of
forestry and veterinary service to a meeting at the Government House in Lagos in
December of 1944. The meeting was to help them coordinate development policy and to
aid them toward working together in areas where their work overlapped. There was
friction between these three departments and it ended up affecting the work of the
departments. Mackie along with the director of veterinary services and the chief
conservator of forests accepted the invitation to the meeting and were in attendance.
Other persons in attendance were the governor, the acting chief secretary, the chief
commissioners of the Eastern, Northern and Western provinces; the development
secretary, and the acting deputy chief secretary. At the meeting, the governor announced
a new structure that he felt would enable the three departments to work well together. The
governor was moving toward greater centralization. The offices of the heads of these
departments were moved from their respective locations to Lagos and their new
responsibility was that of serving as advisers to the Nigerian central government. New
deputies were appointed to head these department heads and were given offices at the
locations where the directors previously had their main offices. The deputy for the
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Northern Province had an office in Kaduna, the deputy for the Southern Province had an
office in Enugu and the deputy for the Western Province had an office in Ibadan. The
governor also considered appointing a fourth deputy for each of the departments who
would be located in Lagos. The aim was to free the department heads to travel more
around the country. The deputies who were assigned to the different provinces were to be
advisers to the chief commissioners. The governor believed that these deputies had to be
in a position in which they could give authoritative advice to the chief commissioners
without reference to the department heads. The deputies were to be “subject to the orders
of the Chief Commissioners in all Administrative matters relating to their Departments,
but Chief Commissioners would not of course, be in a position to give directions on
technical matters. On such matters the Deputies should seek directions from their Head of
Department in Lagos.”256 The authority to post officers to these departments also was to
emanate from the secretariat. By giving control of staff appointments to the secretariat, as
well as subjecting the deputies to the control of the chief commissioners was an attempt
to weaken the technical departments, while at the same time strengthening the political
administration. The governor believed that the overlapping and the frictions between the
three departments was a result of the three heads of departments working in isolated
locations from each other and from the secretariat in Lagos. His belief was that by putting
them in one location, this problem was going to be solved. The authority to discipline
departmental officers was now bestowed on the chief commissioners and if necessary,
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referred to the secretariat in Lagos.257 This reorganization, which was advanced by the
governor, gave victory to the political officials. This change instituted by Richards was
detrimental to development policy that was based on scientific research and advice.
As shown earlier in this chapter, there was always a tension between the technical
department staff and the political officials in the provinces and districts. The political
officers felt that the staff of the technical departments worked under them. Conversely,
the staff of the technical departments wanted to have more autonomy from the political
officers in carrying out their work. The governor, in this meeting, clearly defined the
authority. Not only were the technical staff to take their orders in the provinces from the
chief commissioners, but they were also to be disciplined by them. While Mackie spent
several years pushing for more authority and independence, now he was even stripped of
the authority that he had. He could no longer assign his officers and he now was imposed
with deputies that were not even reporting to him. These deputies reported to the chief
commissioners and only referenced him in technical matters. It is not surprising that this
did not go well with Mackie. While the other two heads of departments accepted what the
governor said, Mackie protested. He said that he did not like the idea of surrendering his
personal authority to post his staff to the secretariat. The governor’s response to him was
that, “while the views of the head of any Department would be taken the final exercising
of authority would of necessity have to be done centrally, and in some cases there was
clearly need for the exercising of some control over the postings made by the Heads of
Departments.”258 This was a big change for the heads of departments who exercised
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authority in posting their staff. Mackie insisted that he would have to “resist interference
with his executive control over the officers of his Department.” The governor insisted
that neither he nor any head of department could be regarded as having complete
command. They would have to rely on his directions.259 The governor’s direction toward
centralization was bound to affect development policy. The most effective structure in
development is a decentralized approach because planners would have better knowledge
of local conditions and take them into account. What the governor was doing was taking
the authority of the agricultural officers and placing it in the hands of officers who had no
experience or knowledge of agriculture. The effect of this was that the process was going
to be less responsive to the local needs and problems of the people.
Over many years the different departments had acquired much power and
independence and they had also wrestled with each other for more authority thereby
leading to tensions. The administrative officials had always wanted to rein in the powers
of the department heads and bring the department heads into their own control. One of
the reasons some of the Residents were not giving access to the technical staff was
because they believed that the departments were running their own schemes and projects
irrespective of the traditional administrations. Yet, the Residents did not want the
technical staff to have direct access to the African leaders. Such access must always come
through the Resident or the provincial commissioners. Governor Richards believed that
the heads of departments caused these tensions. His way of resolving these tensions was
to bring them under the central secretariat and strip them of their executive powers
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leaving them with only limited technical powers. Their technical powers were limited
because they did not have the authority to even advise directly the chief commissioners.
They were now simply advisers to the central government. Most schemes and projects
took place at the provincial and district levels and not at the central level. One can argue
rightly that there was a “palace coup” against them. I believe that this new policy was
directed mostly at Mackie. He seemed to be more aggressive in his quest for more
control. The other two department heads accepted what the governor said without any
protest. Mackie knew there was a coup against him and if anyone had followed his life
closely in Nigeria, they would have known that his days in Nigeria, from that moment,
were numbered.
At this meeting, the development secretary asked that “something definite should
be stated at the meeting in regard to the preparation of development proposals, and asked
that the governor might rule the latest date at which these proposals should be furnished,
as well as a statement of suggested policy for each of the three Departments represented
at the meeting.”260 Mackie said at the meeting that he would have his statement of policy
and proposals ready no later than the end of January. The other two heads of departments
agreed that they would also have theirs ready. The governor ruled that their development
proposals should be completed and ready by the end of January.261
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The Agricultural Plan
The dysfunctional relationship between the department of agriculture, veterinary
services and forestry was part of the reason that the plans of these departments were not
ready in 1944. The poor relationship between the agriculture department and political
officials also contributed to the delay. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, Mackie had
submitted a ten-year agricultural plan four years prior to this time. In his view, this plan
was ignored and forgotten entirely. One wonders why Mackie was not asked to revise
this plan and have it approved by the CO together with the other plans in 1945. In any
event, Mackie submitted six copies of his development proposals to the secretariat on the
30th of January 1945 and he requested that one of the copies be sent directly as it stood to
the S of S. Though the proposals were drawn up for a period of ten years, Mackie did not
believe that they could be implemented within that time frame because there wouldn’t be
adequate staff to fully implement the proposals. For this reason, he saw the proposals as
“one proposal which is to expand the Agricultural Department sufficiently to provide
Nigeria with Agricultural services which are adequate for the needs of the country,
bearing in mind that Nigeria is and will always remain an Agricultural country.”262 This
view by Mackie that the Nigerian productive force would always be agriculture was the
agricultural bias that pervaded the colonial state. If only Mackie could have foreseen that
by the 1970s Nigeria would move from being an agricultural country to an oil-producing
country. However, Mackie was right that Nigeria at the time was an agricultural country,
and I believe it is still an agricultural country. The majority of the people in Nigeria still
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rely on agriculture for survival. Though Nigeria’s economy is now based on the export of
crude oil, Nigerian farmed agricultural products remain a staple of internal trade. Apart
from poultry, only rice is a staple that is imported into the country at a commercial rate.
A good quantity of rice consumed in the country is also locally grown. The maize, yams,
cassava, plantains, etc. which are staples on Nigerian dining tables are grown locally.
These are not usually cultivated by big industrial farms but by peasant farmers. Despite
the oil revenues, agriculture remains the sector that provides the most economic
empowerment to the majority of Nigerians. A majority of Nigerians live in rural areas
and depend on peasant farming for their livelihood. From what they produce, they feed
their families and sell some to gain purchasing power. In a sense, Mackie’s vision of a
strong agricultural service that would be adequate for the needs of Nigeria in the present
and in the future was correct. Nigeria today, as in the colonial times, has been to a large
extent self-sufficient in food. What has plagued Nigeria is in its ability to produce
agricultural products for exports.
More specifically, the agricultural plan that was submitted was divided into five
sections: general agriculture including agricultural research, marketing and produce
inspection, agricultural training, irrigation and oil palm research. I will analyze each of
these sections. The estimated cost of the plan was £12,184,000 over the ten-year period.
Mackie thought because they wouldn’t have the staff necessary to implement the whole
plan within the ten-year period, it should for all practical purposes be considered a fifteen
year plan. He believed that the estimated amount that would be spent in the ten-year
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period of the plan would be £8,000 000.263 In estimating his plan, Mackie was afraid that
the financial demand they were making for agriculture was too large. He even indicated
that his plan might be criticized for being too excessive. He was being cautious when he
indicated that £8 million might be enough for the ten-year period. If one should follow
his logic that Nigeria was an agriculture country and would always be one, more
investment in agriculture should have been expected. The Nigerian development plan was
estimated at about £55 million. The estimates given by Mackie were only about 20% of
the cost of the development plan. Given the importance of agriculture not only to the
economic empowerment of the country and its potential to better the standard of lives of
the people, agriculture should have been expected to receive more investments. But in
light of the hostility that the department faced from the political authorities, it would have
been surprising if agriculture would have received more.
The first section of the plan was on agricultural policy in Nigeria. This section
begins with the definition of agricultural development. It stated: “Agricultural
Development is not a series of schemes it is a question of continuous research and sound
extension work. There is nothing else to it.” 264 This apt definition of agricultural
development laid the foundation for the plan. For many years, the view of agricultural
development was a proliferation of many schemes. The provincial and district officials
carried a series of schemes. Often, these schemes were carried out without making use of
all the technical resources available through the agricultural department because of the
tensions that existed. These schemes had a high failure rate. The proposed plan envisaged
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a more coordinated effort that would bring together research and extension work. Mackie
together with the department of agriculture, was a big advocate of agricultural research.
For him, the department should have spent several years studying any crop or system of
farming before the African farmer was asked to adopt it.
Why this was important was that a series of failed local schemes meant that
farmers were going to lose confidence in the colonial state. Failed crops had severe
consequences for the peasant farmer. As I have stated earlier in this chapter, one of the
biggest handicaps for the peasant farmer was labor. If a peasant farmer, who had been
cultivating maize, was introduced and encouraged to cultivate rice, and if he decided to
adopt rice as crop, it meant he had to reduce significantly the amount of maize he
cultivated or eliminate cultivating maize altogether. If rice had not been carefully
researched and studied over time to be sure that it would produce well in the region and it
failed, this would leave the farmer in severe circumstances. He had neither capital nor
reserves to rely on. There was always the problem of risk aversion for the farmer.
Farmers underwent such difficult circumstances during droughts and were reluctant to
invite such circumstances upon themselves with the introduction of new crops. Careful
research was necessary in order to gain the people’s confidence. Mackie writes, “From
the time when an Agricultural Officer is first posted to a new area it is usually at least 10
years before he can make any appreciable progress with extension work, but after that
steady progress can usually be recorded.”265 It took that much time because the officer
had to gain the farmer’s confidence through his own demonstration farms. Mackie
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insisted that for the agricultural policy of his department to be well carried out well, every
member of the agricultural department “must himself be a farmer, and he must be able to
farm as well as or better than the people of the district in which he is working.” He
continued, “It cannot be too strongly stressed that the main and perhaps only function of
an Agricultural Department is to teach the people how to farm better than they do at
present. It is therefore essential that the Department should actually farm a considerable
area of land, and that our farms in addition to being research stations should also be used
for the training in farming of both European and African staff.”266
The assumption was that if you were an agriculture officer, you know how to
farm. Mackie, from his several years of experience in the agriculture department, knew
that this was not always the case. It is possible to know the theory without actually
knowing the practical. Rather than standing and telling people what to do, Mackie wanted
agricultural officers to be hands on the job. They needed to know how to farm and not
only how to farm but also to be better farmers than the people that they were working
with. This is important because it was a means of convincing the people to take their
advice and to adopt their own methods of cultivation. Mackie wanted to be sure that
before the native form of cultivation was changed, the methods proposed by the
department had been thoroughly tested and found to be superior to the methods used by
the locals. He wrote, “We are therefore learning to farm under all possible conditions and
the more we study the question the more we become convinced that it is extremely
unwise to try and change native systems of Agriculture until we are sure that the change
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is sound from the point of view of the native farmer under his own local conditions.”267
What Mackie was proposing was not always the case in Nigeria or in most British
dependencies in Africa. The African farmer was frequently looked upon as inferior and
without any sound knowledge of cultivation. The colonial officer imposed a new method
of cultivation on them without taking into consideration the local conditions and this
often led to disaster causing the colonial official to lose credibility. For Mackie,
credibility was an important aspect of extension work and there was no better way of
gaining this credibility than by showing the African farmer that you are a better farmer
than him. Mackie wrote, “The African farmer is generally a capable Agriculturalist
within the limits of his own environment and tools and if we try to force him to do
something which he knows is unsound we merely lose both his confidence and
respect.”268 Peasant agriculture communities in Nigeria afford great respect and authority
as excellent farmers. The agriculture officer can gain this respect and authority by
showing his excellence in farming. This takes several years.
Another important aspect to agriculture policy in Nigeria was the training of
African staff. Mackie’s policy placed great importance on using more African staff in the
department. The departmental school in Ibadan had been training African staff since 1921
and the one in Samaru since 1928, and these staff were considered crucial to the success
of the department’s work. Mackie’s proposal was that the Ibadan school should be
expanded to award degrees in agriculture to African staff and he also looked forward to
when women would be trained as agricultural assistants. He wrote, “It is now generally
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agreed in the Department that to enable a European Officer to be of maximum value to
the country he should have an African staff of up to 20 trained people working under
him. The fully trained African Assistant has undoubtedly been a success and I am now
quite satisfied that there is scope for African Agricultural Officers.”269 What he meant
was that Africans should be trained to be district officers and not just assistants. He was
proposing that African staff should also be trained so that they would no longer be just
assistants to the European agricultural officers but could also be agricultural officers in
their own right. If this plan was implemented, it was going to bring about two important
benefits: it would help resolve the perennial problem of Nigerian agriculture which was
the dearth of agricultural officers and it would also be more financially economical to
have African staff in those positions than European staff. For Mackie, African staff
trained with degrees in Ibadan could go to Trinidad for advanced training in tropical
agriculture.270
Another big part of the agricultural development proposals was the reorganization
of the department. Mackie’s proposal took into consideration the decision of the governor
to move the director of the department to Lagos and also to appoint deputies for each of
the provinces. The director would also have a senior deputy director, a secretary and a
statistician working with him at the secretariat. The idea of having these additional staff
was to enable the director to travel more in order to give sound advice to the governor.
Mackie’s organization of the department was geared towards ensuring that every part of
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
269!Ibid.!!
270!The!Imperial!College!of!Tropical!Agriculture!in!Trinidad!was!founded!in!1921!to!provide!

postgraduate!training!in!tropical!agriculture!for!the!agricultural!services!of!the!colonial!empire.!Most!
of!the!graduates!of!the!school!were!appointed!to!different!agriculture!departments.!Upon!leaving!
Nigeria,!Faulkner!was!appointed!Principal!of!the!school!in!1938.!!

!

153!

!

the country was covered adequately with agricultural services. His goal was to provide
each agriculture officer with twenty trained Africans. He also understood that this was
not going to be possible in the ten-year period of the plan. He insisted that no position
was to be reserved for Europeans only. The reason for this was that he had the plan to
have Africans trained as agricultural offices and he believed that sooner or later many
qualified Africans would be available to assume these positions. Mackie was more
forward thinking than most of his peers, breaking down the racial ideologies that
Europeans were more capable than Africans. He believed that Africans would be able to
assume the same positions in the department that were being held by Europeans. This
attitude was one in which the African staff saw clearly and stated in their farewell speech
to him when he retired from the service in Nigeria. Their words that no one else in the
department had worked harder to advance the welfare of the African staff were words
borne of their experiences with him.271
Mackie’s agricultural proposal called for each deputy director to have a team of
specialist staff, experimental farms, a stock-farm and eventually a school where assistant
officers would be trained. Each province was also to have a team of agricultural
officers.272 This was in line with the plan to have everything well researched before the
African farmers were asked to adopt it. Nigeria was a place with varied climatic
conditions and topography. The expert team working with the deputy director would help
research and investigate crops and methods that would be suitable for the area. In the case
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of Nigeria, the approach was not going to be a one size fits all. The team of experts
working with the deputy director were to include botanists, a pasture research chemist,
entomologists, an engineer, an economist, experts in dairy, poultry, and pasture research;
a geneticist, a mycologist and an horticulturist. Mackie did not include soil conservation
officers even though Dr. Tempany had criticized him for this. Mackie’s argument was
that he did not like the term because he felt that “every Agricultural Officer and Forestry
Officer is a soil conservation Officer and they should never be allowed to forget it. To
apply this title to special officers is to give the impression to the others that soil
conservation is not their business.”273 While the other experts included in his list were all
directly related in some way to agricultural cultivation, he included an economist in this
list of experts who were to work with the deputy director. One may wonder about the
importance of an economist to rural agricultural development. If there was a need for an
economist, shouldn’t such an economist be working at the central secretariat? Mackie’s
plan called for a statistician working with the director of agriculture in the central
secretariat to help him with crunching data. At the provincial level, what he felt was
needed was an economist. The role of the economist was to closely study the economics
of peasant farming. He wrote, “farming after all is economics – and the Nigerian farmer
is an economist.”274 Having the economists at the local level helped with collecting data
on the economics of peasant farming and also to be able to access the economic
contribution that women made in peasant farming. It was very easy to see what
contributions the men made because they were the ones who were regarded as the
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farmers. Women made enormous contributions through their labor. They cooked meals
for those who worked in the farms, they helped with watering crops where irrigation was
not present and they also were the ones who did the weeding after the crops had been
planted. The peasant farmer, in choosing what crop to plant and what quantity to
cultivate, had to make an economic decision. This deserved study if native agriculture
was to be successfully expanded to better the economic lives of the people and the
economy of the colony.
True to his definition of agricultural development as being research and extension,
his plan, rather than focusing on developing big agricultural schemes, concentrated on
research/investigation and extension work. His idea was to have a strong research and
investigation center in each of the provinces and then extend the success of that labor to
the local farmers. The temptation in this late colonial period by some officials was to be
engaged in schemes that would guarantee quick returns and this we will see in the next
chapter when one of such schemes in Nigeria is discussed. Mackie understood that to
have a solid agricultural development project, it was going to take time and he saw no
need to rush through the process. He wanted there to be a solid foundation in research
and investigation. His plan encapsulates this principle. In the western province, there was
already the main research station, which was at Moor Plantation. This station was
equipped for both laboratory and field investigations. The area also had a stock farm that
was established in 1932 at Illorin. This stock farm was researching the breading of cattle
that would be resistant to trypanosomiasis.275 He proposed in the plan for a breeding farm
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to produce animals for distribution. At the time of drafting the plan, there was a farm
school in Oyo that was still operating on an experimental basis. If this farm became
successful, he proposed that many other farm schools should be established. While
Mackie’s plan is commendable in its emphasis on studying and researching the problem,
this had a weakness of not doing much in terms of practice. At a time when what the
country needed was immediate relief, his plan’s insistence on research meant things
would be going slowly.
Significantly, his plan did not call for the mechanization of cultivation, in contrast
to the kind of schemes we will discuss in the next chapter. The reason is because he
believed such initiatives would never be successful in southern Nigeria, and he felt that
they would spell disaster. They could only be successful, he argued, if they are
“accompanied by a sound system of manuring and soil conservation, for their use
involves the complete stumping of large areas.”276 He was very weary of using tractors
because he believed they caused erosion. Beyond the problem of erosion there was also
the cost and the problem of spare parts. The Mokwa agricultural development experiment
that we will analyze in the next chapter exemplifies these problems. Mackie’s plan called
for the trial of one large-scale government plantation in the western province based on
cocoa, citrus and white kola. His plan did not provide details on the size of such
plantations nor did it cost it.
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Unlike the western provinces, Mackie acknowledged that in the eastern provinces
agricultural organization was not as advanced. The main agricultural product from this
province was palm fruit. These grew wildly in the forests, unlike in the western provinces
where farmers had adopted the planting of cocoa or in the northern provinces were nuts
and seed were planted by the farmers. In the eastern provinces, there were no specialist
officers and no testing laboratories. There were, however, experimental stations in
Umuahia, Nkwale, Bamenda, Yandev, and in Esosong. It is important to note that Esoson
and Bamenda were in Southern Cameroons and this area was part of the eastern
provinces. In this province, Mackie felt that the first essential thing to do toward
agricultural development was research and experimentation. He wanted to establish a
central research station on the lines of Moor Plantation in this region. This station was to
be provided with laboratories, housing accommodations, buildings, water supply, etc.
The plan did not identify the location of a station as no decision had been made. His next
proposal for the region was a stock farm that would deal with “the improvement and
management of all kinds of stock including poultry.”277 Serious research in the eastern
provinces was important because one of the fundamental problems in the region was that
of soil fertility.
In his organization, he divided the northern provinces into the western area and
the eastern area. Samaru was the headquarters of the agricultural department in the
northern province. Like the western provinces, it had a research station, and several
studies had been carried out there on soil fertility and mixed farming. He proposed to
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
277!Ibid.!!

!

158!

!

establish new school buildings in Samaru and also to increase office, laboratory and
housing accommodations. He also proposed to develop irrigation, establish farm schools
in the provinces and have a settlement scheme for ex-soldiers. Mackie’s proposal in this
area was the testing of agricultural machinery and artificial manures. While he did not
support machinery in the western province, he was in support of machinery in the
northern provinces. The difference is that the northern provinces did not have as much
rains as the western provinces and thus erosion and the problem of soil losing nitrogen
was not as serious in this region as in the western provinces. The eastern part of the
northern provinces also suffered the same problems that the eastern provinces of Nigeria
faced. There was a lack of agricultural services there. There were no facilities for
research in the area. His plan called for the establishment of a headquarters for the
assistant director of agriculture and his specialist staff. He also wanted a central research
station, on the lines of the one proposed for the eastern provinces of Nigeria, to be built.
Such a center was estimated to cost £100,000. He proposed the establishment of an
experimental farm in Maiduguri and also the establishment of a school for training of
traditional administration and other junior staff.
When you look at the details of his agricultural plan discussed above, it is clearly
skewed toward research. His plan also devoted a whole section to oil palm research and
he made a case for it. One does not see big agricultural schemes in his plan. He was
biased toward research and extension work which he saw as key to agricultural
development in a peasant economy. He believed that if this was done in Nigeria, then
Nigeria would have a strong economic footing. As stated earlier, this plan was a revision
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of his 1940 plan and he kept much of the language of the old plan. As you read the plan,
you gain the impression that Mackie had all the intentions to carefully nurture this plan to
full implementation. The temptation is to assume that Mackie would be in Nigeria in
1955 or even 1960 as the director of agriculture to see the successful implementation of
this plan. But that was not the case. A few days after his submission of the plan on 30th of
January 1945, he resigned from his service in Nigeria and moved back to Britain. His
personal correspondences upon the occasion of his retirement showed that he was
frustrated with his service in Nigeria and he knew that he would not have the freedom to
implement this plan, which he had drawn up. In one personal handwritten letter to a
friend, he stated the reasons for resigning. He said the governor made it quite clear that
his departure from Nigeria was going to be welcomed by him. His second reason was that
he did not think systematic agricultural development was possible under the present
circumstances, a situation which the technical department was weakened by being
stripped of authority and subjected to the political officials. He couldn’t agree that the
director of agriculture should lose his executive authority and that his agricultural officers
should be taking instructions from administrative officers rather than from him.278 What
this means to him was that the agricultural service was a subordinate service. He also felt
that the Nigerian government was running a kind of dictatorship. The technical advisers
were no longer consulted and they were not allowed to make public their plans. Another
reason he gave were attempts to make him a subordinate to the director of supplies the
previous year, and he was at the moment made a subordinate to a second rate member of
his own service. He said all the main proposals of his predecessor, Faulkner, and his own
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main proposals of the past twenty years had been restructured by the administration. At
the end of his letter, he wrote, “I and my staff have reached the conclusion that the chief
concern of the Govt is to make Nigeria safe for Admin Dept. and Agric. Development is
merely a sideline. Naaja Lagos is rapidly becoming a public scandal and a job hunters
paradise. This is fully realised by the Africans.”279 His perceived marginalization of the
agriculture department meant that the government was against development. This is a
contradiction because the CO had already set in motion a plan for development and
change, which the Nigerian colonial state took seriously and was working toward. At
issue was a clash of power and visions of development. The political administration
wanted more control and centralization but Mackie wanted more control and a
decentralized approach.
Though Mackie’s plan became the agricultural plan for Nigeria, he never received
any public acknowledgement by the colonial government in Nigeria for his work in
drafting the plan. So, on the 17th of April 1946, he wrote to the S of S protesting that his
contribution to the plan was not acknowledged.280 The S of S made enquiries to Governor
Richards. In his response, Richards acknowledged that Mackie’s contribution to the plan
was considerable. However, he said as the governor he had to take full responsibility for
the plan. He continued, “The recognition that the various sections of the Plan had been
prepared by the officers named in no way implied that those Heads of Departments were
solely responsible for formulating the plans outlined therein.” 281 The governor also
argued that it was only possible for the heads of departments to quickly prepare the Ten
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Year Plan of Development because of the work that had been done to a large extent by
the previous heads of departments. He concluded, “Mr. Mackie is by no means the only
former Head of Department who has contributed to the proposals made in the Sessional
Paper, a great many both past and present officers have made valuable contributions. It
was not, however, considered fitting that acknowledgement of these contributions should
be included in a document of this nature.”282
With or without any public acknowledgement, Mackie was by far the most
influential person in Nigerian agriculture in the late colonial period and the CO was
aware of his contributions. When Mackie’s plan was up for discussion in the CO, Dr.
Tempany said, “I would like to say that Capt. Mackie’s plan represents the outcome of an
enormous amount of work spread over 5 years. When I was in Nigeria I had the
opportunity of discussing in great detail the earlier forms of the plan….I have nothing but
praise for this memorandum. I think that in its preparation Capt. Mackie has rendered a
signal service to Nigeria, and after studying it with care I can find no points in it with
which I am in serious disagreement.”283 Mackie was a visionary and set the department
on a path that if it had followed, would have avoided some of the mistakes that happened
after 1945 in Nigerian agriculture, such as NAP which will be examined in the next
chapter.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
282!Ibid.!!
283!Planning!&!Reorganization!of!Agriculture,!Minute!by!Dr.!Tempany,!30!June,!1946,!TNA:!

CO583/272/3.!!

!

162!

!

Conclusion
By looking at agricultural policy and planning in Nigeria through the lens of the
director of agriculture and his relationship with the administrative officials in Nigeria,
this chapter reveals the contradictions and tensions that existed between the two arms of
the colonial state: the administrative arm and the technical arm. The study shows that this
fractious relationship affected the successful planning of agricultural development in
Nigeria. In this battle between the technical department and the administrative
department in Nigeria, the administrative department won.
Agriculture was the foundation of the Nigerian economy and the success of the
1945 plan depended to a large extent on the success of agriculture. This was the main
reason that Nigerian officials wanted to frontload resources in the early years of the
plan’s implementation. The idea was that if agricultural production is strengthened and
expanded, then there would be resources beyond the ten years to continue to support
development in Nigeria. As was laid out in the first chapter, some scholars do not see the
1945 plan as truly a plan but an amalgam of schemes. An analysis of the agriculture plan
shows that this was a well-thought out plan that was based on several years of
agricultural policy in Nigeria. Though this plan had some practical schemes, it was
however based on a core philosophy that had guided the development of agriculture:
research, experimentation and extension. These three were the anchors of the agricultural
department during the years of Faulkner and Mackie. This tripartite approach led to the
success of green manuring in western Nigeria and mixed farming in northern Nigeria.
This chapter also shows that the agriculture plan was focused on replicating the successes
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of the western and northern parts of Nigeria in the south-eastern parts where there were
no serious research and extension work going on.
At the time that the Legislative Council passed the 1945 plan, most of the
agriculture schemes had not been approved and a substantial sum in the agriculture plan
was identified as “other charges.” This was because the agriculture department in Nigeria
was cautious in advancing schemes without first researching and experimenting them and
then having the necessary human resources to extend those services to the farmers. By
1947 when the Labour Government was in power in London and it was also the height of
the Sterling Crisis, there was a shift in agricultural policy in Nigeria. The agriculture
policy, which up until this moment focused a lot on research and careful trials, was
abandoned. One major consequence of this shift was the catastrophic failure of NAP
which we will see in the next chapter. NAP did not go through careful research and field
trials and it became a very expensive social experiment in modern agriculture.
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CHAPTER FOUR
PLANNING AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT: A CASE STUDY OF THE
NIGER AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT, MOKWA

Introduction
During the Second World War, James Mackie argued that there was a need for
agricultural production to be expanded, as this was necessary not only as a wartime
measure but also for the postwar period. In the last chapter, I discussed Mackie’s
proposals for the expansion of Nigerian agriculture which he believed was essential not
only for the colony itself but for the empire. Mackie retired from the Nigerian service
after submitting his agricultural development plan. Did any shift occur in Nigerian
agriculture after the departure of Mackie? In this chapter, I attempt to answer this
question by using as a case study, the Niger Agriculture Development Project, Mokwa
(NAP). This scheme defied Mackie’s agricultural policy that we saw in the previous
chapter. Mackie had insisted that no agricultural scheme and project should be carried out
without field trials and proper investigations. This scheme best exemplifies agricultural
planning in this late colonial period. Big agricultural schemes and projects such as NAP
and the East African Groundnut Scheme were introduced in British colonies at that time.
While most of the schemes have received plenty of careful studies, NAP has not.284
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The CDC & Economic Development After 1945
The period after the Second World War was a difficult time for Britain. The Sterling
Crisis of 1947 created severe economic hardship for Britain and her gaze was turned
toward empire for economic redemption. The Labour government impressed on
“individual administrations the need to intensify the exploitation of imperial resources in
an effort to use the colonies to earn dollars by exporting to the United States, and save
dollars through substitution of imports from the dollar area to Britain.”285 Earlier, in
1945, Parliament passed the CD&W Act to help develop the resources of the colonies for
the betterment of the colonial people. In 1948, Parliament passed the Overseas Resources
Development Act to develop the economic resources of the colonies. The goal of this Act
was to supplement what private enterprises were already doing in the colonies. There
were areas where private enterprises were not equipped or able to develop the economic
resources immediately, and the Act envisioned the British tax payer helping to fund
development in such places.
The Act created two corporations: The OFC and the CDC. The Overseas Food
Corporation was responsible for increasing world food production. One of the schemes
that has been associated with this corporation and has forever tainted it is the East Africa
Groundnut Scheme, Tanganyika. 286 The colossal failure of this scheme was a big
disappointment to those who had hopes in the economic potential of the resources of the
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
after!the!scheme!failed.!The!CDC!suggested!to!Baldwin!to!write!the!book.!A!long!time!has!passed!since!
Baldwin’s!book!and!I!think!this!project!deserves!a!new!look!and!analysis.!
285!Hodge,!Triumph'of'the'Expert,!208!
286!This scheme created in 1947 was taken over by the Overseas Food Corporation in April of 1948. The
project was estimated at £24 million. The scheme was in trouble by the end of 1948. The scheme was
abandoned in January of 1951. Hodge, Triumph of the Expert, 210-211.!

!

166!

!

colonies to power Britain during her economic dark times. Of interest in this chapter is
the CDC. The corporation was charged with the duty of “securing the investigation,
formulation and carrying out of projects for developing resources of colonial territories
with a view to the expansion of production therein of foodstuffs and raw materials, or for
other agricultural, industrial or trade development therein.”287 The CD&W Act of 1945
allocated £300 million for the development of the colonies. Of this amount, £110 million
was available for the CDC to borrow for its work in the development of the economic
resources of the colonies. The allocation of £300 million by the 1945 Act implicitly
distinguished between the “commercially remunerative” and the “commercially nonremunerative” aspects of economic development. Whereas the CO disbursed grants to the
colonial governments for their commercially non-remunerative work of development, a
public corporation (the CDC) disbursed the funds for the “commercially remunerative”
ventures of the British government. As a public corporation, the CDC was independent of
the British Parliament in its daily administration.288 The belief was that the CDC would
help Britain with its balance of payments crisis that resulted from the sterling crisis.
Arthur Creech Jones, the S of S, told Prime Minister Clement Attlee that the CDC was
going to increase colonial production “on an economic and self-supporting basis with an
eye to the production of foodstuffs, raw materials and manufactures whose supply to the
UK … will assist our balance of payments.”289 The British government wanted the CDC
to work and the S of S believed it would. The S of S had powers of directions over the
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CDC. He could give a general direction to the CDC board on matters that affected the
public interest. The CDC also relied on the S of S and the Treasury to approve loans for
every scheme that was carried out. This is because the CDC itself had no money of its
own.
Although the CDC could operate projects solely on its own, its preference was to
operate in partnership with commercial enterprises in carrying out development schemes.
When such an arrangement was entered into, there had to be a separate company founded
in which equity was shared and the CDC might directly control the operations of the
company. When the CDC entered into such partnerships, it was expected that it would
have controlling interests.290 In the early years of the CDC, the time period between 1948
and the end of 1950, it tended to be the sole owner of the projects or schemes that it
carried out. This was in stark difference from the idea of a public corporation in Britain in
which such bodies solely owned and controlled the scheme. Only eight of the fifty
projects that were in existence by the end of 1950 were in partnership with private
enterprises. After 1950, the CDC changed its model and was more engaged with private
enterprises for its schemes and projects. Wicker writes, “By the end of 1953 the
Corporation had reduced the number of projects for which it was solely responsible to
sixteen, and in five of these the C.D.C. was negotiating for association with private
enterprise or colonial government authorities.”291 The change in policy was as a result of
the heavy losses the CDC suffered in its early years. In order for the CDC to show
“vigorous and even spectacular activity” in its work of developing the colonies, the CDC
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engaged in some schemes that were not economically and commercially sound.292 The
change in 1951 was as a result of the conservatives coming to power. They decided to
disband the OFC and subjected the CDC to stringent regulations, making it much more
like a development bank.
The Oilseed Mission to Nigeria
The active presence of the CDC in Nigeria came by way of the oilseed mission that
visited West Africa in 1947. After the Second World War, there was great demand for
oilseeds in Europe. The oilseed mission to West Africa was mandated “to investigate the
possibility of the production of groundnut and other oilseeds in Nigeria.”293 This oilseed
mission reported that the area in which the NAP would eventually be situated showed
possibilities for large scale mechanized production of groundnuts. As envisioned by the
oilseeds mission, NAP had three goals:
1. To increase cereal and oilseed production for the local market and for exports.
2. To settle an unpopulated area with new village communities in which there is a
combination of collective mechanized farming and local agricultural skills and
experience.
3. To formulate a new pattern of farming which could be extended to cover all the
cultivatable land in the area and could be applied to other parts of the country.294
Nigeria was skeptical of introducing large scale mechanized farming in a peasant
economy. Before the introduction of the wooden ploughs in the late 1930s, attempts at
introducing small scale mechanized farming had failed mainly due to the cost of ploughs
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
292!H.!Nutcombe!Hume,!“The!Work!of!the!Colonial!Development!Corporation”,!Journal'of'the'Royal'

Society'of'Arts,!104,!4984,!(1956):!785.!
293
G. A. Abu, P. I. Ater and D. Abah, “Profit Efficiency among Sesame Farmers in Nasarawa State,
Nigeria,” Current Research Journal of Social Sciences 4,4 (July 30, 2012): 262.
294
A CDC Scheme for the Agricultural Development of an area near Mokwa, Nigeria (Niger Agricultural
Project, Ltd), 20 May, 1953, TNA: CO 554/458. !

!

169!

!

and their maintenance. Nigeria was persuaded to participate in this scheme because it
would be successful. The Gezira scheme295 in the Sudan was used as an example of the
success of such schemes that partnered between commercial corporations and tenant
cultivators. The colonial state dispatched two officers to go to Gezira on a fact-finding
mission in April of 1948. These officers visited both Gezira and the Mechanized Crop
Production Scheme at Ghadambaliya.296 The report of these two officers was influential
to the future direction of the scheme. There was a change “in emphasis from the increase
in the production of groundnuts, sought by the Oilseeds Mission, to mechanized farming
to give genuine independent settlers more corn to eat and larger share of crops to sell.”297
The production of food that the farmers could themselves consume was important and
this was in line with the policy that Mackie had laid down in the early 1940s. He had
insisted that farmers who cultivated cash crops must also be self-supporting by
cultivating enough food to feed their own families.
Early Settlements and Cultivation at NAP
In 1949, the CDC was asked by the CO to join the Nigerian colonial government
in establishing this scheme.298 In establishing the scheme, the CDC and Nigeria agreed
that the CDC would finance the scheme but Nigeria would be responsible for the losses
incurred in the first seven years of the scheme up to £31,793. Also, Nigeria guaranteed
the CDC a 3% annual return in the first ten years of the scheme. Based upon this
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agreement, work started at the site of the scheme in June of 1949. When work began on
the site, the staff included a manager and eight expatriate staff. No Nigerian staff was
employed at the professional level. The few Nigerians who were employed were clerical
staff. This initial team of expatriate staff established a training farm and an engineering
training school for the local boys. The involvement of Nigerians at this initial stage of the
scheme was by way of a local advisory committee. The chairman of this committee was
appointed by the Resident of the Niger Province. This committee was made up mainly of
Africans. Members were drawn from the traditional authorities and also included the
provincial heads of development departments. Though this committee had the title of an
advisory committee, their advice did not involve the technical operations of the scheme.
Their main responsibility was in choosing the settlers and dealing with their welfare and
complaints.299
As executed, the scheme had three partners, the principal ones being only the
Nigerian colonial government and the NAP. The settlers who were the third partner in the
scheme had no administrative representation or decision-making. These partners and their
responsibilities were:
1. The Nigerian colonial government. Through the traditional authorities, it provided
the land that was needed, the main roads, and the supply of water.
2. The Niger Agricultural Development Project Ltd. 300 This was the managing
company. This company was set up to deal with the problem of who has control
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over the scheme. It was responsible for administering the settlement area;
providing the farm roads, fertilizers, tractors and agricultural equipment;
providing the technical and mechanical staff; and to clear and prepare the land for
the initial sowing of seeds.
3. The settlers. They were responsible for the sowing of seeds, weeding, hoeing, and
in some cases harvesting.301
The model for the scheme was the crop-sharing undertakings that had already evolved
in the Gezira Cotton Scheme in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan that was considered very
successful. However, the designed plan for Mokwa only shared some similarities with
Gezira. Like Gezira, the land was parceled out to the different settlers. Gezira settlers
each received about ten acres of land. In the Mokwa scheme, the idea was to create ten
settlements and each settlement was to have eighty farmers with their families. Each
farmer was awarded 48 acres to cultivate, half of which would be fallow. Apart from the
acreage awarded to the farmers, there was to be another 576 acres that would be used as a
demonstration farm to conduct trials on crops and rotations. The goal was to have about
65,000 acres of usage when the project was in its full maturation.302 While the Gezira
farmers had ownership of the land, the settlers at Mokwa did not own the land. They were
only granted use of the land.
In the case of Gezira, there was a tripartite partnership structure: the cultivators, the
government and the Sudan Plantation Company. Though Mokwa had a tripartite
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partnership structure, the cultivators did not have an ownership stake in the scheme. The
farmers were tenants of the company and the Nigerian colonial government had the
responsibility of providing the farmers to the company. In both schemes, the management
company provided the technical supervision of the scheme.
There were two main areas where Gezira and Mokwa differed in significant
proportions. A major difference was in the area of mechanization. Unlike Gezira, the key
innovation in Mokwa was mechanization. Mechanization was to showcase the power of
modern technology in transforming rural agriculture. At Gezira, the tenants were
responsible for their own labor force to weed, pick the cotton, clean the fields and
maintain their irrigation ditches. 303 Another important difference between the two
schemes was in the area of research. It took several years of experimentation and field
trials through pilot schemes before settlers were brought into the Gezira settlement. This
was not the case with the Mokwa scheme. The scheme was quickly put together without
field trials and experimentation. This as we shall see later became one of the reasons for
the failure of Mokwa.
Despite the lack of field trials and experimentations, the first group of farmers moved
into the first settlement in 1951. This settlement was called Ndayako. The second
settlement, called Pannini, was established in 1952. The original plan was to have eighty
farmers in each settlement. Three years into the project, only 135 farmers had been
settled. The Ndayako settlement had 78 farmers instead of the eighty farmers that were
planned and the second settlement at Pannini only had 57 settlers. The Pannini settlement
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was comprised of people from outside of Mokwa. The first settlement had mostly people
from within the Mokwa area.
The progress of land clearance was also slow. In March of 1952, only about 7,754
acres of land had been cleared. The average cost of clearance per acre in November of
1951 was £12.8 and in February of 1952, it was £12.13.304 The continuous high cost was
associated with removing the tree stumps from the land that had been cleared earlier.
NAP was supposed to be a project that would showcase the power of mechanized
agriculture. The land was initially ploughed with Fordson Major diesel tractors and
Ransomes Dragoon disc ploughs. The clearing was done in a hurry and no one
considered stumping the trees. These concealed roots ended up creating problems for the
equipment and slowed the progress of the work. More than 5,000 acres of land that had
already been cleared had to be stumped and rooted manually by hand. As a demonstration
of how deep the roots were, the manager of the scheme kept in the verandah of his office
a lateral root removed that was 54 feet long.305 It cost about £13 per acre to remove the
stumps and to root the land. At the end, clearing was no longer done by machines but by
hand because it was considered by the management of NAP to be cheaper than any other
method. Mechanized clearing was considered to be extremely expensive in equipment,
maintenance, and staff.306 Mechanized clearing thus had to be abandoned. Mokwa’s
problems mirrored those of the East Africa Groundnut Scheme started only a little earlier
than Mokwa. The Groundnut Scheme like Mokwa was hastily conceived without
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allowing sufficient time for field trials and experimentations. This scheme was also billed
to be fully a mechanized scheme. Like Mokwa, this scheme experienced problems with
the operation of tractors and supplying the spare parts needed. The planners did not take
into consideration “the high attrition rate of the second-hand tractors, or the challenges
involved in removing the long, sinewy roots of the Kongwa scrub, which clogged the illsuited rooters, causing extended delays.”307
Beyond the problem of mechanized clearing were doubts that the management of
NAP began to have about the capabilities of the African farmer. Having been observing
the settlers for about a year, the management was not certain that the African farmer was
capable of cultivating the 48 acres of land that had been allocated to him. There was no
certainty that even after the company had ploughed the land and prepared it for sowing,
the farmer was capable of looking after the 24 acres of land under cultivation. According
to the regulations, half of the land had to remain fallow. This doubt raised a serious
problem for the economics of the scheme. O. E. Mercer, the regional manager of the
CDC in West Africa, believed that the economic viability of the project depended on how
much of the land the individual settler could cultivate. Given that the project company
had already spent half of its capital on a project that had not reached 25% completion, the
question was whether the scheme should continue expanding with the rest of the
settlements or whether it should downsize. If the company chose to continue with the full
implementation of the scheme, then more capital would be needed.308 The decision was
made that the company should await the end of the year report in order to determine the
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
307!Hodge,!Triumph'of'the'Expert,!211.!!
308

Notes of a meeting at the CDC, 29 June, 1952, TNA: CO 554/458.

!

175!

!

way forward. However, the company at this time was short of working capital and a
suggestion was made that the CDC should advance a loan to the company if the Nigerian
colonial government was unable to make arrangements for further capital in 1952.309 The
June 1952 report of the Mokwa scheme, while not as bad as the report ending in March,
still showed a bleak future. The general outlook in terms of production looked bad. The
cost of production greatly exceeded the value of output. The total acreage cleared by this
time was still only 8,225 acres. There was a delay in overhauling the tractors because of
the delays in the delivery of the spare parts. Spare parts were not found locally and so
they had to be imported. The cost of using the tractors was much higher than had been
expected because of the cost of maintenance. In fact, the tractor running cost was 100%
over the estimates.310
The increased cost of removing roots meant that the company was already spending
much more capital than was budgeted. By the second quarter of 1952, it became obvious
that the work could not continue without some additional capital infusion. To alleviate
the issue of capital, the CDC and the Nigerian colonial government equally subscribed to
an additional share capital of £60,000 to further finance the scheme. For the quarter that
ended in September of 1952, however, the scheme continued to fall outside of its
estimates. For example, it cost £11,258 to run the tractors. This was more than 100%
beyond the estimates. The estimates for seeds and fertilizers were £5,000, but the
company ended up spending only £1,500. The reason less money was spent than
estimated was because they could not find enough settlers to plant the seeds and to use
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the fertilizers. For the first nine months of the year, the company had already lost £22,763
and estimates were that the losses might be about £30,000 by the end of the year. The
outlook for 1953 looked bleak, as a preliminary study showed that the scheme would
continue to operate at a loss.311
At the end of 1952, the company had lost £29,599, an amount that was very close to
the projected loss of £30,000 in the September report. This was a loss of about £250 per
settler. The total amount of land that was cleared by the end of the year was only 8,684
acres. Just 1,704 acres of land was cleared for the whole of 1952. It became obvious that
in order for the scheme to become profitable, the revenue per acre had to increase
dramatically and the possibility of that was not in sight. The crops also had
underperformed. Due to dry weather at the time of planting, the groundnuts failed. The
bambarra nuts performed a little better, but maize and millets failed. The only crop that
performed well was guinea corn.312 The failure of groundnuts would not have been a
surprise to the settlers. They had earlier shown reluctance in planting them because they
understood that they would result in poor yields given the time of the year that they were
being planted. Groundnuts were usually planted in May, but farmers were asked to plant
groundnuts in July. They could not be planted earlier because they had not finished
preparing the land for cultivation. The experts that ran the scheme believed that the seeds
would still perform well under the circumstances. The results proved the settlers right.
The poor yield was bad for the settlers who had to rely on one third of the yield for their
own subsistence. Many of the settlers were unsatisfied and wanted to leave the
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settlement. By the end of the year, discussions were already opened between the CDC
and the Nigerian colonial government as to the future of the scheme.313
NAP as an Experiment
K. D. S. Baldwin argued in his book, The Niger Agricultural Project: An Experiment
in African Development that the scheme was never expected by the CDC to be very
profitable. He writes, “The scheme was never expected by the Corporation to be very
profitable. The Corporation pointed out to the Government that a wide-scale social
experiment of this sort brought great development advantages to the country concerned,
but was an abnormal risk with small return for any party unless the Government took a
large share in the undertaking.”314 The scheme was a good example of what James Scott
calls “High modernist.” At the heart of high modernism, he argues, “was a supreme selfconfidence about continued linear progress, the development of scientific and
technological knowledge, the expansion of production, the rational design of social order,
the growing satisfaction of human needs, and, not least, an increasing control over nature
(including human nature) commensurate with scientific understanding of natural laws.”315
Thus, Mokwa was considered a social experiment that would bring about progress and
change the human conditions of the people.
Christophe Bonneuil observes that the language of experimentation was one that was
deliberately used in development narratives beginning from the 1930s. Late colonial
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development schemes were viewed as experiments that were both scientific and social.
He argues that these schemes had two things in common: they put experts in power and
the physical and social space of the schemes was designed according to plans produced
by scientists.316 Before this time period, political officials relegated technical staff and the
scientists who worked in the African colonies to second-class status. Nigeria was no
exception. In the last chapter, I showed how the provincial and district officers treated the
agriculture department staff. Mackie resigned his service in Nigeria as a result of the poor
treatment of technical staff. In this late colonial period when massive agricultural
schemes were favored, the scientists and the technical staff were very powerful. They
designed these schemes, which were supposed to showcase the power of science in the
development of rural and backward regions. African colonies saw an upsurge of new
scientists and technical officers who pontificated over development in Africa. These had
the kind of authority and prestige that those who had worked before them in Africa could
have only dreamt of. Bonneuil writes that these experts “were mobilized by the colonial
state to help appropriate and master African environments, pathologies, and societies. In
British Africa, the 1930s saw increasing concern with soil erosion and deforestation as
well as with malnutrition and public health. These brought to power a flood of experts.
The gospel of soil conservation legitimized scientific measures (including confinement of
people in settlement schemes, where access to land and grazing were restrained) against
‘irresponsible’ Africans who had to be prevented from destroying their environment.”317
The value placed on experts thus changed during this late colonial period. In the early
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years of colonial rule “the administrative officers were more powerful, more conspicuous
and relatively more numerous.”318 However, in the late colonial period, the technical
officers “considerably outnumbered the Administration in the field and progressively
exerted more influence at all levels of government.”319 Mokwa witnessed the presence of
many foreign experts who were unaware of the local conditions unlike the previous
agricultural department staff who had spent several years working in the area and
understanding culture. As Baldwin rightly observes, “Undue haste at Mokwa gave the
farmers no time to satisfy themselves that the new methods were better than their own.
Furthermore, none of the senior staff had worked in Nigeria before. None spoke Nupe or
even Hausa, hence all their dealings with the farmers had to be through interpreters.
Finally there was a serious break in the continuity of staff at the end of 1950. It is
difficult to see how this could have been avoided. If no senior staff were available in
Nigeria, they had to be recruited from somewhere else.”320 After the resignation of
Mackie, many other senior staff had either resigned or requested to leave Nigeria. Also,
the staff who disagreed with the direction of Mokwa and how the whole project was
rushed, also left the Nigerian service.
The second common feature of this period was that the physical and social space of
the various schemes were in accordance with plans produced by “the scientific
bureaucracy.” Members of this bureaucracy included “engineers, planners, technocrats,
high-level administrators, architects, scientists, and visionaries.”321 They believed that the
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human condition could be improved through social engineering. Thus, “Agricultural and
social activities were construed in terms of uniform fields and villages, with rigid
schedules. Farmers were told what to plant and what cropping system to use. The timing
of each farming operation was centrally controlled.”322 Here was a social experiment in
which a traditional society was completely reorganized. The idea was that by organizing
a society in this way, production was going to increase. This social experiment was
created because of the circumstances that the Europeans found in Africa. The places
where these settlement schemes were going to be located had sparse populations and it
was difficult to bring the people under their control and to make them do what they
wanted. Locating the settlements in sparsely populated places provided at least two
advantages: they had the land that they needed without undue pressure from the locals
and they could exercise more power. By creating these new settlement schemes, the
Europeans were attempting to shift the balance of power from the agrarian community to
the company.323 Settlement schemes “were the laboratories where the developmentalist
state attempted to shape agrarian societies and environments so as to render them
compliant to ‘development’: more productive, more commensurable to expert
knowledge, and more amenable to state intervention.”324 This explains why the Nigerian
colonial government was willing to invest in NAP even though it knew that it may not be
profitable. It could invest in the scheme because it saw value in the social experiment.
The Gezira Scheme in the Sudan is a good example of how the Europeans changed a
whole social order. The area where the scheme was established was treated as if nothing
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had existed there before. The British did not take into consideration the social
organizations that existed and the patterns in which land was used. The goal was to bring
the people under British control and create a new social order. This scheme as Victoria
Bernal notes, “represented an attempt not simply to remake or reform rural Sudanese
society, but to create a (colonial) Sudanese society: a homogenous society of
hardworking and disciplined peasants. The British did not try to transform local practices
so much as obliterate them, starting literally from the ground up, with new systems of
production and productive relations of their own design.”325 The area in Mokwa was
treated as such and if NAP was successful, this would have been replicated in other parts
of Nigeria. Unlike Mokwa, Gezira was to a large measure successful. There are two
important reasons for this: the farmers in Gezira clamored to be part of the scheme while
those in Mokwa were not interested in being part of the scheme. There was no pressure
on land in Mokwa unlike Gezira where there was demand for the land. The second
important reason is that Gezira was preceded by decades of experimentation on a small
scale and Mokwa did not undergo experimentations.
Beyond the fact that NAP was a social experiment, to the scientists and technical
experts who created the scheme, it was a showcase of the power of planned mechanized
agriculture. The poor results and the near bankruptcy of the scheme just two years after
the settlements had been established created doubts as to its successful future. It is
important to note that when the oilseeds mission conceived this scheme, it was not
intended to be a social experiment. It was expected that it would be a profitable venture
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that would help alleviate postwar shortages fast. When the CDC examined the proposed
scheme, they ruled it a social experiment and marketed it to the Nigerian colonial
government as such. As the scheme began, neither the settlers nor the staff saw
themselves as part of a social experiment. Between the settlements of the first farmers up
until 1952, the scheme was not being described as an experiment. I believe that those
who were actually part of the work in the scheme believed that the scheme was going to
be successful economically. A major shift occurred in 1953 when the scheme was more
and more often described as an experiment. As was the case in the East Africa Groundnut
Scheme, the rhetoric of experimentation “helped to justify the huge amounts of money
lost in such schemes and to excuse in advance all errors.”326 In 1953, it was obvious the
scheme was failing. But describing it as an experiment allowed the scheme to avoid the
public embarrassment that its failure would cause both the CDC and the Nigerian
colonial government who were the two major investors in the scheme.
The major shift in the rhetoric of experimentation occurred when Elspeth Huxley, a
British/Kenyan writer and journalist, contacted the CO to request information on the
progress in Mokwa. She had earlier visited Nigeria and experienced first hand the high
hopes that the people had about the scheme. In February of 1953, she was writing a piece
that touched on NAP and wanted certain facts about the scheme’s progress. In her letter
to the CO, she wrote: “One has to be a bit careful with these things – one may write that
it is the blue-eyed pet of the Government and full of bright promise, and then find that it
has fallen under a cloud and is about to be closed as uneconomic.”327 The CO sent a
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proposed reply they had prepared for her to the CDC, which was directly involved with
the scheme. In it they wrote that, “I think that it would be preferable not to treat the
scheme as a ‘blue-eyed pet of Government’ but as a serious and rather expensive
experiment which would ultimately break even financially and point to a possible way of
mechanising African, peasant agricultural production.”328 C. W. Dumpleton of the CDC
responded to M. A. Willis of the CO requesting a modification in the document of any
suggestion that the scheme can be made to pay.329 The CDC knew that there was no way
the scheme would become economically viable. They were more comfortable with the
language remaining as that of experimentation. At the end, the response that was sent to
Elspeth Huxley read, “I think that it would not be preferable to treat the scheme as a
‘blue-eyed pet of Government’ but as a serious and rather expensive experiment. It might
also be desirable to point out that it will probably be necessary to wait for some years
before the value of the scheme can be assessed.”330 This response was carefully worded
and did not include the profit motive of the scheme. The scheme was an expensive
experiment, they argued, but it was going to take some years to assess its actual value.
What was the actual value of the scheme? The CO would later argue that it was not
economic. By saying the scheme was just an experiment, the emphasis was no longer on
profitability but on knowledge gained. Huxley’s response to the information received
showed that she was not convinced of the argument the CO was now making. She was
critical of their response. In a diplomatic way, she wrote: “All that you say is interesting
and confirms the general experience that none of these big mechanized schemes is really
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economic and the same goes for land settlement. I quite agree they have a value as
experiments even if they only prove negatives. Unfortunately (perhaps) a great many
Africans now feel that mechanization will solve all problems and get round the food
shortage everyone warns them about.” 331 Huxley’s own experience spending three
months traveling in Kenya and seeing the agricultural schemes that were carried out there
left her convinced that there was value in these agricultural schemes. Her book, A New
Earth, tells of many success stories despite the problems of agricultural development in
Africa. She devotes a chapter of her book to discussing the Meru settlement schemes,
which she claims everyone was proud of “because of their success and above all of their
economy.”332
Determining the Future of NAP
With the shift in the rhetoric to that of experimentation, the important question that
arose was the future of NAP. It was as if this was a preparation for the announcement of
the failure of the scheme. Most of 1953 was occupied with debates on the future of the
NAP. While J. D. Brown, the director of agriculture in the Northern Region, where the
scheme was located, believed that it was a failure and it should be ended, the local
Resident of the Niger Province, M. V. Rackhouse, made a strong case for continuing the
scheme. Brown’s argument was that the scheme was uneconomic and the knowledge that
would be gained from the scheme was not worth spending £50,000 each year. At the end
of 1952, the approximate cost of producing an acre of groundnuts or guinea corn was
£7.9. Even at a target of six settlements, the calculations showed that the cost of
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producing an acre would not fall below £6.2. The company’s revenue was dependent on
the value and field of the crop as well as the output of the settlers. The annual yield of
groundnuts was taken at 560 lbs per acre and guinea corn at 1120 lbs per acre. The price
of groundnuts in 1953 was £36 a ton and that of guinea corn varied. A reasonable and fair
market price of guinea corn for the sake of estimates was £15 a ton. The company based
future prospects on a price of £28 for a ton of groundnuts and £12 for a ton of guinea
corn. If the annual yield of groundnuts was 560 lbs per acre, then the company’s revenue
would be two-thirds of that. At £28 a ton, that would be about £4.13. The annual yield of
guinea corn was 1120 lbs per acre of which the company was entitled to two-thirds. At
£12 a ton, that would be about £3. Brown’s argument was that if six settlements were
operating at a full capacity, the cost of cultivating an acre would still be £6.2 per acre
while the revenue per acre for groundnuts would be £4.13 and that of guinea corn £3.
Based on the above calculations, the company would still lose £2.07 per acre in the
cultivation of groundnuts and £3.2 per acre in the cultivation of guinea corn. He argued
that there was nothing to suggest that “this revenue can be bridged by increased
efficiency in the use of machines, and on the basis of six settlements the price of
groundnuts would need to rise to £40 a ton before ends could be met. Even on a basis of
ten settlements maturing in twelve years the estimated cost of cultivation shows little or
no margin of profit from this revenue.”333
Brown also believed that the existing structure of remunerating the settlers did not
encourage them to cultivate more. Settlers were required to cultivate 24 acres while they
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allowed 24 acres to fallow. Brown did not believe that this was beyond the capabilities of
the settlers. He noted that there were indications that under the instituted structure even
the better settlers were unwilling to cultivate the full acreage. The reason he felt was
because they were required to do too much for too little pay. He wrote: “It is possible that
they may ask themselves whether they would not be happier cultivating even less than 8
acres in the bush in complete freedom rather than enjoying the products of 8 acres
cultivated under the direction and management of the N.A.P.”334 The problem here was
not the backwardness or conservatism of African farmers, it was the project design. The
amount of work the Africans were required to do was too onerous and the return was too
little.
One of the reasons advanced in the reports for the poor yield of crops in 1952 was
weather. The argument from the management of the scheme was that the low yield
resulted from the complete drought in August. Brown rightly argued that “Mokwa is in a
rain belt which more often than not has a ‘small dry’ period in July and August (unlike
the northern groundnut areas) and this factor is one of the many peculiarities of the belt
and only one of the problems that have to be met at Mokwa.”335 That the technical
experts were not aware of this shows how much they ignored the local wisdom. Nigerian
agriculture, as argued in the previous chapter, since Faulkner and through Mackie’s time
had a history of experimental trials and research. That NAP did not go through such trials
was a result of the urgency in getting the scheme started to cater to the shortage of the
oilseeds. Most people born in this region of Nigeria know of the “August Break,” a
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
334
335

!

Ibid.!!
Ibid.

187!

!

period marked by lack of rainfall. Brown’s conclusion was that there were no prospects
that this scheme would ever return any financial profits for its shareholders, that the
scheme was ahead of its time, and the mechanization of agriculture in the Northern
region “will not be economically feasible until prices of export crops on the one hand and
local wage rates on the other, rise very much higher than they are at present.”336
On the other hand, the Resident of the Niger Province, Rackhouse, had positive
prospects as to the future of the scheme. He argued that the scheme should not be
abandoned because it served a purpose beyond the immediate economic benefits. He said
the success of the scheme could not be measured based on the total yields or finance “but
only through visual contact with the scheme by those who have seen the improved tilth
after ploughing and the solid expanses of miles of growing corn in 1952 and of growing
groundnut in 1951.”337 The idea of visual contact was to show what was new and
modern. This was to distinguish what was now done at NAP with the traditional system
of cultivation. The idea of visualization was important and in the 1960s IR-8 was widely
used in Southeast Asia to distinguish tradition and modernity and also as “symbolic
divider marking the onset of a new political and economic dispensation.”338 The impact
of this scheme for Rackhouse was more than the economic bottom line. Rackhouse saw
the scheme as a complex scheme that would take time to sort out. Beyond it being an
agricultural scheme, it cut across different sectors of the Nigerian society. For that reason,
the scheme was not only plagued by technical problems but also by “economic,
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administrative, political and sociological problems which must also be solved. Even on a
small scheme, a solution to such a variety of problems can not be obtained over a short
term.”339 Rackhouse believed that the duration for which the scheme was in operation
was too short to condemn it to failure. Schemes of this nature took time to mature and so
the schemes should start small and build up slowly. He argued that the administration of
NAP was based on the Gezira Cotton Scheme in the Sudan. It took the Gezira scheme 50
years to reach its fruition of a million acres. He noted that at the initial stages of the
Gezira project, “moderate targets were often being reduced in scope.”340 The Gezira
scheme started with a pilot project of only about 1.038 acres irrigated by pumps in 1910.
It was only after the successful production of cotton that work started on the construction
of a dam in Sennar in 1913. World War I interrupted the construction of the dam and it
was finished in 1925. Between those years of constructions, additional pumps were
installed to help with irrigation.341 In terms of planning and execution, the Gezira scheme
had a long view in mind. Though it has often been hailed as one of the major successes of
agricultural development planning in Africa, Tony Barnett argues that in broader
historical terms it is not. It is “stagnant, holds little hope of continually rising living
standards for its inhabitants, and, as a major component of the Sudanese economy, it
exposes that economy, and thus the society, to considerable potential and actual
instability.”342 Rackhouse wanted NAP to be looked upon as Gezira and given several
years for it to mature. His reasoning was that NAP had the potentials to help in the
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development of peasant farming across Nigeria. The question then becomes, how long
did the scheme need to be in operation before it could be determined if it was successful?
Should it be 50 years like the Gezira project or seven years as it was originally planned?
These were questions that Rackhouse did not answer.
Rackhouse was not absolutely sure that NAP would be successful. His argument was
that if NAP failed, it would help prevent repetition elsewhere. For him, it was an
experiment and thus he argued strongly for its continuance. He wrote:
The experiment is only beginning. On the agricultural side, this season is the
first when the ploughs have had comparatively rootless land to operate in.… A
curtailment of the scheme now would be a great disappointment and set-back to
the Native Authorities and the people of this Province and to all those from
outside who have followed its progress with the greatest interest. … This
experiment is being closely watched at home and in other colonies and should
not be abandoned before failure is clearly demonstrated.343
Rackhouse’s defense of the scheme was a question of prestige. Even at this late stage,
he was arguing that the scheme should be expanded to six settlements and then later to
the ten settlements that were originally planned and that the government should be
responsible for the capital to achieve this. He also saw the merit of the scheme as it
served as a model for other areas. He wrote, “… this scheme must be regarded as an
experiment which is to some considerable extent aimed at solving land development
problems which also occur in other African colonies.” 344 The Inspector-General of
agriculture in Lagos agreed with Rackhouse that the scheme should be considered as an
experiment. He wrote, “The Resident, Niger Province, quite rightly states that the project
is an experiment, and is only just beginning. There should be no consideration of
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abandonment as too much is at stake, not solely from the consideration of invested
capital, or from the requirements of the local area, but from an all-Nigerian development
aspect.”345 The issue here was that of prestige. Abandoning this scheme would lead to
doubts about colonialism and its ability to deliver the goods.
In arguing that the scheme was an experiment, this means that lessons were going to
be learned from the scheme whether good or bad. If we agree that this project was purely
an experimental scheme as has been argued by the major stakeholders, then it was a very
expensive experiment. It was expensive not only in terms of the financial resources
poured into it but it was also in terms of the human resources. Apart from the Europeans
who managed the scheme, many African farmers and their families had invested their
time and labor into what was not sold to them as an experiment. The farmers who were
recruited for the farms were not told they were living laboratories. They had hopes of
better agricultural production in the scheme. The community at large was affected as the
scheme tried to create an artificial community in which the people were no longer
directly responsible to their chiefs but to the company. A new social organization and
relations never before present were now created. In a way, NAP disrupted completely not
only the economic lives of the people but also their social relations. Continuing the
scheme in the same pattern for the unforeseeable future meant continuing to destroy both
the economic and social lives of the African farmers.
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Negotiating the End of NAP
In the last section, I discussed the arguments for ending NAP by Brown and the
arguments for continuing NAP by Rackhouse. The CDC was determined to withdraw
from the scheme because it believed that it had a fiduciary responsibility to British tax
payers and should not continue to lose money for what it considered an experiment. By
the early part of 1953, the financial stakeholders of NAP felt that they had three possible
options on what to do with it: abandon the project, continue it at its present level, or
expand it to five or six settlements and then perhaps later to ten. Each of these courses
posed a problem. If the project was discontinued, it meant that the stakeholders had to
acknowledge that the project had failed. Here, the stakeholders had varying interests. If
the CDC was the only shareholder of the company, this would be the course of action it
would take because as a corporation, it had a responsibility to it shareholders and profit
was part of that responsibility. In assessing whether to wind down the scheme, the
Nigerian colonial government had different considerations from those of the CDC. It had
to take into consideration “sociological and political factors, and economic considerations
besides the single one of profit.”346 To continue the scheme at the present level meant that
the project would be continued on an experimental basis, a situation that the CDC might
not be interested in funding. If the CDC withdrew its financial support, the colonial
government would be forced to assume full financial responsibility and administrative
control of the scheme. That meant that the company founded to run the scheme would
now be solely owned by the Nigerian colonial government. There was no doubt that the
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CDC wanted Nigeria to take over the CDC’s investment at face value. This meant that
the Nigerian taxpayer would have to assume the losses of the corporation given that as
part of the agreement for the CDC to be involved, Nigeria was going to cover the losses
of the first seven years. Expanding the scheme to five or six settlements meant that more
capital had to be injected into the scheme. The question was where would this capital
come from? The CDC estimated that the total capital required for expansion to five
schemes was £560,000 and to six schemes was £580,000. The conditions under which the
CDC was willing to provide more capital were unfavorable to the Nigerian government.
It said it could only do so by debenture, which is basically a certificate of indebtedness.347
Given the three actions that could be taken, it seemed obvious that the CDC would
withdraw from the scheme. How would they do this?
A discussion had already been opened between the Nigerian Central Government
(NCG) and the Northern Regional Government (NRG) on the future of the scheme.
While the CDC was awaiting the response from the NCG, it took the step to officially
withdraw its support for the scheme. In a letter on the 30th of November, 1953 to M. A.
Willis of the CO, the director of the CDC, C. W. Dumpleton, wrote, “We still await the
Central Government’s definite proposals but I am now writing you formally to seek
approval for the Corporation’s intention to abandon participation in this scheme and to
ask that it shall qualify for waiver of interest.”348 The CO did not provide an immediate
waiver sought by the CDC. It did not want the CDC to just abandon the project but
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wanted the CDC to negotiate an exit from the scheme with the appropriate local
authority. In his response, Willis wrote:
Definite approval, however, would have to await such a satisfactory agreement
and the Secretary of State will wish to be given the opportunity to consider the
terms of the agreement before it is finally accepted by the Corporation. He will
wish in this connection to be given a full report on the reasons which have
induced the Corporation to abandon its participation and to be satisfied that
adequate arrangements are made under the agreement for an appropriate
valuation of any assets belonging to the Corporation which are transferred to
other authorities.349
Even before the Corporation had the opportunity to respond to the request of Willis,
the S of S, Oliver Lyttleton wrote to the Officer administering the Nigerian government.
He seemed not to have been aware of the debates that had been going on both at the CDC
and also by some of the experts in Nigeria. His letter made reference to the positive
report that had been given by G. W. Nye, his deputy agricultural adviser, after his visit to
Mokwa in November of 1952. The tone of his letter was very positive and even hoped
that other regions of Nigeria may be interested in the project. He offered to send one of
his advisers to Nigeria to help with determining a future for the project should there be a
need for such assistance.350 The information the S of S had about the NAP was old; the
project continued to experience losses in 1953. He was basing his comments on the
assessment Nye had given in his 1952 report in which he concluded that if the project
were allowed to proceed without being pressured to be profitable, it would be successful
under the present management.351

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
349

Willis to Dumpleton, 23 December, 1953, TNA: CO 554/458.
S of S to the Officer Administering the Government of Nigeria, telegram, 14 January, 1954, TNA: CO
554/458.
351
Report by G.W. Nye on Niger Agricultural Project, 29 November, 1952, TNA: CO 554/458.!
350

!

194!

!

This however, was not the belief of most of the stakeholders in the scheme. It was
almost impossible to find anyone who was a major stakeholder in the scheme who in
1954 still believed that the scheme would be successful within three to five years. As I
have demonstrated earlier in this chapter, even ardent supporters of the scheme such as
Rackhouse were at this time looking at it more as an experiment that would take several
years for it to be successful in terms of knowledge gathered. Economic success at NAP
was not even a serious factor under consideration. This goes to show the disconnect that
existed between the CO, the CDC, the NCG, and the technical experts. When these
colonial development schemes are seen from a distance, one may be tempted to see a
heavily coordinated attempt by the different elements of the British bureaucracy to carry
them out and to exploit the colonies. When these schemes are looked at closely, as in the
case of NAP, a disjointed organization with different competing interests is evident. This
bureaucratic confusion was sometimes responsible for the failure of these post-war
development schemes.
Be that as it may, the Governor of Nigeria, Sir John Macpherson, responded to the 14
January, 1954 letter from the S of S. The governor updated him on the different proposals
that were being considered as a result of the CDC’s decision to withdraw from the
project. The Nigerian Council of Ministers considered four alternative solutions. The first
NCG to take over the interest of the CDC in the scheme and then invite the NRG to take
over control of the project. The third proposal was for the NCG to take over the interest
of the CDC at valuation and then invite the NRG to provide the funds that were needed to
cover the recurrent expenditure of the scheme for another five years. The final
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consideration was for the NRG to take over the interest of the CDC and assume all the
cost required to continue the scheme for the next five years.352 The decision of the
Council of Ministers was that the NCG could not assume any future financial
responsibility for the scheme, and thus it had no interest in operating the scheme or taking
over the interest of the CDC in the scheme. The NCG was willing to transfer its shares in
the scheme free of charge to the NRG. The decision was placed by the NCG on the NRG
that had the choice either to operate the scheme with or without the CDC or to wind it
down.353 The NCG’s offer to transfer its shares in the scheme to the NRG was not a gift
but a liability. It was obvious to the NCG that the scheme was a failure and continuous
participation meant investing in a project that would not reap any benefits. This goes to
show also that the Council of Ministers was not persuaded by the arguments of both the
Niger Resident and the Inspector General of Agriculture. Their papers arguing for the
continuance of the scheme were made available to the Council of Ministers. By April of
1954, when a parliamentary question was asked on the future of the scheme, the CO
responded clearly that both the Nigerian colonial government and the CDC had
withdrawn from the scheme and it was now under consideration by the NRG. The NCG
continued to fund the scheme awaiting the decision of the NRG. The reason they did this
was to make sure that there was no break in continuity should the NRG choose to
continue the scheme.354
As the governor reported in May, the NRG was interested in continuing the scheme.
It made a bid of £60,000 for all the assets of NAP. The NCG and the CDC accepted the
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bid. This proposal, however, was subject to the approval of the Executive Council of the
NRG.355 By taking over this scheme, the NRG was assuming responsibility over the
management of the scheme and its employees, who were to become staff of the NRG.
The Executive Council of the NRG did not immediately approve the transfer of the
company to the Northern Region.
While the NRG saw great value in the continuation of the scheme as an experiment, it
had problems with the cost that this would entail. Their plan was to modify the settlement
scheme and reduce it to a compact area of about 4,000 acres. A pre-requisite for the
scheme was “some further clearing against tsetse fly, re-alignment of holdings and
protection against erosion.” 356 The modified scheme was going to closely study
mechanical cultivation and cropping and the size of holdings. They were also going to
examine the possibility of introducing cattle to the scheme. The scheme needed to solve
many technical issues and they felt that an experimental farm would be essential to its
success.357 With the modification of the scheme, the cost also reduced. The capital cost
was going to be £91,500 and the annual recurrent cost was estimated at £21, 000. They
were going to approach the S of S to provide £51,000 grants from the CD&W funds. This
was over and above what was already allocated to the NRG. The NRG proposed to
provide the remaining £40,000. They had a second plan should the S of S refused to grant
them the request. They were going to find savings under the agricultural section of their
present development plan. For the annual expenditures of the scheme, the NRG was
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confident that it could provide £10,000 annually and was requesting that the S of S to
provide the remaining £11,000 as an extra grant. The annual revenue accruing from the
scheme in the first year was estimated at £4,000 and it was expected to cover the cost of
ploughing.358
In the negotiations with the NRG, both the NCG and the CDC agreed that the 1st
of June 1954 should be the date that the full responsibility of the scheme was going to be
transferred to the NRG. The long awaited response from the NRG was only received on
the eve of the day the official transfer of ownership was supposed to take place. The
response was not an approval of the Northern Executive Council, but rather, a request for
money from the CD&W fund to help her cover the £106,500 that the scheme would cost
over the next five years. The basis for such a request was that the cost of running this
scheme was an unexpected commitment and it was important that the scheme should be
continued. They cited from the S of S own confidential letter to the governor in which he
agreed with his agricultural adviser’s view that the scheme was important and its value
was not only good for Northern Nigeria but would make a valuable contribution to the
agricultural development of Nigeria. 359 Their argument here was that the imperial
government had some responsibility to help aid the project with the CD&W funds. Was
the letter sent at this last minute when the NCG and the CDC were about to abdicate
responsibility over the project an attempt to force the hand of the CO to provide funding
for the scheme? It may as well have been perceived that way. The NRG itself was afraid
that it may be viewed that way. Thus, the letter said toward the end: “I am to emphasize
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
358!Ibid.!!
359!P.

!

H. G. Scott to F. E. V. Smith, 31 May, 1954, TNA: CO 554/1269.!

198!

!

that this request is in no sense an attempt to take advantage of the present situation and
public interest in this country and in the United Kingdom in Mokwa.”360 Obviously, it
was.
The situation was that both the NCG and the CDC had already decided to
abandon the project. The NRG had to accept to continue the project because of two
reasons. The first reason was that the settlers were subjects of the NRG and the
government had a moral obligation to these settlers. The second reason was that the
NRG, for some unexplained reason, seemed to be convinced of the experimental value of
the scheme even though its director of agriculture had argued against continuing the
scheme. If the scheme was not continued, it would have been a public embarrassment to
the NRG, which had raised the hopes of the people on the value of the scheme, and also
the technical experts who had created the program and had believed that it was going to
work. Although the abandonment of this project would have created a public relations
problem for the CO which would have had to deal with stories of abandonment of
another set of settlers in a settlement scheme they were associated with, the CO would
have been fine with the scheme closing because the Labour Party was defeated in 1951.
The Conservative Party was in government and they were opposed to public sector
development.
Though the NRG was making a request for CD&W funds on the eve of the
official handover of the scheme, the handover still took place as planned. On the 1st of
June, 1954, the CDC and the NRG handed over control of NAP to the NRG. A day later,
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the NRG wrote a letter to the CO requesting for a grant to cover cost of continuing the
project. Dick Gresswell, a Nigerian official who was back in Britain on holiday visited
the CO to discuss the letter. He met with two officials there. Three main points emerged
from that meeting. He was told that it was contrary to the existing policy for CD&W
funds to be used to rescue CDC projects. The second point was that there was no
parliamentary authority that permitted the Treasury or the CO to give CD&W funds after
the end of 1955/56. This is because the 1945 Act was for a ten-year period. So, there was
no need to ask for grants for the recurrent expenditures for the next five years. And the
final point was, “Provided that H.M. Treasury agree that the new Mokwa project is
eligible for C.D. & W. assistance, the probable ruling by the Colonial Office will be that
costs, ever and above the Regional contribution to the end of 1955/56, must be met from
balances in Nigeria’s current territorial allocation.”361 While the CO did say they had not
heard anything from Nigeria regarding the proposed grant that the NRG was requesting,
they did agree to approach the Treasury and to inform them that Nigeria would be
making an application for assistance for the NAP scheme effective 1st of June 1954.
Gresswell’s take away from the meeting was that the CO was expecting a new plan that
would lay out what the NRG intended to do at Mokwa and how that fitted into the Ten
Year plan and why it was not included before.362 Given that the CO was expecting the
NCG to communicate with them in reference to grants for the Mokwa scheme, the Acting
Governor of Nigeria sent a letter to the S of S on the 29th of June, 1954 making a strong
case for assistance to the NRG for the NAP. Most of the letter laid out the history of the
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scheme and re-echoed the same arguments, and sometimes the same language, in the
letter of the financial secretary of the NRG on the 31st of May 1954. The acting governor
concluded his letter by writing:
I shall therefore be grateful if you will give consideration to the possibility of
making available assistance from Colonial Development and Welfare Funds to
the Northern Regional Government bearing in mind the fact which your
Agricultural Adviser has pointed out and which was contained in your saving
No. 111 of the 14th of January, 1954, that the scheme stands a chance of success
and should make invaluable contribution to the Agricultural development of
Nigeria provided it is not expected or required to show a profit in the nearest
future.363
It is interesting how they were using the words of the Secretary of State as a way of
convincing him to provide support for the scheme. In his reply, the S of S, Lyttleton
accepted to consider an application for assistance from the CD&W funds without making
any commitments. He, however, informed the Acting Governor that should the
application be approved, the money had to be found from within the allocation that had
been made to the Nigerian territory. Money would not be sourced from other areas of the
CD&W fund.364 The problem the NRG faced was that the CD&W fund was coming to
the end of its ten-year period. The NCG was also not committed to using the funds that
were meant for the whole of Nigeria for the NRG.365
NAP under the NRG
After the NRG took over the scheme, the scope of operations was reduced as had
been planned prior to take over. Palmer, the agricultural engineer was asked to list all
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equipment available and to indicate which ones were required to run the project for the
meantime. Other equipment was to be transferred to other stations or sold.366 The NRG
was also prepared to sell some of the buildings in Mokwa that they felt were not going to
be useful for the project. Unlike the old grandiose plan to establish a big settlement
scheme, the scheme under the control of the NRG was much reduced and was truly an
experimental and pilot scheme. What was happening at this time was what should have
happened in 1949 when the scheme was conceived. In a meeting held on the 7th of June
1954 by some of the senior staff of the Agricultural department,367 it was agreed that only
a minimum experimental work should be carried out at the initial stage in order to assess
the “possibility of extending the working season.” It was also decided that parts of the
Demonstration farm should be used for experimental purposes. For the next planting
season, the Project was to be prepared to cultivate not more than 3,000 acres and not less
than 1,500 acres.368 This figure was a far cry from the project’s initial goal of cultivating
65,000 acres. The acres that they were projecting to cultivate were even smaller than the
8,684 acres that they had cleared and were planting at the end of 1952. Capping
cultivation at 3,000 acres was truly a step toward cutting cost and using the project purely
for field trials and experimentation. After the NRG took control of the project, the
emphasis was on planting guinea corn, soya beans, groundnuts, and cotton. The new
scheme had fewer settlers. It had only about 90 farmers that were settlers in 1955. In
August of 1955, the farmers were debited with the cost of cultivations, cash advances and
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the value of guinea corn that was supplied to them as food. This amounted to about
£11,546.10. Farmers then sold their produce to the NRG. The NRG did not expect it to be
profitable anytime soon. It was seen as an experimental station even on the eve of
Nigeria’s independence. In the post-colonial period, a college of agriculture was built in
the Mokwa area and the area remains a strong agriculture region. NAP never became a
huge success in mechanized rural agriculture as was envisioned, but it was successful as
an experimental station.
Problems with NAP
Residents of Manchester, United Kingdom woke up on the morning of the 8th of
July, 1954 to see a big headline in their local paper, “ANOTHER GROUNDNUTS
SCHEME Failure in Northern Nigeria.” The article went on to report that the Niger
Agricultural project, Mokwa, which was initiated in 1949 with colonial development and
welfare funds, sought to develop an area of over 2,000 square miles, but it had to be
wound up only after developing a little more than 8,000 acres. The story concluded by
making references to the failure of the Tanganyika groundnut scheme.369 The failure of
this project was a source of embarrassment for the British as they were still living in the
shadow of another failed development scheme, the East Africa Groundnut scheme. The
important question that needs to be answered is why did NAP fail?
The first problem with this scheme is in its initial planning. This scheme started
without any extended field trials. The Faulkner and Mackie agricultural policy in Nigeria
since the 1920s had insisted on extensive field trials before schemes were to be carried
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out. This was not the case with NAP. Given the proportion of this scheme, why were
there no field trials? There were no field trials to truly determine if the location was good for
agriculture. The only considerations were the fact that there was good water supply, high rainfall
and easier evacuation routes.370 Like the East Africa Groundnut Scheme, the CDC and the
colonial state did not resort to any field trials because there was a need to develop export
industries in Africa quickly. The scheme was rushed because Britain needed foreign

exchange to deal with its balance of payments. The scheme also needed to be done
quickly to help pay for Britain’s post-war reconstruction. There were limited experiments
that were carried out in the demonstration farm that was run by the company but these
were on the “the use of fertilizers and variety trials.” 371 No one had a scientific
knowledge of which seeds were going to be more productive in the settlement. Both the
CDC and the colonial state were in a rush to start this scheme that was started before the
managing company and board was formed.372 On one hand, the CDC argued that the
scheme was not a financially profitable venture but a social experiment and on the other
hand, they were rushing the scheme.
There was a founding hope that NAP might be successful. Rackhouse revealed in
his confidential memo that,
a decision was taken about the lay-out of the scheme during a five minute ride
over it in an aeroplane and grave mistakes resulted. An aerial survey was
undertaken at great expense of the whole of Kontagora Emirate whereas a close
contoured plan of the pilot area was required… Insufficient attention was paid
to the question of water supply, it being assumed that the provision of water at
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the bottom of a well was adequate for settlers who had never pulled a skin of
water from a well in their lives.373
Rackhouse, the Resident of Niger at the time, was very critical of the scheme. This
scheme was neither his idea nor that of other local officials. It was a project that came
from the outside, in this case the metropolitan government, and it went completely
against the local tradition of careful research and incremental change. Not only was the
scheme an outside project but it was also micromanaged by the central organization of
the CDC in London. Rackhouse argued that the central organization tried to
micromanage the project in order to get quicker returns. They insisted on clearance and
cropping targets and wanted immediate returns for the money invested in the scheme. He
wrote in the secret memorandum:
by insisting on clearance and cropping targets and immediate returns for their
money they [CDC] caused a loss of some £20,000 to £30,000 over stumping,
breakages of machinery and waste of manpower. These stumps are still being
removed at great expense and there is still a large area to do. They were
responsible for sowing up by direct labour the newly cleared land with guinea
corn, thus incurring a great loss both in money and prestige when it failed.374
The management of the scheme was pressured for quicker returns.375 This meant that the
management could not have long term planning and execution in view but would have to
resort to options that would raise money immediately. Investigations and proper trials
were skipped.
The third major problem this scheme faced was that of settlers. This problem plagued
the scheme from the onset. A political decision was made that for the first settlement,
settlers should only be drawn from the Mokwa area. The reason behind this was the fear
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that the local people would oppose settlers being brought in from other regions of the
country and this would create problems for the execution of the scheme. Many
immigrants, such as Igbo people of Eastern Nigeria who were residing in the Northern
Region and had provided the first labor for the scheme, were prevented from participating
in this settlement. Even for the rest of the settlements, the decision was made that settlers
should only be drawn from the Northern Region. The reason was because of the contempt
that northerners had toward the southerners. Settling southerners in this region would
seem like the southerners were taking over. The north was not able to supply enough
manpower for the efficient execution of the scheme. For a scheme that involved the
resources of the whole of Nigeria, there shouldn’t have been tribalism in the allocation of
settlements. Settlers should have been brought from wherever in the country there were
willing people to work. NAP was plagued by the same problems that besieged the Office
du Niger. Like the Office du Niger, Mokwa was a sparsely populated area. The initial
settlers were from the local area but as the project expanded, recruitment of settlers
became a major problem that preoccupied the French.376 As settler recruitment become a
major problem, the French started using coercive recruitment techniques. For NAP, by
the middle of 1952, there were already concerns about its prospects as there were issues
attracting settlers and the first year’s outcome wasn’t satisfactory. The Ndayako
settlement was a great failure from the onset. There was no mechanism to insure that
these settlers were qualified to be awarded land. Most of them were attracted by the
desire to get land for nothing. It was later discovered that a large number of these settlers
were not good farmers and were not interested in doing their share of the work. Most of
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these settlers decided to leave by the end of 1952, after the failure of the groundnuts and
an aggressive collection of the two-third proceeds by the company.377 At this point, only
one settlement had been fully established and there were hopes that the second settlement
would be fully established by the end of 1952; and then the third settlement in 1953. By
March of 1952, only one and a half settlements had been achieved. In discussing the
quality of settlers to the settlement, Baldwin writes that when the department of labor in
Kaduna was asked to send all available men of Northern Provinces or adjacent French
territory who were seeking work. The 225 men who arrived were unimpressive:
Some were ex-Servicemen, who appeared never to have wanted work, let alone
agricultural work. Others were obviously thoroughly unfitted for hard manual
work – one had a withered leg and could not walk without the help of a stick,
another had advanced syphilis, two had been discharged unfit from the Army
and four or five were aged about 80. Within three weeks, desertions had been so
heavy that only eighty-seven remained. Shortly afterwards most of the others
left, some of them being sentenced to imprisonment by native courts as rogues
and vagabonds for idling round railway stations.378
By the end of June, 1952, 24 of the original 78 settlers in the Ndayako settlement
had been replaced and in order to achieve the standard of cultivation desired, 24 more
settlers needed to be replaced. By September of 1952, four more farmers were dismissed
from the Ndayako settlement and farmers were resistant to hoe areas for the cultivation of
groundnuts and Bambara nuts. As a result of this, the company was forced to take over
the direct cultivation of 260 acres of land.379 Losing more than half of the settlers in the
first year of the settlement meant a great waste of time and resources. The settlers were
not familiar with the type of farming they were being introduced to. They had to learn,
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and the hope was that they could get better in time thereby leading to more positive
results. Continually replacing the farmers meant that no significant experience was
gained. New settlers had to be trained. This meant expending a lot of time and resources.
The problem of settlers is one that continued to plague the scheme throughout its
existence. To attract volunteer settlers was a problem because the people in the region
were not starving for land and they considered where they were already farming as fertile
land and there was no reason for them to abandon that to embrace a new form of farming
that had not been tested and proven to be more beneficial than their own ways bequest to
them by their ancestors. Thus, finding settlers became a perennial problem and that was
the reason the settlements were not being filled according to schedule. Before the end of
1952, the company was forced to replace ten unsatisfactory settlers and nine more had
surrendered their holdings.380
Another problem that the scheme faced was mechanical. The tractors that were
used were not suitable for the land. Based on the experiences acquired by the engineering
department of CDC from the East African Groundnut Scheme, they decided against
mechanized clearing of Mokwa. They ruled out the use of the 80 horsepower bulldozers.
Their understanding was that only 130 horsepower bulldozers would be suitable. These
were not readily available in Nigeria. They needed to be shipped from the United States
and it was going to take several months, which meant the project was going to be delayed
for several months. This was also going to significantly increase the budget of the
project.381 At the end of the day, they used the equipment that was readily available, the
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Fordson Major diesel tractors and Ransomes Dragoon disc ploughs. These machines
suffered mechanical problems, and they had to wait some times for months for spare
parts to arrive from overseas. Baldwin writes that the “delays in the arrival of machinery
and parts was, throughout the period of operation of the scheme, a great administrative
problem. In April 1952 two senior officers had to travel personally from Mokwa to Lagos
to search for cases of spares which had been mislaid somewhere on Apapa wharf ...
Matters were not helped by the inefficiency of the postal system. The delivery of letters
and packets, and even the supply of stamps was irregular. Parcels clearly marked Mokwa
were sent to Minna, 140 miles away.”382 The mechanization aspect of the project created
so many problems that they had to resort to hand tools. At the end, mechanization failed
and the traditional African methods triumphed.
Another problem that plagued this scheme was the lack of consultation of local
knowledge. There is no evidence that the local people were consulted in the planning
process of the project. The scientific experts carried out the survey of the area and
determined the location of the settlements and the property in the settlement. The
contributions of the local emir or leaders were very marginal. They served in the advisory
board but their role was limited to recruiting settlers and disciplining them. If the local
people were consulted, the way the residential quarters of the farmers were built would
have been done differently. The houses were built facing the roads. This style of building
was alien to the local people. They built their houses facing each other, creating
compounds. They saw this style of construction as a means of social bonding. The
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settlements never felt like home to the settlers and thus many of them lived in Mokwa
city and came from there to their farms, thereby defeating the purpose for which the
houses were built. The locals also understood the weather patterns and the appropriate
times in which to plant their seeds. The technical officers never sought this knowledge
from the locals.
Another problem that marred this project were the incentives. The settlers
received one-third of their produce, while the company took two-thirds of the produce.
The settlers did not see any incentive to cultivate more because they felt that Europeans
were exploiting them. Based on the calculations, the average African farmers who did not
live in the settlement and were not part of the scheme cultivated about four acres of land
a year and earned an average income of £25 a year. They did this while having the choice
to cultivate whatever they wanted to. A settler who was forced to cultivate about 24 acres
of land still made about the same income. As Baldwin argues, “It is clear that in the first
two years the average incomes actually earned by the settlers were only a half to threequarters of what the average local farmers were obtaining on their much smaller plots
without the aid of mechanical equipment.”383 This was also part of the reason why many
of the settlers chose to desert the settlement. Given that they could make as much money
cultivating a smaller portion of land without the strict orders of the Europeans, they chose
freedom over living in the settlement. The morale in the settlement was very low and the
settlers did not believe in the scheme. For a scheme of this nature to work, the settlers
must be committed to the project. In the case of NAP, they were not. The settlers could
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not be forced to work either because there was no proportional punishment. Expelling
them from the settlement had little or no negative impact on them. They returned to their
normal lives with their families.
The problems that plagued NAP were the same that many other large agricultural
settlement schemes experienced in this period. These problems were lack of local
knowledge, failure of mechanical equipment, settler unrest or high turnover, etc. All of
these problems could be explained with one term, “poor planning.” The desire to produce
quickly blinded them to the need to carry out extensive field trials. Even the Gezira
scheme, which was hailed as a success story and upon which NAP was fashioned, took
several years of incremental trials and expansion. NAP ignored thirty years of wisdom
that was propagated by the agriculture department in Nigeria. What we learn from the
failure of this scheme is that “any successful agricultural extension scheme based on
large-scale, highly capitalized methods, depends initially on adequate knowledge about
the characteristics and significance of tropical conditions, about the theory of this kind of
development, and about the complex conditions existing in the actual area in which the
development is contemplated. Secondly, any kind of agricultural innovation should
proceed slowly and carefully, for the object of rural development should be simply to
graft on to indigenous life the things that it lacks.”384 Development schemes are only
successful in as much as the planning is done properly. Proper planning takes not only an
assembly of technical experts and colonial bureaucrats, but it has to involve the local
people for whom the process is intended to benefit. It is also a mistake for “experts” to
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assume that the ways of the locals are primitive and foolish. As I have argued severally in
this chapter and in the prior chapter, there is sense to peasant agriculture. Their ways of
cultivation may not be advanced in the mechanized sense but they have generations of
wisdom we can learn from. Some of the mistakes of NAP were those that could have
been easily dealt with if the designers and executors of the scheme consulted both the
native wisdom and the wisdom of the agriculture department in Nigeria.
Conclusion
The failure of this scheme and many other similar schemes during the colonial period
was not a requiem to these schemes. The 1950s were the eve of independence for most
African nations. Ghana’s independence was in 1957 and Nigeria’s independence was in
1960. The nationalists and the educated elites saw mechanization as the way forward for
their nations to prosper economically. Rather than allowing these schemes to die or to replan them from the scratch, the emerging African leaders expanded these schemes or
created new ones. They believed that food security and economic development meant a
massive take over of agricultural development by the government. They did these by
pouring more financial resources (usually with borrowed money from international
financial organizations) into these schemes. Some of the European expatriates who
managed these failed schemes continued to be technical advisers under the new regime.
NAP remains a good example. Though it was seen as a failure in early 1953, the CDC
and the company did not just abandon it and walk away. They had to look for a new
trustee for it and this was the NRG. The scheme would continue into the post-
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independence period with modifications. But as I have argued above, this scheme was
plagued by problems and did not fulfill the goals for which it was conceived.
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CHAPTER FIVE
Recreating the Nigerian State: The National Development Plan, 1962-1967
!
Introduction*
!

Though!colonial!rule!ended!in!Nigeria!in!1960,!development!planning!did!not!

end.! The! emerging! Nigerian! leaders! saw! development! as! an! instrument! for!
dispensing!the!benefits!of!self\rule.!Between!1955!and!1962,!the!different!regions!of!
the! country! and! the! federal! territory! wrote! and! attempted! to! implement! different!
development! plans.! These! plans! suffered! a! starvation! of! funds! and! were! poorly!
implemented.!Some!of!the!major!schemes!that!were!initially!billed!to!be!part!of!the!
1955!development!plans!became!part!of!the!1962!plan.!Though!the!1955!plans!offer!
a! segue! between! development! in! the! colonial! and! postcolonial! period,! it! is! not! my!
goal! in! this! work! to! analyze! those! plans.! The! goal! in! this! chapter! is! to! analyze! the!
planning!process!that!resulted!in!the!1962!national!plan.!!
Unlike!the!1945!colonial!plan,!the!US!and!international!organizations!were!a!
major!factor!in!the!design!and!implementation!of!this!plan;!and!African!agency!was!
stronger!than!in!the!former!plan!because!Nigeria!was!now!an!independent!country.!I!
will! show! that! the! independence! of! Nigeria! and! the! active! presence! of! the! United!
States! and! other! international! organizations! and! foundations! such! as! the! World!
Bank,! the! Ford! and! Carnegie! foundations! did! not! signify! a! break! in! development!
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policy.! In! fact,! the! same! policies,! most! especially! in! the! agricultural! sector,! were!
continued.!!
This!chapter!will!look!at!how!American!social!scientists!such!as!Walt!Rostow!
and! his! compatriots! associated! with! the! CIS! were! motivated! by! modernization! to!
influence! the! US! government! to! financially! support! development! work! in! Nigeria!
with!the!goal!of!recreating!it!into!a!modern!country!in!the!image!of!America.!I!will!
argue!that!despite!the!bold!development!prescriptions!of!modernization!theory,!in!
practice,! it! continued! late! colonial! era! development! policies! such! as! the!
development! of! rural! agriculture.! This! study! will! also! show! that! the! US!
government’s! acceptance! of! modernization! theory! and! its! willingness! to! provide!
substantial! financial! aid! to! the! 1962! plan! was! not! completely! altruistic! but! was!
stimulated! by! the! Cold! War! and! America’s! desire! to! align! itself! economically! with!
the! most! populous! African! nation,! with! the! aim! of! creating! a! new! market! for!
American!goods!and!businesses.!!
The*Rise*of*Modernization*Theory*
The!post\!World!War!II!period!witnessed!enormous!changes!in!the!world!and!
American!social!scientists!were!in!a!mission!to!bring!the!gospel!of!modernization!to!
the!developing!world.!Nils!Gilman!argues!that!these!social!scientists!suddenly!found!
modernization! a! seductive! category! during! this! time! because! of! three! factors:!
decolonization,! the! availability! of! resources,! and! the! Soviet! influence! that! was!
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moving!beyond!Europe!to!former!colonial!areas.385!During!his!inauguration!speech!
of! 20! January,! 1949,! President! Harry! Truman! in! his! fourth! point! gave! his! foreign!
policy!as!follows:!!
We! must! embark! on! a! bold! new! program! for! making! the! benefits! of! our!
scientific! advances! and! industrial! progress! available! to! the! improvement!
and! growth! of! underdeveloped! areas.! More! than! half! the! people! of! the!
world! are! living! in! conditions! approaching! misery.! Their! food! is!
inadequate.! They! are! victims! of! disease.! Their! economic! life! is! primitive!
and!stagnant.!Their!poverty!is!a!handicap!and!a!threat!both!to!them!and!to!
more! prosperous! areas.! For! the! first! time! in! history,! humanity! possesses!
the! knowledge! and! skill! to! relieve! suffering! of! these! people.! The! united!
States!is!pre\eminent!among!nations!in!the!development!of!industrial!and!
scientific! techniques.! The! material! resources! which! can! afford! to! use! for!
assistance!of!other!peoples!are!limited.!But!our!imponderable!resources!in!
technical!knowledge!are!constantly!growing!and!are!inexhaustible.386 !!
Later!that!same!year,!the!Truman!proposed!his!“Fair!Deal”!domestic!agenda!in!his!
State! of! the! Union! speech.! This! agenda! proposed! modern! liberal! policies! such! as!
more!federal!aid!for!education,!universal!health!care,!and!full!employment.!This!was!
the! American! version! of! the! “welfare! state”! that! was! at! the! very! same! time! being!
introduced!in!Europe.!Such!promises!made!by!Truman!were,!however,!defeated!by!
the!conservative!dominated!congress.!The!failure!to!create!a!modern!liberal!state!as!
envisioned!by!some!of!these!social!scientists387 !internally!within!the!US,!led!them!to!
turn!outward.!They!sought!to!achieve!externally!what!could!not!be!fully!achieved!in!
the! US,! by! recreating! American! style! society! around! the! world.! Decolonization!
provided! an! opportunity! to! the! fulfillment! of! this! dream.! The! partition! and!
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387!Some!of!these!social!scientists!were!Walt!Rostow,!Lucian!Pye,!David!Apter,!and!Gabriel!Almond.!
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independence! of! India! and! Pakistan! in! 1947! inspired! many! other! colonies! to! seek!
independence,!not!only!in!Asia!but!also!in!Africa.!The decolonization movement was
an attempt by colonial people to free themselves from! the! imperial! grips! of! the!
European!nations!whom!they!had!been!under!for!several!decades.!In!the!late!1940s,!
every! African! nation! with! the! exception! of! Liberia! and! Ethiopia! were! under! some!
European!imperial!domination.!What!was!also!true!during!this!period!was!that!most!
of!these!African!nations!were!moving!toward!independence.!!
The! rise! of! the! nationalist! movements! and! the! concurrent! resistance! of! the!
people! to! colonial! rule! created! problems! for! the! European! states! in! their! colonial!
holdings.! For! their! part,! the! European! states! emerged! from! World! War! II! heavily!
bruised! both! economically! and! psychologically! and! lacked! the! capacity! both! in!
human!and!economic!terms!to!hold!onto!empire.!As!hard!as!they!tried!to!hold!onto!
the!colonies,!by!the!1950s,!it!became!clear!to!them!that!decolonization!was!in!their!
best!interest.!
America’s!unique!and!vital!role!during!the!war!placed!her!in!a!new!position!
in! the! world! stage.! Though! President! Roosevelt! was! philosophically! opposed! to!
European! empire,! the! administration! of! Harry! Truman! and! later,! Dwight!
Eisenhower,!maintained!solidarity!with!the!colonial!powers!against!the!nationalist!
movements!until!the!Suez!crisis!of!1956!in!which!the!Eisenhower’s!administration!
forced! Britain! to! abandon! its! imperial! quest! in! Egypt.! This,! as! Monica! Belmonte!

!

217!

!

argues,! was! a! shift! in! US! policy! toward! colonial! rule.388!As! she! argues,! US! policy!
toward!Africa!during!the!Cold!War!rested!on!the!assumption!that!self\determination!
was! not! an! “unqualified! right”! but! was! something! to! be! earned.! Drawing! upon!
cultural!supremacy!and!racism,!US!officials!believed!that!“non\western!peoples!had!
to!show!themselves!ready!for!independence!according!to!western!standards.”389 !US!
continuous! support! of! colonial! rule! was! motivated! by! a! racist! idea! that! Africans!
were! not! prepared! to! govern! themselves! and! thus,! would! be! vulnerable! to!
communist!influence.390!The!independence!of!Ghana!in!1957!and!the!willingness!of!
Ghanaian! leaders! to! deal! with! the! Soviet! republic! did! not! assuage! the! fears! of! US!
officials.! Belmonte! writes,! “Washington,! dubious! of! Nigerian! fitness! for!
independence,!embraced!the!undemocratic!regime!the!British!put!in!place!as!likely!
to!preserve!Nigerian\UK!bonds.!If!a!vigorous!Nigerian!nationalism!was!driving!the!
UK! from! its! empire,! London! still! retained! enormous! power! to! determine! which!
Nigerians!would!inherit!the!colonial!state.”391 !
Though!the!old!colonial!masters!still!had!their!grips!on!the!emerging!African!
nations!in!the!late!1950s,!American!sphere!of!influence!became!greater!in!most!of!
these! colonial! holdings.! America! was! present! through! international! funding!
institutions! such! as! the! IBRD,! American! foundations! such! as! Ford! and! Rockefeller!
and! a! slew! of! American! businesses! and! technocrats! who! were! giving! expert! and!
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technical!advices!to!the!emerging!countries.!The!American!presence!in!these!nations!
was!not!to!establish!formal!empires!as!in!the!case!of!the!British!or!other!Europeans.!
Unlike! imperialist! Europeans,! “Americans! did! not! subscribe! to! the! idea! that! some!
ethnic!or!racial!superiority!gave!them!the!right!or!indeed!the!obligation!to!rule.”392!
Moreover,!American!social!scientists!saw!an!opportunity!to!recreate!these!emerging!
countries!into!the!likeness!of!the!US.!Given!that!these!nations!were!rich!in!natural!
resources,!the!idea!was!that!if!American\style!free!enterprise!was!promoted!in!these!
places,!American!businesses!would!stand!to!benefit!which!also!means!that!America!
would! stand! to! benefit.! In! the! course! of! their! struggle! for! independence,! the!
nationalist!movements!in!these!emerging!countries!had!promised!their!supporters!
that!the!nation!would!become!as!modernized!as!those!of!their!oppressors.!What!was!
also! true! was! that! this! was! going! to! be! very! difficult! to! achieve.! The! emerging!
political! leaders! of! these! nations! had! neither! the! economic! resources! nor! the!
manpower! to! carry! out! this! vision! for! their! nations.! American! social! scientists!
stepped! in! with! what! Larry! Grubbs! calls! “The! Gospel! of! Modernization.”393!A! key!
part!of!this!gospel!was!economic!improvement.!As!Gilman!writes,!“American!social!
scientists!and!policy!makers!proposed!economic!improvement!as!a!solution!to!the!
challenges! of! decolonization! because! greater! prosperity! was! one! of! the! few! things!
they!felt!capable!of!providing!to!foreign!countries.”394 !
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Rhetorically,!modernization!theory!was!different!from!colonial!development.!
In! Africa,! the! British! pushed! for! the! improvement! of! the! social! conditions! of! the!
colonial! people! through! the! 1940! and! the! 1945! CD&W! Acts.! What! they! were!
attempting!to!do!was!too!little!and!too!late.!Though!extensive!plans!were!drawn!up!
to!help!in!this!work!of!development,!it!was!never!their!intention!to!provide!Africa!
with!both!the!economic!resources!and!social!facilities!to!bring!it!on!par!with!Britain.!
For! some! of! the! colonial! officials,! Africa! and! Africans! were! always! going! to! be!
inferior!to!Europeans.!The!proponents!of!modernization!theory,!such!as!Rostow!and!
Marion!Levy,!saw!modernization!as!a!phased!and!homogenizing!process.395!Some!of!
these! American! social! scientists! actually! believed! that! the! conditions! of! African!
nations! could! be! changed! and! Africa! could! and! should! become! more! like! America.!
For! them,! nations! underwent! a! historical! process! from! primitive,! traditional!
societies! to! modern! societies.! They! argued! that! traditional! society! is! bereft! of! an!
advanced!economic!system!and!is!dependent!on!agriculture.!The!traditional!society!
is!also!backward!in!thinking.396!!A!good!example!here!is!how!this!society!deals!with!
gender.!A!traditional!society!lacks!liberal!democracies!and!social!amenities!such!as!
good! and! universal! health! care,! public! education,! and! human! rights.! What! was!
modern! was! a! direct! opposite! of! what! was! traditional.! The! modern! state! for! them!
was!an!industrialized!state.!It!afforded!its!citizens!human!rights!and!saw!health!care!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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theory!because!Rostow!had!great!influence!on!CIS!and!the!work!their!social!scientists!did!in!Nigeria.!!
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and!public!education!as!rights!afforded!to!every!citizen!and!not!things!available!to!a!
privileged!few.!This!view!rested!on!the!assumption!that!African!societies!and!culture!
was!backward!and!stagnant!and!needed!to!be!changed!from!the!outside.!Such!a!view!
was!tendentious!toward!cultural!superiority!and!arrogance.!!!
!Modernization!theorists!such!as!Walt!Rostow!believed!that!African!societies!
could! be! moved! from! traditional! societies! to! modern! ones.! In! their! thinking,! this!
process!could!even!be!hastened!in!order!to!enable!these!nations!to!reach!that!point!
faster.! The! way! to! achieve! this! was! through! systematic! and! scientific! central!
planning.! In! the! 1950s! and! 1960s,! most! of! these! theorists397 !worked! at! policy!
studies!centers!and!think\tanks!where!they!helped!to!craft!plans!of!modernization!
for! emerging! nations.! Their! goal! was! to! make! these! nations! look! like! the! United!
States! and! not! the! Soviet! Union! or,! after! 1949,! China.! This! was! a! wholesale!
marketing! of! American! culture.! What! was! sold! to! these! nations! was! not! only! the!
American! political! system! but! also! her! economic,! social! and! cultural! system.! What!
was! traditional! in! these! nations! was! to! be! replaced! with! what! was! modern.! There!
needed!to!be!a!break!with!what!was!considered!traditional!norms.398!To!achieve!this!
goal,! it! was! not! important! for! these! scientists! to! painstakingly! understand! the!
culture! of! the! people! and! to! try! to! work! from! within! that! culture.! Their! arrogance!
convinced! them! that! the! inherent! culture! of! the! people! was! no! longer! suitable! for!
the!modern!world.!Such!a!culture!needed!to!be!replaced!with!what!was!modern.!The!
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failure! of! modernization! theory! can! be! attributed,! at! least! partly,! to! its! failure! to!
understand! and! work! from! within! the! cultural! system! of! the! people.! This! was! a!
major! problem! with! the! 1962! development! plan! as! we! will! see! later.! Unlike! the!
colonial!development!models!espoused!by!people!like!James!Mackie!which!insisted!
on!the!understanding!of!local!conditions!and!culture,!the!1962!plan!was!designed!by!
foreign! experts! who! were! ignorant! of! the! ethno\cultural! rivalries! and! politics! of!
Nigeria.!!
The*Advent*of*Modernization*Theory*in*Nigeria*
One! African! nation! that! was! important! for! the! evangelists! of! the!
modernization! gospel! was! Nigeria.! Two! American! social! scientists,! Arnold! Rivkin!
and! Wolfgang! Stolper! associated! with! the! CIS! made! unique! contributions! toward!
Nigeria’s! 1962! development! plan.! These! men,! together! with! CIS,! used! Nigeria! as! a!
laboratory! for! the! experimentation! of! Cold! War\era! modernization! theory.399!The!
appeal! of! Nigeria! for! these! men,! and! in! fact! for! CIS,! stemmed! from! the! fact! that!
Nigeria! was! Africa’s! most! populous! nation! and! its! emerging! leaders! exhibited!
moderate!political!views.!To!Rivkin,!a!Nigeria!recreated!in!the!American!image!could!
serve!as!a!model!to!other!African!nations!at!a!time!when!voices!of!communism!were!
raging! in! the! continent.! However,! the! US! was! interested! in! keeping! communism!
from! taking! hold! in! Nigeria! because! this! would! have! been! disastrous! to! the! US!
economic! goal! of! building! more! capitalist\oriented! economies! throughout! the!
continent.! Modernization! gospel! came! to! Nigeria! not! only! because! of! the! fear! of!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
399!Grubbs,!“Bringing!‘The!Gospel!of!Modernization’!to!Nigeria,”!283\84.!
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communism!but!also!because!of!the!belief!that!Nigeria!could!be!built!into!a!modern!
economic!society!with!a!liberal!democracy.!
CIS!played!an!influential!role!in!US!government!policy!circles!because!it!was!
a! center! whose! very! founding! was! inspired! by! the! government.! ! At! its! core,! CIS’s!
mission! was! to! fight! against! communism! and! to! spread! American! style! democracy!
around!the!world.!The!Truman!administration!established!CIS!in!the!hopes!that!its!
work! would! help! to! counteract! the! spread! of! communist! propaganda! around! the!
world,! which! was! very! successful! in! swaying! people! to! its! political! ideology.! The!
Voice! of! America,400!which! was! used! by! the! US! government! as! an! instrument! to!
reach!the!people!of!Eastern!Europe!and!the!USSR,!was!failing!to!achieve!its!goal.!As!
Blackmer! notes,! Soviet! “jamming! of! Voice! of! America! radio! broadcasts! behind! the!
Iron!Curtain!had!by!1949!become!so!effective!that!only!about!five!percent!of!VOA’s!
Russian!language!transmissions!were!getting!through!to!Moscow.!In!the!summer!of!
1950,!Undersecretary!of!State!James!Webb!turned!to!MIT!for!help.”401!!
MIT!was!expected!to!help!the!US!government!find!technical!ways!in!which!to!
stop! the! jamming! of! the! radio! signals.! The! project! was! called! Project! Troy402,! “the!
idea!being!to!smuggle!a!Trojan!horse!bearing!the!American!vision!of!the!world!into!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
400!The!Voice!of!America!(VOA)!was!founded!in!1942!as!a!shortwave!radio!station!to!broadcast!

commentary!(propaganda)!about!the!war.!The!first!live!broadcast!was!on!February!1,!1942!and!it!
was!to!Germany.!!
401!Donald!L.!M!Blackmer,!The'MIT'Center'for'International'studies:'The'Founding'Years,'1951Y1969!
(Cambridge,!Massachusetts:!MIT!Center!for!International!Studies,!2002),!4.!
402!This!was!a!project!of!the!State!Department.!It!was!codenamed!Troy!after!the!wooden!horse!that!
the!Greeks!are!said!to!have!hidden!their!army!for!them!to!secretly!gain!entrance!into!Troy.!The!idea!
of!the!project!was!to!deal!with!both!the!technical!issues!and!political!warfare!that!was!necessary!for!
the!US!to!gain!entrance!into!Eastern!Europe!and!USSR.!!
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the! enemy! camp.” 403 !The! President! of! MIT,! James! Killian,! and! the! Dean! of!
Humanities!and!Social!Studies,!John!Burchard,!were!interested!in!the!project!on!the!
condition!that!they!would!tackle!not!only!the!technical!aspects!but!also!the!broader!
communications!issues.!This!meant!that!social!scientists!were!going!to!be!included!
as!part!of!the!research.!Webb!agreed!to!the!condition!and!within!a!few!days!Killian!
wrote! to! inform! him! of! MIT’s! desire! to! proceed! with! the! project.! The! study! was!
supposed!to!last!for!three!months.!MIT!did!not!have!all!the!resources!in!the!social!
science! department! to! help! with! the! project! and! so! Killian! sought! help! from! Paul!
Buck,! the! Harvard! provost.! Four! faculty! members! were! recruited! from! Harvard! to!
help! with! the! project.404!A! year! after! Project! Troy! was! completed! and! the! report!
submitted,!Max!Millikan,!who!was!an!active!member!of!Project!Troy,!was!named!the!
Director! of! CIS.405!CIS! was! created! in! January! of! 1952! and! its! initial! seed! money!
came!from!the!CIA.!The!center!would!also!receive!a!grant!of!$875,000!from!the!Ford!
Foundation!as!initial!moneys!to!help!it!with!its!communications!research!programs.!
Other!foundations,!such!as!Rockefeller!and!Carnegie,!would!also!contribute!funds!to!
the!center!within!the!first!decade.406!The!creation!of!the!center!was!the!brainchild!of!
the! participants! of! Project! Troy.! The! first! research! project! of! the! center! actually!
started! in! the! fall! of! 1951! with! Walt! Rostow! supervising! a! study! on! “Soviet!

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
403!Blackmer,!The'MIT'Center'for'International'studies,!4.!
404!These!were!Edward!Purcell,!a!physicist;!Jerome!Bruner,!a!psychologist;!Robert!Wolff,!a!Russian!

historian;!and!Clyde!Kluckhohn,!an!anthropologist.!
405!Blackmer,!The'MIT'Center'for'International'studies,!5\8.!
406!Gilman,!Mandarins'of'the'Future,!158.!
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Vulnerability.”!Rostow’s!study,!which!was!completed!in!eighteen!months,!resulted!in!
the!publication!of!his!book,!Dynamics'of'Soviet'Society.407!
Walt*Rostow*and*the*Modernization*Gospel*
Walt!Rostow!was!born!to!Russian!Jewish!immigrants!to!the!US!on!the!7th!of!
October,! 1916.! He! graduated! with! a! bachelors! and! doctorate! degree! in! Economic!
history!from!Yale!University!in!1940.!During!the!Second!World!War,!he!worked!in!
the!Office!of!Strategic!Services.!After!the!war,!he!worked!for!the!State!Department!as!
an! assistant! chief! of! the! German\Austrian! Economic! division.! In! 1947,! he!
participated!in!the!development!of!the!Marshall!Plan!in!his!role!as!the!assistant!to!
the!Executive!Secretary!of!the!Economic!Commission!for!Europe.!Between!1951!and!
1961,!he!was!professor!of!Economic!history!at!MIT.!While!in!this!role,!he!was!also!
advisor!to!President!Dwight!Eisenhower!on!economic!and!foreign!policy.408!!
Rostow! was! one! of! the! most! influential! economic! historians! of! the! center.!
Rostow’s! economic! theory! had! a! great! impact! on! the! work! of! the! center! in! the!
developing! world.! One! of! his! most! influential! books! is! his! 1952! work! entitled! The'
Process' of' Economic' Growth.! This! book,! which! expounds! the! central! tenets! of!
modernization!theory,!links!economics!to!other!social!sciences.!This!theory!expands!
beyond!development!economics!to!look!at!modernization!as!a!total!social,!political,!
cultural! and! economic! transformation,! in! which! cultural! attitudes! and! beliefs! are!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
407!Blackmer,!The'MIT'Center'for'International'studies,!21\26.!See!Walt!Rostow,!Dynamics'of'Soviet'

Society'(Cambridge,!MA:!MIT,!1951).!!
408!Later!on,!Rostow!would!work!for!both!the!Kennedy!and!Johnson!administrations.!More!on!this!
later!in!this!chapter.!!
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important!in!triggering!the!“take!off”!to!sustained!economic!growth!and!investment.!
Rostow! approached! this! by! introducing! six! propensities.! These! are,! (1)! propensity!
to! develop! fundamental! science! (physical! and! social);! (2)! propensity! to! apply!
science! to! economic! ends;! (3)! propensity! to! accept! innovations;! (4)! propensity! to!
seek! material! advance;! (5)! propensity! to! consume;! and! (6)! propensity! to! have!
children.409!For!Rostow,!“[t]hese!propensities!depend!on!the!attitudes,!motives!and!
aspirations!of!the!people!which!in!turn!depend!on!the!previous!political,!economic!
and! social! factors.! The! total! working! force! and! the! magnitude! and! productivity! of!
the! capital! available! in! the! economy! are! the! prime! movers! in! the! process! of!
economic! growth.”410!The! six! propensities! that! Rostow! mentioned! were! aspects! of!
culture! that! were! necessary! for! the! economy.! For! example,! the! labor! that! was!
available!for!the!economy!of!any!society!was!dependent!on!the!birth!and!death!rate.!
These! propensities! are! interconnected! and! had! an! impact! on! economic!
performance.! His! position,! as! Gilman! remarks,! “synthesized! cultural! and!
technological! determinism:! technology! was! the! ultimate! driver! and! definer! of!
modernization,! but! it! was! culture! that! determined! how! a! society! took! up! that!
technology.”411 !!
A!criticism!that!befell!Rostow’s!economic!theory!was!that!it!failed!to!explain!
root!causes!of!historical!change.!Why!would!a!society!shift!from!one!economic!stage!

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
409!W.!W.!Rostow,!The'Process'of'Economic'Growth!(New!York:!W.!W.!Norton,!1952),!13\13.!!

410!Kulwant!Rai!Gupta,'Economics'of'Development'and'Planning:'History,'Principles,'Problems'and'

Policies!(New!Delhi:!Atlantic,!2009),!192.!
411!Gilman,!Mandarins'of'the'Future,!162\63.!
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to! the! next?! Rostow! never! solved! this! problem! that! his! theory! faced.412!Rostow’s!
1960! work,! The'Stages'of'Economic'Growth:'A'NonYCommunist'Manifesto,413!was! an!
important! work! for! adherents! of! modernization! theory.! In! it! he! argued! that!
economic! modernization! happened! in! five! stages:! the! traditional! society,! the!
preconditions! for! take\off,! the! take\off,! the! drive! to! maturity! and! the! age! of! high!
mass\consumption.414!Social! scientists! associated! with! CIS! saw! this! model! as! one!
that! could! be! replicated! in! the! developing! world.! The! work! of! CIS! in! Nigeria! was!
aimed!at!moving!Nigeria!through!these!stages!of!development.!It!was!believed!that!
these!stages!could!be!moved!through!quickly!thereby!leading!to!a!modern!society.!
Rostow’s! book! was! very! influential! even! to! American! politicians! who! saw!
communism! as! a! threat.! Both! John! F.! Kennedy! and! L.! B.! Johnson! were! great!
admirers!of!Rostow’s!work,!seeing!it!as!a!prescription!against!communist!influence.!
David!Milner!writes!that,!“[t]hrough!the!1950s!Senator!Kennedy!was!impressed!by!
Rostow’s! intellectual! ability,! his! productivity,! and! the! originality! with! which! he!
approached! the! then! politically! charged! question! of! U.S.! foreign! aid.”415!Rostow!
argued! strongly! in! his! book! that! the! US! should! provide! foreign! aid! to! developing!
nations! to! enable! them! to! achieve! a! capitalist! economy! and! a! liberal! democracy.!
Rostow!also!believed!that!properly!channeling!of!U.S.!foreign!aid!toward!developing!
nations!would!help!stem!the!influence!of!communism.!After!the!election!of!John!F.!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
412!Ibid.!
413!W.!W.!Rostow,!The'Stages'of'Economic'Growth:'A'NonYCommunist'Manifesto!(Cambridge:!

Cambridge!University!Press,!1990).!
414!Ibid.,!4\10.!!
415!David!Milner,!America’s'Rasputin:'Walt'Rostow'and'the'Vietnam'War!(New!York:!Hill!and!Wang,!
2008),!9!
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Kennedy! as! president,! Rostow! was! appointed! deputy! special! adviser! for! national!
security! affairs.! Milner! says! “Rostow! assumed! White! House! responsibility! for! U.! S.!
policy! toward! Southeast! Asia! and,! indeed,! for! most! of! the! world! east! of! Suez.”416!
Later,! Kennedy! would! move! Rostow! to! the! Policy! Planning! Council! at! the! State!
Department.! After! the! assassination! of! Kennedy,! President! Lyndon! Johnson!
appointed! Rostow! as! his! national! security! adviser! and! Rostow! helped! guide! his!
policy!in!Vietnam.!!
The! rise! of! Rostow! through! the! echelons! of! the! US! government! meant! the!
influence!of!modernization!theory!increased!around!the!world.!Rostow!had!the!ear!
of! Kennedy! and! Johnson! and! he! helped! direct! a! lot! of! US! foreign! aid! during! their!
administrations.!Nigeria!was!one!of!the!beneficiaries!of!US!foreign!aid,!and,!in!fact,!
the!country!was!one!of!the!largest!recipients!of!aid!from!Washington.!The!aid!given!
to!Nigeria!was!intended!to!help!implement!the!country’s!first!national!development!
plan!which!was!crafted!with!the!help!of!Rostow’s!former!colleagues!at!CIS.!!
The*Independence*Plans,*1955*to*1962*
!

Beginning! in! the! early! 1950s,! Nigeria! witnessed! the! growing! presence! of!

international! organizations! such! as! the! IBRD,! the! International! Cooperation!
Administration! (ICA),! which! was! the! precursor! to! the! United! States! Agency! for!
International! Development! (USAID).! In! September! of! 1953! the! IBRD! made! an!
economic!mission!to!Nigeria!on!the!request!of!the!governments!of!Nigeria!and!the!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
416!Ibid.!
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United!Kingdom.!The!task!of!the!mission!“was!to!assess!the!resources!available!for!
future!development,!to!study!the!possibilities!for!development!in!the!major!sectors!
of! the! economy! and! to! make! recommendations! for! practical! steps! to! be! taken,!
including! the! timing! and! co\ordination! of! developmental! activities.” 417 !This!
international! mission! comprised! of! ten! full\time! members! and! five! part\time!
consultants.!The!Food!and!Agriculture!Organization!nominated!three!of!the!experts!
on! agriculture.! Members! of! the! mission! were! from! the! Netherlands,! Australia,!
France,! Italy,! Turkey,! the! United! Kingdom! and! the! United! States.418!After! having!
spent!about!three!months!in!Nigeria,!the!mission!prepared!an!integrated!program!of!
development!for!Nigeria.!In!this!over!six!hundred!pages!program!report,!it!identified!
as!an!obstacle!to!Nigeria’s!development,!the!lack!of!“technical!and!managerial!skills!
and!the!knowledge!of!the!country’s!resources!necessary!to!carry!out!an!accelerated!
program! of! development.” 419 !To! resolve! this! problem! of! skills! shortage,! a!
recommendation! was! made! that! personnel! be! recruited! from! overseas! while!
Nigerians! must! be! trained. 420 !The! report! also! called! for! the! development! of!
agriculture,!transportation!and!the!university!system.!!
!

Twenty! days! after! the! IBRD! mission! submitted! this! integrated! plan! of!

national! development,! Nigeria! became! a! federation! on! October! 1,! 1954.! The!
implications!of!this!was!that!the!regional!governments!could!either!adopt!or!reject!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
417!World!Bank,!The'Economic'Development'of'Nigeria:'Report'of'a'Mission'Organized'by'the'

International'Bank'for'Reconstruction'and'Development'at'the'Request'of'the'Governments'of'Nigeria'
and'the'United'Kingdom!(Baltimore:!John!Hopkins!Press,!1955),!vii.!!
418!Ibid.!!
419!Ibid.,!3.!!
420!Ibid.,!4.!!
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the! recommendations.! Adebayo! Adedeji! wrote,! “Although! each! government! made!
references! to! the! mission’s! work,! the! five! development! programmes! of! the!
governments! were! far! from! constituting! an! integrated,! mutually! consistent! and!
coordinated! development! programme.”421!The! five! plans! of! development! resulted!
from! the! half\hearted! attempts! of! the! different! governments! to! create! their! own!
plan.!The!federalization!of!the!government!meant!that!there!were!now!four!different!
governments!and!the!Federal!Territory:!the!Northern!Regional!Government!(NRG),!
the!Western!Regional!Government!(WRG),!the!Eastern!Regional!Government!(ERG),!
the! Southern! Cameroons! and! the! Federal! Territory! of! Lagos.! All! of! these!
governments! had! their! own! development! programs.! The! different! plans! from! the!
different! governments! took! different! directions.! Both! the! federal! government! and!
the! WRG! prepared! complete! plans! for! the! five! year! period! beginning! in! 1955! and!
ending! in! 1960.! The! NRG! only! published! a! policy! statement! on! the! development!
program! and! then! in! 1958! revised! it! to! extend! to! 1962.! The! ERG,! which! was!
experiencing!financial!difficulties,!only!published!an!outline!of!a!development!plan!
projected! to! cost! £5.2! million.! In! 1958! the! ERG! extended! its! plan! to! 1962! and!
increased!the!capital!expenditure!to!£20.7!million.422!
!

One! of! the! recommendations! of! the! IBRD! mission! in! 1953! was! the! creation!

“of! a! special! body! to! advise! on! economic! policy! and! to! propose,! analyze! and! co\

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
421!Adebayo!Adedeji,!“Federalism!and!Development!Planning!in!Nigeria”!in!A.!A.!Ayida!and!H.!M.!A.!

Onitiri,!eds.,!Reconstruction'and'Development'in'Nigeria:'Proceedings'of'a'National'Conference!
(Ibadan:!Oxford!University!Press,!1971),!101.!!
422!Ibid.,!100.!!
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ordinate! public! investment! programs.”423!This! machinery! that! they! recommended!
was!to!consist!of!“an!economic!secretariat!within!the!federal!government,!to!provide!
staff! services! for! an! economic! committee! of! the! federal! Council! of! Ministers.”424!
They!also!proposed!that!the!different!regions!should!have!an!economic!committee!
and! that! “there! be! created! a! national! economic! council! in! which! the! federal! and!
regional! governments! would! be! represented.”425!The! National! Economic! Council!
(NEC)!was!created!in!1955!and!the!Governor\General!was!the!chairman.!Later,!the!
federal! prime! minister! became! the! chairman.! In! 1958,! the! council! created! another!
development! organ! called! the! Joint! Planning! Committee! (JPC)! to! play! an! advisory!
role! to! the! NEC.! In! 1959,! the! NEC,! recognizing! the! incoherent! and! uncoordinated!
plans!in!existence,!decided!that!a!national!development!plan!be!prepared!for!Nigeria!
“with! the! objective! of! the! achievement! and! maintenance! of! the! possible! rate! of!
increase!in!the!standard!of!living!and!the!creation!of!the!necessary!conditions!to!this!
end,! including! public! support! and! awareness! of! both! the! potential! that! exists! and!
the!sacrifices!that!will!be!required.”426!
Triangulating*Development:*Britain,*the*United*States*and*Nigeria*
!

As! Nigeria! was! moving! toward! integrated! national! development! while! still!

under! colonial! rule,! the! presence! of! the! US! through! the! ICA,! consulate! staff! and!
foundations!created!a!complex!relationship!between!Britain,!Nigeria!politicians!and!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
423!World!Bank,!The'Economic'Development'of'Nigeria,'82.'!
424!Ibid.!!
425!Ibid.!!
426!Federation!of!Nigeria,!National'Development'Plan,'1962Y68'(Lagos:!Government!Printer,!1962),!46\

47.!!
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the!US.!This!relationship!is!best!understood!by!a!statement!that!was!made!by!British!
information!officer!on!hearing!about!the!appointment!of!a!USIS!official!to!Lagos!in!
1955.!He!said,!!
…our!people!in!Nigeria!…[who]!have!a!sufficiently!delicate!task!in!helping!
the! peoples! of! Nigeria! toward! self\government! without! friction! among!
themselves!and!in!friendship!with!the!United!Kingdom![now]!have!also!to!
contend! with! the! clumsy! efforts! of! an! almost! completely! unheralded!
American! to! proclaim! the! American! way! of! life! in! the! largest! of! Her!
Majesty’s!dependent!territories…!it!seems!only!too!likely!that!in!one!way!or!
another!he!will!either!offend!some!section!of!Nigerian!opinion!or!promote!
ideas!that!will!tend!to!throw!doubts!on!British!aims!and!methods.427!
!

The!complexity!of!the!relationship!lay!in!the!fact!that!the!British!did!not!like!

the! Americans! or! the! international! organizations! meddling! in! the! affairs! of! the!
colonies,!yet!they!wanted!the!US!to!provide!aid!to!Nigeria.!As!Belmonte!has!shown,!
the! American! consulate! in! Nigeria! continued! to! receive! their! briefings! on! Nigeria!
from!the!British!officials.!An!ICA!visitor!to!Nigeria!found!out!that!“in!Lagos…the!staff!
appears! to! be! not! only! too! small! but! inhibited! by! the! sensitivities! of! the! British!
authorities! in! its! contacts! with! Nigerians! as! well! as! its! activities! relating! to! US! aid!
availabilities.” 428 !There! were! chiefly! two! sources! of! Anglo\American! friction! in!
Nigeria.!Belmonte!writes!that,!“Americans!found!colonial!officials!too!complacent!on!
Washington’s! primary! concern! in! Africa;! UK! officers,! in! turn,! thought! the! US!
communist! mania! disproportionate.”429!The! second! source! of! friction! was! the! bias!
against! US! education.! The! British! in! Nigeria! did! not! recognize! American! degrees.!!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
427!SH!Evans,!Head!of!Information!Department,!to!RHK!Marett,!31!May,!1955,!TNA!CO!1027/83,!in!

Belmonte,!“Reining!in!Revolution,”!278.!!
428!Memo.!For!Files.!Mr.!Butler’s!Comments!on!his!trip!through!Africa,!15!November,!1957,!RG!59,!
250/49/15/2,!Box!10,!NAII,!in!Belmonte,!“Reining!in!Revolution,”!276.!!
429!Belmonte,!“Reining!in!Revolution,”!281\282.!
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The! Nigerian! politicians! on! the! other! hand! were! aggrieved! that! Washington! was!
directing! its! foreign! aid! to! countries! which! displayed! more! receptivity! to!
communism.! The! complexity! of! the! relationship! is! best! summarized! by! Belmonte!
thus:! “For! although! Americans! emphasized! communism! they! did! not! detect! a!
sufficient! threat! to! warrant! US! aid.! Attendant! on! Washington’s! belief! that! Nigeria!
should!remain!in!the!UK!orbit,!moreover,!was!the!notion!that!London!should!retain!
development!responsibility.!Yet!while!London!shunned!substantial!US!engagement!
in!Africa,!the!UK!anticipated!generous!US!development!assistance.”430!
While! these! US! and! British! concerns! impacted! development! planning! in!
Nigeria,! the! biggest! challenge! facing! the! independence! plans! (1955\1962)! was! the!
need! for! capital.! As! a! British! dependency,! Nigeria! received! most! of! its! external!
assistance!from!Britain.!Over!half!of!Nigeria’s!private!foreign!investment!also!came!
from! Britain.! For! the! years! 1958\1962,! roughly! three\fourths! of! the! cost! of! the!
development!plans!was!paid!for!with!Nigeria’s!budget!surpluses,!a!drawdown!of!its!
reserves! and! internal! borrowing.! The! remaining! one\fourth! of! the! cost! came! from!
external! loans! and! grants.! This! amounted! to! £28.4! million.! Britain! provided! £17.7!
million!of!which!£2.7!million!was!a!grant!and!the!rest!a!loan.!The!IBRD!also!provided!
a! loan! of! £10! million.! Nigeria! still! had! a! financing! gap,! which! was! equal! to! the!
external!financing!that!was!already!arranged.431!As!shown!earlier!in!this!chapter,!the!
US! believed! that! Britain! was! responsible! for! development! policy! in! Nigeria! and!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
430!Belmonte,!“Reining!in!Revolution,”!283.!!
431!American!Consulate!general!to!US!Secretary!of!State,!25!June,!1960,!National!Archives!at!College!
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Washington!was!reluctant!to!provide!development!aid!to!Nigeria.!The!US!consulate!
in!Nigeria!made!the!argument!that!it!was!in!the!United!States’!interest!that!Nigeria!
be!able!to!fill!its!funding!gap.!If!Nigeria!could!not!fill!this!financing!gap,!it!would!be!
disappointed!in!its!attempt!“to!advance!the!pursuit!of!her!aspirations!for!economic!
and!social!development!by!cooperative!association!with!the!U.S.”432!!
Nigeria! would! need! to! respond! to! this! gap! in! two! ways:! either! by! seeking!
assistance! from! the! communist! bloc! or! allowing! itself! to! undergo! slow! internal!
development.! Neither! of! the! two! options! were! of! much! benefit! to! U.S.! interests.!
Therefore,!the!consulate!argued,!“Either!would!tend!to!interfere!with!the!major!U.S.!
interest! in! having! a! successful! demonstration! in! Nigeria! of! economic! and! social!
progress! under! the! type! of! free! political! and! economic! institutions! that! the! U.S.!
would! like! to! see! as! widely! and! firmly! established! as! possible! in! Africa! and!
elsewhere.! Nigeria! may! be! the! best! prospect! in! Tropical! Africa! for! such! a!
demonstration.”433!Nigeria!was!of!particular!strategic!interest!to!the!US!during!this!
period!of!the!Cold!War!because!it!was!the!most!populous!African!nation.!The!US!was!
very!uncomfortable!with!Nigeria!associating!itself!with!the!communist!bloc!nations.!
The! US! consulate! in! Nigeria! was! obsessed! with! the! activities! of! Nigerian! elites! or!
politicians! who! traveled! to! the! Soviet! bloc.! Their! political! speeches! and! writings!
were! closely! monitored! for! any! communist! influence.! It! was! important! to! the! US!
that!Nigeria!did!not!seek!for!any!form!of!financing!from!the!Soviet!bloc!so!that!her!
economic! development! would! not! be! tainted! by! communist! philosophy.! Given! the!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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size! of! Nigeria! and! its! potential! impact! on! the! African! economy,! the! potential! for!
Nigeria’s! influence! in! the! region,! leading! other! regional! countries! toward!
communism!was!great.!Economically,!this!also!meant!that!Nigeria!would!align!itself!
with!the!Soviet!bloc!market.!Security!and!stability!was!also!a!strategic!interest!to!the!
United! States.! Nigeria! in! the! 1950s! and! 1960s! was! not! only! a! world! exporter! of!
agricultural! products! but! it! had! also! just! started! commercial! oil! exploration! and!
production! and! many! US! businesses! and! companies! were! operating! in! Nigeria.! Oil!
was! discovered! by! Shell\British! Petroleum! in! 1956.! By! the! 1960s,! Mobil! One,! an!
American!company!was!carrying!out!oil!exploration!in!Nigeria.!Nigeria!by!the!1960s!
had! become! “an! important! purchaser! of! industrial! materials,! machinery,! and!
transport! equipment,! rather! than! consumer! goods! as! in! the! past….! American!
entrepreneurs! took! an! important! share! in! developing! its! oil! resources.”434!Helping!
to! protect! this! fledging! oil! industry! through! development! of! the! country! was!
economically! beneficial! to! the! United! States.! US! companies! could! continue! to! do!
business! in! Nigeria! and! in! turn,! a! modernizing! Nigeria! will! purchase! equipment!
from!the!US!to!help!it!with!modernization.!!!
The!US!consulate!was!thus!looking!for!a!way!in!which!America’s!interest!in!
Nigeria! would! be! safeguarded! without! the! United! States! putting! too! much! money!
into!Nigeria’s!development!against!its!stated!policy.!The!problem!was!that!of!using!
US! aid! to! finance! budget! deficits! or! balance! of! payment! gaps,! a! problem! Nigeria!
needed!financing!for.!This!was!difficult!because!any!external!capital!that!was!made!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
434!Peter!Duignan!&!L.!H.!Gann,!The'United'States'and'Africa:'A'History!(Cambridge:!Cambridge!
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available! to! Nigeria! would! benefit! the! Nigerian! government! and! the! balance! of!
payments.!The!US!was!trying!to!avoid!a!problem!where!Nigeria!or!any!nations!that!
were! a! beneficiary! of! US! aid! were! permanently! dependent! on! the! United! States! to!
pay! their! debts! due! to! their! inability! to! properly! manage! their! economies.! The!
recommendation! of! the! consulate! was! that! in! order! to! protect! US! interests,! “A!
number! of! loans! from! the! DLF! and/or! Export\Import! Bank,! plus! some! modest!
Special!Assistance…”!should!suffice.435!
The! US! consulate’s! goal! of! finding! a! solution! to! the! aid! problem! was!
motivated! by! the! frustration! that! Nigerian! leaders! felt! with! the! United! States’!
reluctance!to!provide!development!aid!to!Nigeria.!The!response!of!Nigerian!leaders!
was! the! use! of! a! strategy! Abou! Bamba! describes! as,! “triangulating!
modernization.” 436 !For! months! in! 1960,! there! was! an! impasse! in! Nigeria! over!
development! loans.! The! Nigerian! government! was! unable! to! receive! the! loans! for!
which! they! applied! through! the! DLF! and! the! Export\Import! Bank.! These! two!
institutions!insisted!that!they!could!only!finance!items!that!were!imported!from!the!
US.!In!his!budget!speech!before!the!Federal!House!of!Representatives!on!4th!of!April!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
435!American!Consulate!general!to!US!Secretary!of!State,!25!June,!1960,!National!Archives!at!College!

Park,!(Hereafter,!NA!II):!745H.!5\MSP/6\2560.!
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Project!in!central!Ivory!Coast.!In!the!planning!of!this!project,!this!former!French!colony!did!not!rely!
solely!on!France!because!France!was!reluctant!to!provide!the!money!needed!for!the!project,!but!they!
sought!help!from!the!World!Bank!and!the!US!which!did!not!only!provide!technical!partners!but!also!
loans!through!the!Export\Import!Bank.!A!US!company,!Kaiser!engineers,!outbid!the!French!
engineering!company,!which!bided!for!the!project.!This!left!bitterness!in!the!French!who!thought!the!
Ivorian!leaders!were!showing!favoritism!toward!the!Americans.!France,!wanting!not!to!remain!in!the!
sidelines!watching!America!encroaching!into!their!sphere!of!influence,!stepped!back!in!when!the!
project!needed!more!funds!to!run!the!original!operations.!See!Abou!B.!Bamba,!“Triangulating!a!
Modernization!Experiment:!The!United!States,!France!and!the!Making!of!the!Kossou!Project!in!
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1960,!the!Federal!Minister!of!Finance!went!after!the!US!over!its!change!of!policy!as!
regards! development! loans! for! Nigeria.! The! minister! said! that! western! nations!
provided!financing!only!for!short\term!and!not!long\term!and!they!were!reluctant!to!
provide!financing!for!local!goods!and!services.!He!noted!that!any!financial!assistance!
that! was! available! was! not! for! a! government! like! Nigeria! but! for! the! industrialists!
because! it! was! only! the! “industrialist! who! will! wish! to! purchase! substantial!
quantities!of!machinery!which!will!pay!off!loan!charges!in!a!fairly!short!period.”437!
He!continued!that!in!this!respect,!“Her!Majesty’s!Government!in!the!United!Kingdom!
does!take!a!more!enlightened!and!liberal!view!of!these!matters.”!This!was!evidenced!
in! Britain! providing! £3! million,! which! could! be! used! as! they! wished! either! on!
imports! or! local! goods! and! services.! He! then! went! on! to! excoriate! the! US! for! the!
change! of! policy! tying! loans! to! US! imports.! That! created! a! difficulty! for! Nigeria!
accepting!the!loans!because,!more!often,!they!could!get!the!goods!cheaper!in!other!
markets!outside!of!the!US.!The!minister!then!went!on!to!make!his!strongest!rebuke!
in! the! speech! against! the! US.! He! said,! “It! is! also! quite! illogical! for! countries! which!
express!a!belief!in!the!wisdom!of!multilateral!systems!of!trade!and!payments!to!tie!
capital!exports!in!a!way!that!is!a!complete!negation!of!a!declared!multilateral!policy.!
We!in!Nigeria,!I!believe,!have!shown!by!our!actions!that!we!are!prepared!to!pursue!
liberal! multilateral! policies! in! international! trade.! We! look! to! other! countries! for!
them! to! reciprocate.”438!The! Minister! was! triangulating.! Nigeria! was! not! going! to!
pledge!its!allegiance!to!only!one!country!when!it!came!to!finding!foreign!aid.!Though!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Britain!remained!very!generous!and!it!was!counting!on!the!United!States!for!aid,!if!
the!US!was!not!willing!to!provide!aid,!it!was!going!to!look!to!other!countries!for!aid.!!
The*Role*of*the*US*Foundations*
While! Nigerian! leaders! were! negotiating! development! aid! with! the! United!
States!government!in!this!time!period,!there!was!also!a!strong!presence!of!American!
foundations!such!as!the!Carnegie!and!Ford!foundations.!In!his!excellent!monograph!
on! the! influence! of! the! Carnegie,! Ford! and! Rockefeller! foundations! on! American!
foreign!policy,!Edward!H.!Berman!argues!that!the!programs!that!were!carried!out!by!
these! foundations! overseas! complemented,! to! a! large! extent,! US! foreign\policy!
initiatives.! In! fact,! these! foundations! were! being! subsidized! by! the! US! government!
through!the!tax\free!status!that!they!enjoyed.439!Berman!identifies!four!interrelated!
factors!that!led!to!these!foundations!influence!on!foreign!policy:!their!possession!of!
significant! capital,! their! ability! to! allocate! this! capital! to! institutions! such! as!
universities! and! authors! who! in! turn! (not! always)! produce! works! that! reflect! the!
foundations!worldview,!their!close!association!with!the!decision!making!apparatus!
of! the! capitalist! state! and! finally,! their! shared! view! that! “the! development! of! the!
domestic! polity! and! polities! abroad! can! best! be! advanced! through! the! aegis! of! the!
world!capitalist!system,!dominated!by!the!United!States.”440!Berman!acknowledges!
that! there! were! occasional! differences! between! the! foundations! and! the! US!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
439!Edward!H.!Berman,!The'Influence'of'the'Carnegie,'Ford,'and'Rockefeller'Foundations'on'American'
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representatives! abroad! but! these! differences! were! insignificant! compared! to! their!
shared! interests! which! was! to! protect! US! interest! and! the! world! capitalist! system.!
He!writes,!“This!shared!belief!in!the!general!direction!of!United!States!foreign!policy!
after!World!War!II!–!always!allowing!for!minor!differences!–!resulted!from,!among!
other!things,!the!fact!that!many!of!the!same!individuals!were!so!directly!involved!in!
the! political! fortunes! of! the! state,! the! nation’s! major! corporate! and! financial!
institutions,!and!the!foundations.”441!!
Carnegie’s! major! involvement! in! Nigeria,! for! instance,! was! in! the! field! of!
education.! The! view! of! Carnegie! was! that! education! was! the! key! to! development.!
Thus,!Carnegie’s!efforts!“as!well!as!of!those!they!mobilized,!such!as!Ford!and!various!
U.S.!agencies,!were!directed!to!developing!a!system!of!colleges!and!universities!that!
would!mass!produce!men!and!women!qualified!to!‘develop’!Africa.”442!The!plan!that!
these!foundations!had!for!Nigeria!!involved!intervening!in!Nigerian!education.!!
One! such! school! that! would! receive! the! focus! of! the! foundations! was! the!
University! of! Ibadan,! the! oldest! Nigerian! university! founded! in! 1948! as! an!
independent! external! college! of! the! University! of! London.! Through! the!
instrumentality! of! its! first! Nigerian! Vice! Chancellor,! Kenneth! O.! Dike,! himself!
formerly!a!professor!at!Northwestern!University,!the!university!received!massive!US!
funding! from! the! foundations! to! help! it! expand.! The! University! of! Ibadan! became!
not!only!the!“intellectual!engine”!of!the!nation!but!a!place!“increasingly!oriented!to!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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serving!development!and!nation!building!in!independent!Nigeria.”443 !Between!1958!
and! 1973,! the! University! of! Ibadan! received! a! total! of! $9! million! from! the!
Rockefeller! Foundation! and! $4.5! million! from! the! Ford! Foundation.! As! Inderjeet!
Parmar!argues,!these!grants!were!awarded!to!Ibadan!without!consultation!with!the!
Nigerian! government,! and! the! foundations! failed! to! take! into! consideration! the!
strong!regional!political!arrangements!in!Nigeria.444!!
If!the!foundations!thought!that!by!creating!a!strong!Nigerian!University!and!
using!it!as!an!engine!to!drive!national!planning!and!development,!they!were!catering!
to! the! development! needs! of! Nigeria! as! a! whole,! they! were! making! a! political! and!
cultural!mistake.!The!then!political!arrangement!in!Nigeria!encouraged!emphasis!on!
regional! development,! which! meant! that! funding! the! University! of! Ibadan! was! not!
funding!Nigeria!but!funding!the!Western!Region.!The!different!political!regions!also!
represented!semi\cultural!blocks.!The!Western!region!was!comprised!mostly!of!the!
Yorubas,!the!Eastern!Region!was!comprised!mostly!of!the!Igbos,!and!the!Northern!
region! was! comprised! mostly! of! the! Hausa/Fulanis.! Within! these! different! regions!
were! minority! groups.! But! on! the! whole,! the! three! regional! governments!
represented!three!large!ethnic!groups!that!comprised!the!Nigerian!polity.445!It!was!a!
mistake!for!the!foundations!to!think!that!by!building!up!the!University!of!Ibadan,!an!
Igbo!or!an!Hausa!would!sincerely!thank!them!for!their!generosity!to!Nigeria.!Though!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
443!Ibid.!,170\71.!
444!Ibid.,!172.!
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the!foundations!had!a!plan!for!Nigeria,!their!plan!was!one!created!by!outsiders!who!
did! not! adequately! understand! the! ethno\political! differences! that! made! up! the!
Nigerian!polity.!The!other!ethnic!groups!did!not!see!the!University!of!Ibadan!as!their!
university.!It!was!a!university!for!western!Nigeria.!It!was!such!responses!that!later!
led! to! the! creation! of! the! University! of! Nigeria,! Nsukka! (located! in! the! eastern!
region)!and!Ahmadu!Bello!University,!Zaria!(located!in!the!northern!region).!!
The*Foundations,*Arnold*Rivkin*and*the*African*Project*
Beyond!the!work!that!the!foundations!did!in!Nigeria,!the!Carnegie!foundation!
and! later! the! Ford! foundation! were! the! sponsors! of! the! African! project! at! CIS!
founded!and!headed!by!Arnold!Rivkin.!There!was!no!American!social!scientist!who!
propagated! the! gospel! of! modernization! in! Nigeria! in! the! late! 1950’s! more! than!
Arnold!Rivkin.!Rivkin!was!born!in!New!York!and!he!studied!economics!at!Brooklyn!
College.!He!later!got!a!law!degree!from!Harvard!Law!School.!In!1950,!he!worked!as!
the!Assistant!General!Counsel!of!the!European!Headquarters!of!the!Marshall!Plan!in!
Paris.!During!his!time!in!Paris,!he!had!the!task!of!coordinating!US!economic!aid.!It!
was!during!this!time!that!he!made!his!first!trip!to!Africa.!He!visited!Madagascar.446!
This!was!the!beginning!of!his!involvement!with!Africa.!The!US!institute!for!which!he!
worked! for! was! the! International! Cooperation! Administration,! (ICA). 447 !This!
institution! was! the! precursor! to! the! United! States! Agency! for! International!
Development.! ICA! had! been! present! in! Nigeria! from! the! middle! of! the! 1950s! and!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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helped!in!administering!the!Development!Loan!Fund!(DLF).!The!DLF!was!created!in!
1957! under! Eisenhower’s! administration! as! the! first! US! foreign! aid! program! that!
was!explicitly!focused!on!development!goals.448!!
In! 1957,! Rivkin! joined! CIS! and! there! he! founded! the! African! Economic! and!
Political!Development!Project.!It!was!Rivkin!who!pushed!the!direction!of!the!Center!
beyond!Asia!to!Africa.!Rivkin!believed!that!a!study!of!Africa!was!necessary!because!
of!the!political!changes!that!were!taking!place!on!the!continent.!Most!African!nations!
were! at! this! time! at! the! verge! of! independence.! In! West! Africa,! Ghana! gained! her!
independence! in! 1958! and! many! others! would! follow! in! 1960.! While! political!
changes!were!swiftly!taking!place,!the!economic!changes!were!not!keeping!pace.!In!
July!of!1958,!CIS!submitted!a!grant!application!to!the!Carnegie!Corporation!to!help!
fund! the! African! project.! A! careful! look! at! this! proposal! is! important! because! it!
reflected!Rivkin’s!ideology!as!it!relates!to!emerging!African!societies.449 !!
Rivkin! believed! that! what! happened! in! Africa! would! have! an! impact! on! the!
world! and! that! the! world! needed! to! pay! close! attention! to! what! was! going! on! in!
Africa.! He! wrote! in! the! application,! “The! focus! of! the! Project! will! be! on! Africa! as! a!
factor! of! growing! importance! in! world! politics! and! economics.! This! means! that! a!
primary!concern!of!the!Project!will!be!the!interrelationships!of!Africa!and!the!free!
world,!and!the!interplay!of!selective!developments!within!each!of!the!two!areas!on!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
448!Blackmer,!The'MIT'Center'for'International'studies,!104.!
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no!doubt!that!Rivkin!wrote!the!grant!and!it!reflected!his!thinking.!At!the!time,!CIS!did!not!have!any!
African!specialist!nor!was!it!carrying!out!any!research!on!Africa!except!the!one!Rivkin!started!the!
previous!year.!In!discussing!the!document,!I!will!refer!to!it!as!Rivkin’s!work.!
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one! another.! It! will! also! inevitably! mean! the! study! and! analysis! of! internal!
developments! in! Africa! as! a! prerequisite! to! understanding! their! significance! and!
assessing! their! impact! on! the! free! world.”450!Rivkin! called! for! an! in\depth! study! to!
be!made!of!four!African!territories:!Nigeria,!French!West!Africa,!the!Belgian!Congo,!
and! the! Federation! of! Rhodesia! and! Nyasaland.! He! wanted! the! project! to! examine!
diverse!areas!to!enable!it!to!make!generalizations!about!the!whole!continent!south!
of! the! Sahara.! He! argued! that! the! four! areas! selected! “illustrate! the! great! range! of!
difference! in! metropole! policies! and! programs! and! the! differing! impact! of! these!
policies! and! programs.”451 !His! selection! showed! that! diversity:! a! British! colony! in!
West! Africa,! Nigeria;! then! the! French! colonies! in! West! Africa;! a! Belgian! territory;!
and!then!a!British!territory!in!southern!Africa!that!had!European!settlers.!
A! key! question! is:! why! did! Rivkin! select! Nigeria?! He! believed! that! on!
achievement!of!independence!in!1960,!Nigeria!would!be!one!of!the!most!important!
independent!countries!in!Africa.!Nigeria!would!play!a!vital!role!in!West!Africa!with!
respect! to! its! relationship! with! Ghana,! the! French! Cameroons! and! Francophone!
West! Africa. 452 !What! Rivkin! wanted! to! study! were! the! problems! of! economic!
development!and!how!these!interfaced!with!political!change.!He!also!believed!that!it!
was! important! to! study! these! territories! because! with! the! emergence! of!
independence,! the! economic! relationships! that! existed! between! them! and! Europe!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
450!Politics!of!Transition!Proposals,!African!Projects,!Proposal!for!a!Project!on!Economic!Development!
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would!likely!be!affected.!A!particular!interest!of!the!study!was!the!US.!Rivkin!wrote,!
“The!interests!of!the!United!States!will!be!given!particular!attention!both!from!the!
point! of! view! of! direct! United! States! interests! and! from! the! point! of! view! of! the!
triangular! relationships! among! the! United! States,! Africa! and! Western! Europe.”453!
This! idea! of! triangular! relationships! reflected! the! approach! to! development! in! the!
late! colonial! and! early! “postcolonial”! period.! No! longer! were! relations! bilateral,!
metropole! to! colony,! but! the! United! States,! as! well! as! other! international!
organizations!such!as!IBRD!had!competing!interests.454 !
Rivkin’s!study!was!to!be!carried!out!by!an!interdisciplinary!research!teams:!
economists,! sociologists! and! political! scientists,! and! after! their! initial! preliminary!
research! in! Cambridge,! they! were! going! to! spend! some! time! doing! fieldwork! in!
these!African!territories.!While!the!director!of!the!center,!Max!Millikan,!was!to!be!in!
charge! of! the! research,! it! was! Arnold! Rivkin! who! was! to! direct! the! research.! It! is!
important! to! note! that! Rivkin’s! expertise! was! neither! in! sociology,! African!
economies!or!political!science.!He!was!a!lawyer!by!training.!His!expertise!on!Africa!
was! based! on! the! years! he! worked! in! the! African! operations! of! the! International!
Cooperation! Administration! and! his! many! visits! to! Africa.! In! its! preliminary!
research,!the!center!also!collaborated!with!the!United!Nations’!Bureau!of!Economic!
Affairs’!African!Unit.!The!center!also!brought!in!more!senior!researchers!to!work!on!
the!African!project.!The!estimated!cost!of!the!research!was!$250,000!and!it!was!to!
cover!the!period!from!1!October,!1958!to!30!June,!1961.!The!grant!application!was!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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submitted!to!the!Carnegie!Corporation!on!2!October,!1958.455 !In!November!of!1958,!
Carnegie! approved! a! grant! of! $200,000! to! CIS! for! its! research! on! Sub\Saharan!
Africa.456!!
Having! secured! the! grant! for! the! African! Project,! CIS! brought! in! three!
individuals! that! were! instrumental! to! the! center’s! research! on! Nigeria:! Wolfgang!
Stolper,!Charles!Nixon!and!Archibald!Callaway.!Stolper!was!born!in!Vienna,!Austria!
in!1912!and!he!migrated!with!his!family!to!the!US!in!1933.!He!studied!under!Joseph!
Schumpeter!at!Harvard!and!graduated!in!1938!with!a!doctorate!in!Economics.!From!
1941,! he! was! professor! of! Economics! at! the! University! of! Michigan! Ann! Arbor.! He!
took! a! leave! of! absence! from! the! University! of! Michigan! for! the! academic! year!
1958/59! to! write! a! book! on! East! German! economies.! He! spent! this! year! at! CIS!
working! on! the! book.! It! was! during! this! time! at! CIS! that! he! became! curious! about!
Europe’s! African! colonies! and! he! became! interested! in! African! economies.! Stolper!
will!later!spend!time!in!Nigeria!working!on!the!Nigerian!development!plan.!
!Charles! Nixon,! on! the! other! hand,! was! a! political! scientist.! He! was! born! in!
Rochester,! New! York.! He! earned! his! doctorate! in! political! theory! and! philosophy!
from! Cornell! University! in! 1944.! Between! 1944! and! 1947,! he! taught! at! Smith!
College,! Northampton,! Massachusetts.! In! 1947,! he! joined! the! faculty! at! the!
University! of! California,! Los! Angeles! as! a! political! science! professor.! In! 1955,! he!
received!a!one!year!grant!from!the!Carnegie!Corporation!to!teach!at!the!University!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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of!Natal,!Durban,!South!Africa.!When!he!returned!in!1956,!his!interest!in!Africa!was!
heightened.! In! 1959,! he! was! hired! by! CIS! to! carry! out! a! research! for! the! African!
Project!in!Nigeria.!Between!1959!and!1960,!he!carried!out!several!research!trips!to!
Nigeria,!Rhodesia!and!Nyasaland.!Archibald!Callaway!was!an!economist!that!joined!
the!African!project!at!MIT!to!carry!out!research!in!Nigeria.!!
While! Arnold! Rivkin! himself! did! not! move! to! Africa! to! carry! out! research!
there,!he!made!frequent!visits!from!his!base!in!London!and!directed!research!from!
there.! His! two! researchers! in! Nigeria! were! Nixon! and! Callaway.! Nixon’s! research!
focused!on!the!political!factors!that!influenced!economic!decision!making!in!Nigeria.!
His!analysis!centered!“on!the!general!problem!of!evolving!a!political!system!which!
can!effectively!set!and!execute!policy!concerning!the!state’s!economic!functions.”457!
After!spending!time!in!Nigeria,!he!went!to!the!Federation!of!Rhodesia!and!Nysaland!
to!continue!his!research.!!
Archibald! Callaway! spent! a! considerable! amount! of! time! in! Nigeria.! Even!
after! the! original! grant! expired! in! 1961,! he! remained! in! Nigeria! to! continue! his!
research! with! the! help! of! a! supplemental! grant! from! the! Ford! Foundation.!
Callaway’s! research! focused! on! the! problem! of! surplus! labor.! He! completed! his!
research! in! 1965.! The! labor! in! question! was! young! people! in! Nigeria! who! had!
finished!their!primary!education!and!were!unable!to!find!jobs.!Callaway’s!research!
was! necessitated! by! the! presence! of! young! people! roaming! the! streets! who! had!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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completed! primary! education! but! did! not! have! the! financial! resources! to! go! to!
secondary!schools!and!there!were!no!jobs!available!to!them.!In!his!thinking,!this!was!
not! only! a! social! and! economic! threat! to! Nigeria! but! it! also! constituted! a! political!
threat.!The!fear!was!that!unemployment,!especially!of!young!people,!would!lead!to!
discontent!and!frustration,!which!could!lead!to!revolution!or!communist!influence.!
What!he!did!in!his!research!was!to!follow!the!lives!of!some!of!these!young!people!
from! their! villages! through! primary! education! and! their! quest! for! jobs! or! higher!
education.!His!solution!to!the!problem!of!school!leavers!in!Nigeria!was!the!creation!
of! “modern! agricultural! experimental! farms! that! will! provide! challenging!
employment! for! school\leavers! who! would! otherwise! swell! the! grown! mass! of!
urban!unemployed.”458!
This! “school! leaver”! problem! was! not! new! in! the! 1950s.! Experts! in! the!
Colonial!Office!had!identified!it!as!early!as!the!1930s!and!40s.!!As!noted!by!Hodge,!
“The!old!problem!of!labor!shortage!was!transformed!by!the!Depression!into!a!new!
crisis! of! labor! surplus,! in! the! form! of! growing! unemployment! and!
underemployment,!low!wages,!and!widespread!urban!and!rural!immiserization.”459!
Callway’s!thinking!was!in!no!way!a!break!from!colonial!thinking.!Even!the!solution!
he! proffered! for! this! problem! was! one! that! was! already! advanced! by! the! colonial!
developers! in! the! 1930s! and! 1940s! when! they! advocated! a! return! to! the! land,! an!
agrarian! bias.! It! was! for! this! reason! that! colonial! officials! began! to! advance! more!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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extensive! state\directed! and! social! engineering! development! initiatives! in! the!
1940s.!The!fear!was!that!without!such!interventions,!the!problem!of!surplus!labor!
might!lead!to!a!breakdown!in!colonial!order.460!!
The*Gatekeeper*State!
In! his! book,! Africa' Since' 1940,! Frederick! Cooper! notes! that! colonial! states!
were! gatekeeper! states.! He! argues! that! these! states! “had! weak! instruments! for!
entering!into!the!social!and!cultural!realm!over!which!they!presided,!but!they!stood!
astride!the!intersection!of!the!colonial!territory!and!the!outside!world.!Their!main!
source! of! revenue! was! duties! on! goods! that! entered! and! left! its! ports;! they! could!
decide! who! could! leave! for! education! and! what! kinds! of! educational! institutions!
could! come! in.…”461!During! colonial! rule! in! Nigeria,! many! of! the! subjects! had! a!
ceiling!on!the!level!of!education!that!they!received.!The!education!that!many!of!the!
people! received! was! primary! education.! A! very! small! few! acquired! secondary!
education.! Those! with! university! degrees! were! scarce.! Up! until! the! dawn! of!
independence,!Nigeria!had!only!one!university,!the!University!of!Ibadan,!and!it!did!
not!offer!advanced!degrees.!Most!Nigerians!who!were!privileged!enough!to!receive!
college! degrees! and! sought! for! advanced! studies! had! to! look! toward! the! United!
Kingdom! or! America.! Thus,! most! of! the! nationalist! elites! held! American! and! UK!
degrees.!As!stated!earlier!in!this!chapter,!there!was!bias!against!American!degrees.!
The!control!exerted!by!the!colonial!state!as!a!gatekeeper!limited!the!opportunities!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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that! were! available! to! Africans! to! exercise! leadership! and! prove! their! capabilities.!
The! widespread! availability! of! such! opportunities! could! have! potentially! defeated!
the!colonial!ideology!that!colonial!peoples!were!incapable!of!governing!themselves.!
Thus,! in! the! late! 1950s! when! these! African! countries! started! marching! rapidly!
toward!independence,!there!was!a!major!problem!of!effective!human!power.!What!
the!new!African!leaders!inherited!were!the!keys!to!the!economic!gates!without!the!
means!of!using!these!economic!resources!to!better!the!lives!of!their!citizenry.!The!
rhetoric!of!nationalism!had!convinced!the!people!that!colonial!rule!was!a!great!evil!
and! that! independence! was! going! to! afford! African! nations! the! same! level! of!
prosperity! as! enjoyed! by! the! Europeans! and! other! Western! countries.! What! the!
rhetoric!did!not!emphasize!was!that!African!leaders,!due!to!decades!of!colonial!rule,!
had!not!the!financial!and!human!resources!to!transform!their!people!within!a!short!
period! of! time.! There! were! rising! expectations! and! aspirations! of! the! future,! what!
James! Ferguson! calls! the! “expectation! of! modernity.” 462 !Failure! to! provide! the!
dividends! of! self\rule! within! a! short! time! was! only! going! to! lead! to! the! people!
turning!against!their!own!African!leaders.!This!explains!the!reasons!for!most!of!the!
internal! conflicts! and! strife! that! many! African! nations! experienced! shortly! after!
independence.! To! borrow! Frederic! Cooper’s! conception,! African! leaders! inherited!
the!mantle!of!a!gatekeeper!state!without!the!mechanism!of!subjecting!the!people!to!
the!new!rule.463 !

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Wolfgang*Stolper*and*the*Nigerian*National*Development*Plan!
In! any! development! planning! for! a! newly! independent! country! like! Nigeria,!
moreover,!questions!of!unemployment!and!lack!of!basic!skilled!manpower!were!not!
the! only! issues! that! confronted! planners.! There! was! also! the! problem! of! finding!
suitable! high\level! technocrats! to! manage! Nigeria’s! economy! and! varied!
governments.! Though! most! British! officials! and! experts! remained! in! the! country,!
Nigeria! officials! reached! out! to! technocrats! from! the! United! States! to! help.! As!
Nigeria! began! plans! to! prepare! a! post\independent! development! plan,! it! turned! to!
the! local! Ford! Foundation! office! to! help! it! recruit! Western! economists! to! assist! in!
putting! together! the! plan.! The! Ford! Foundation! Office! in! New! York! contacted! a!
Harvard! economics! professor,! David! Bell,! who! “had! helped! organize! and! provide!
Harvard! advisory! assistance,! funded! by! Ford,! to! the! planning! commission! in!
Pakistan.! Bell! learned! of! Stolper’s! interest! and! enlisted! him! to! head! the! Nigerian!
team.”464!Other!team!members!included!Lyle!Hansen,!a!Harvard!economist!who!had!
worked!in!Pakistan,!and!Peter!Clark!who!had!just!completed!his!PhD!in!Economics!
from! the! Massachusetts! Institute! of! Technology.! None! of! these! three! economists!
were!experts!on!Nigeria!or!African!colonial!economies!for!that!matter.!Stolper’s!area!
of! research! was! on! East! German! economy.! His! first! experience! with! Africa! was! an!
eight!weeks!visit!to!Nigeria!organized!by!CIS!in!which!he!collected!data!on!Nigeria!
and!talked!with!some!of!the!officials!who!worked!there.!!

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Stolper’s! very! candid! diary,! which! he! wrote! during! these! eight! weeks! visit!
and! his! subsequent! 16! months! residence! in! the! country! tells! of! his! interactions! in!
the! newly! independent! country! and! how! he! fashioned! the! Nigerian! National!
Development!Plan.!His!ignorance!of!Nigeria!and!the!impact!of!British!colonial!rule!is!
revealing!as!he!wrote!during!his!first!few!days!of!arriving!in!Nigeria!in!July!of!1960:!
“The!Britishers!here!have!no!racial!prejudices!whatsoever.!Clubs,!residential!areas,!
everything!is!desegregated.”465 !Though!one!may!argue!that!he!was!contrasting!this!
experience!with!the!US!experience,!it!was!such!a!broad!generalization.!It!is!naive!to!
think! that! because! there! was! no! segregation,! there! wasn’t! racial! prejudices.! The!
crowd!that!Stolper!hung!out!with,!something!he!did!a!lot!during!his!stay!in!Nigeria,!
were! mainly! African! elites! with! degrees! from! the! US! and! Europe.466!Later! in! the!
diary,! he! would! mention! one! racial! act! he! saw! committed! against! an! African.! He!
recorded:! “While! shopping! in! Kingsway,! the! local! department! store! run! by! United!
Africa!Company,!I!had!my!first!taste!of!racism;!a!minor!one!at!that.!A!middle\aged!
English! woman! yelled! at! a! uniformed! African! doorman,! ‘Don’t! you! touch! me,! you!
touched! me,’! and! when! he! tried! to! point! out! that! he! hadn’t! deliberately,! she! just!
yelled! ‘Shut! up.’”467!If! this! was! the! first! incident! of! racial! prejudice! he! saw,! he! was!
either!blinded!by!his!own!racial!prejudices!or!was!just!naïve.!His!own!diary!tells!a!
different! story.! Before! this! time,! Nigerians! were! spoken! of! disparagingly! by! the!
Europeans!working!there.!The!incident!at!Kingsway!took!place!in!August!but!on!the!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
465!Ibid.,!2.!
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28th! of! July,! he! recorded! a! conversation! that! he! had! with! a! Scottish! medical!
statistician.!The!latter!told!him!that!in!“Nigeria!you!could!find!everything!from!the!
most! sophisticated! Westernized! African,! such! as! his! successor,! to! cannibals! on! the!
Cameroon!border,!where!census!takers!take!the!risk!of!being!eaten,!and!officials!are!
allowed!in!only!with!armed!guards!to!prevent!them!from!being!killed!with!poisoned!
arrows.”468!That! Stolper! did! not! see! any! racial! prejudices! in! this! statement! leaves!
much!to!the!imagination.!His!statement!spoke!to!the!implicit!assumption!about!the!
stages! of! development! that! most! Westerners! held! that! time.! The! assumption! was!
that! Africans! who! were! westernized! were! sophisticated! and! the! non\westernized!
Africans!were!cannibals!who!feasted!on!human!flesh!for!protein.!!
In!any!case,!Stolper!was!excited!about!the!job!he!was!going!to!do!in!Nigeria.!
He!saw!his!assignment!as!a!unique!opportunity!to!shape!the!events!of!history!in!the!
most! populous! African! nation.! He! wrote:! “I! have! the! most! enviable! assignment! a!
man! can! have:! developing! an! integrated! plan! for! the! most! important! African!
economy!with!the!biggest!and!most!hopeful!future!of!any!African!nation.…There!are!
strong! autonomous,! almost! (but! not! quite)! separatist! tendencies! in! Nigeria,! and! I!
have!a!chance!to!help!weld!the!territory!into!a!nation.!Even!hardships!are!worth!this!
opportunity.”469!He! saw! himself! as! having! the! task! of! achieving! what! the! British!
could! not! achieve! since! the! British! Governor! Lord! Lugard! amalgamated! the!
Northern! and! Southern! protectorates! of! the! country! on! the! 1st! of! January! 1914.!
Stolper! naively! believed! that! he! could! singlehandedly! do! this.! In! this! sense,! he!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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envisioned! himself! as! the! Nigerian! messiah! who! through! his! gospel! of!
modernization!and!economic!planning,!would!help!create!a!new!Nigeria!that!would!
be! better! integrated! and! grow! economically.! In! a! sense,! this! vision! conflicted! with!
what!he!said!out!loud.!In!a!discussion!with!the!permanent!secretary!of!the!Ministry!
of!Economic!Development!(MED),!Charles!Thompson,!one!of!the!senior!British!civil!
servants,!Stolper!assured!him!that!he!(Stolper)!was!a!“Nigerian!civil!servant!with!a!
specified!job!to!do!in!a!specified!time,!taking!general!instructions!from!my!superiors,!
rather!than!an!academic!who!would!do!a!research!job!as!he!pleased!in!his!own!good!
time.”470!Absent! in! this! statement! was! his! messianic! vision! to! remake! Nigeria.! His!
statement!that!he!was!a!Nigerian!civil!servant!taking!orders!from!his!superiors!was!
in!response!to!the!information!given!to!him!by!Thompson!that!the!prime!minister!
(PM)! would! be! getting! an! economic! adviser! from! the! World! Bank.! He! wanted! to!
make!sure!that!there!wouldn’t!be!conflicts!between!the!two!of!them.!Though!Stolper!
did! not! think! there! would! be! any! rivalry,! it! became! a! normal! occurrence! between!
him!and!Narayan!Prasad471,!the!economic!adviser!to!the!PM.!!
Crafting*the*Nigerian*Plan:*The*Stolper*–Prasad*Conflicts*
Throughout! the! crafting! of! the! Nigerian! plan,! Stolper! and! Prasad! were! in!
constant! disagreements! with! each! other! and! this! fractious! relationship! no! doubt!
affected! the! final! Nigerian! plan.! They! wrestled! publicly! over! who! was! responsible!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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for! the! Nigerian! National! Plan! (NNP).! Stopler! felt! Prasad! was! reneging! on! the!
agreement! they! had! in! “Washington! not! to! have! public! differences”! until! they! had!
them!ironed!out!in!private.472!!
Stolper! and! Prasad’s! first! conflict! seemed! to! have! started! on! the! 27th! of!
February!1961!during!a!strategy!meeting!for!the!Joint!Planning!Committee!meeting!
(JPC).473!There! were! differences! between! them! on! planning! targets.! Stolper! wrote:!
“He! wants! us! to! make! a! sort! of! bargaining! plan,! which! we! don’t! want! to! do.! He!
claimed! that! in! India! the! economists! made! projections! regardless! of! the! foreign!
exchange! gap,! and! the! necessary! foreign! exchange! was! forthcoming.! But! this! was!
not! really! true! during! India’s! second! Five\Year! Plan.”474!Stolper! wrote! furtherthat!
that!Prasad!was!trying!to!make!himself!responsible!for!the!plan,!something!Stolper!
disagreed!with.!He!believed!that!he!had!to!assert!himself!and!suspected!there!would!
be! problems! between! the! two! of! them.475!The! disagreement! between! Stolper! and!
Prasad!was!not!a!radical!difference!on!how!to!approach!development,!as!we!would!
see!later!in!the!chapter,!it!was!a!question!of!who!was!going!to!control!the!process.!
Stolper!wanted!to!devise!a!strategy!with!his!colleagues,!Hansen!and!Clark!on!how!to!
work!with!Prasad.!He!believed!that!people!were!getting!confused!by!all!the!advisors.!
He! claimed! he! had! no! objections! if! “Prasad! wants! to! be!the! big! shot”,! however,! he!
wanted! to! keep! the! identity! of! their! operations! separate! and! clearly! fixed.! The!
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reason!was!because!he!thought!it!was!“a!bad!idea!to!be!too!closely!identified!with!
either!Prasad’s!successes!or!his!failures.”476!!
From! these! initial! conflicts,! there! was! already! a! crack! in! the! team! that! was!
supposed! to! put! together! the! plan.! Their! disagreements! were! getting! in! the! way!
with! putting! the! plan! together.! Prasad! had! direct! access! to! the! PM! while! Stolper’s!
own! influence! was! with! the! Federal! Minister! of! Economic! Development,! Wachuku!
Jaja,!who,!according!to!Stolper’s!diary,!did!not!have!that!much!interest!in!their!work!
as! he! was! jostling! to! be! made! the! Minister! of! Foreign! Affairs.477!Prasad! used! his!
access! to! the! PM! to! undercut! both! those! in! economic! planning! and! in! finance.! The!
permanent!secretary!of!finance,!Reginald!Clark,!a!British!colonial!official,!in!March!of!
1961!wanted!a!meeting!with!Stolper!and!Hansen!to!discuss!one!of!Prasad’s!memos!
to! the! PM.! He! was! disturbed! by! “Prasad! constantly! writing! memos! to! the! PM! and!
others,! without! sufficient! factual! information.”478!Stolper! would! acknowledge! that!
Prasad! was! not! always! wrong.! In! fact,! he! thought! of! him! as! a! fine! and! able!
economist.!Prasad!asked!for!a!meeting!with!Stolper!in!order!for!them!to!work!out!
their! relationship.! They! had! a! meeting! and! Stolper’s! conclusions! were! that! Prasad!
was! irritating! not! only! to! the! British! but! also! to! the! Nigerians.! Prasad! wanted! to!
change! the! organizational! setup! immediately.! Stolper! felt! that! in! the! long! run,!
Prasad!was!probably!right!but!if!they!got!embroiled!in!that!now,!they!would!never!

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
476!Ibid.,!71.!
477!Ibid.!!
478!Ibid.,!79.!
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produce! a! plan.479!While! there! were! few! differences! between! Stolper! and! Prasad!
such!as!Prasad’s!focus!on!list!of!investment!projects!rather!than!a!macroeconomic!
framework,! a! position! favored! by! Stolper,! in! the! diary,! Stolper! acknowledged! that!
their! approaches! came! to! “pretty! much! the! same! thing.”480!What! was! at! issue! was!
the!way!that!Prasad!did!things.!The!impression!one!gets!from!Stolper’s!diary!is!that!
Prasad!wanted!to!call!the!shots!and!always!wanted!it!his!way.!!
Throughout! the! development! of! the! plan,! the! conflicts! between! Stolper’s!
team! and! Prasad! only! escalated.! In! April! of! 1961,! for! example,! Hansen! informed!
Stolper! that! Prasad! had! given! the! US! ambassador,! Joseph! Palmar,! much! higher!
figures!for!aid!needs!than!the!ones!they!had!come!up!with,!yet!he!was!unwilling!or!
unable! to! tell! him! how! he! arrived! at! the! figures.! Stolper! condemned! Prasad’s!
recklessness!and!believed!that!it!would!eventually!blow!up!in!his![Prasad’s]!face!and!
might! spill! over! to! affect! his! own! team.! Stolper! wrote! thus! about! Prasad:! “His!
recklessness!in!giving!advice!may!give!the!whole!economic!advising!business!a!bad!
name.! Moreover,! we! have! reason! to! believe! that! he! says! one! can’t! really! plan! in!
Nigeria! because! there! are! no! statistics.! Of! course! statistics! are! rudimentary! to! say!
the!least.!But!the!point!illustrates!the!difference!in!approach!between!him!and!us.!He!
really! is! a! planner! which! we! are! not.! He! would! consider! exchange! control! quite!
lightly! while! we! would! consider! it! a! very! serious! step! to! be! avoided! if! at! all!
possible.”481!One!of!the!issues!here!was!the!figures!that!they!were!using.!Stolper,!it!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
479!Ibid.,!80.!
480!Ibid.,!69.!!
481!Gray,!ed.,!Diaries'of'Wolfgang'Stolper,!93.!
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seems,!was!caught!up!in!the!statistical!data!that!had!been!drawn!and!published!in!
1959! by! the! National! Economic! Council.! Prasad! was! suspect! of! this! data! and! did!
most! of! his! projections! without! sharing! how! he! arrived! at! the! numbers! while!
Stolper!used!those!numbers!for!his!projections.482!!
Prasad’s! actions! motivated! Stolper! to! begin! questioning! his! motives.! He!
concluded! that! Prasad,! being! Indian,! was! anti\English! as! well! as! patronizing! to!
Nigerians.! Stolper! believed! that! Prasad! was! unhappy! and! filled! with! disbelief! that!
Nigeria’s!economy!was!growing!faster!than!that!of!India’s,!despite!the!fact!that!the!
Indians! were! trying! much! harder! than! the! Nigerians.! Despite! these! problems! that!
Stolper!had!with!Prasad,!he!still!had!compliments!for!him.!He!believed!Prasad!was!a!
“good,!competent!man,!a!most!unusual!World!Bank!type….”483!Only!a!few!days!later,!
Stolper!wrote!in!his!diary!entry!accusing!Prasad!of!a!flagrant!lie!and!threatening!to!
resign!rather!than!taking!any!further!orders!from!Prasad.!By!the!16!of!April!1961,!
there! was! a! public! standup! between! Stolper! and! Prasad! at! Toby! Lewis’! home.484!
Prasad! told! Stolper! that! he! would! let! them! proceed! with! planning! if! they! wanted,!
but!he!did!not!think!they!would!get!anywhere!with!it.!Stolper!retorted!that!Prasad!
was! in! no! position! to! let! them! proceed! as! they! wished.! Stolper! said! he! was!
responsible!for!planning!and!Prasad!was!responsible!for!short\term!advice.!Prasad!
shot!back!that!“no!one!had!told!him!to!stick!to!short\term!advice.”!Stolper!rejoined!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
482!See,!National!Economic!Council,!Economic'Survey'of'Nigeria:'1959!(Lagos:!Government!Printer,!

1959).!!
483!Ibid.!
484!Toby!Lewis!was!a!British!colonial!expert.!He!was!the!Second!Permanent!Secretary!at!the!Federal!
Ministry!of!Economic!Development!during!Wolfgang!Stolper’s!time!in!Nigeria.!
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that!he!understood!it!to!be!their!respective!terms!of!reference.!Prasad!rebuffed!that!
he!was!wrong.!In!the!end,!Stolper!thought!that!Prasad!might!have!been!correct.485!!
The!disagreements!between!these!planners!were!reminiscent!of!those!in!the!
colonial! period.! Like! the! numerous! conflicts! between! Mackie! and! the! political!
department!of!the!colonial!state,!there!were!several!other!conflicts!throughout!the!
duration! of! the! time! Stolper! and! Prasad! were! working! together,! which! space! does!
not! permit! me! to! examine! in! further! detail.! However,! I! believe! it! is! important! to!
present! some! of! these! conflicts! because! they! reveal! the! other! side! of! development!
planning,! which! is! the! human! side.! You! have! two! main! characters,! Stolper! and!
Prasad,! jostling! for! power! and! control! to! the! point! where! they! allowed! it! to!
adversely!affect!their!work.!The!conflicts!subsumed!the!major!part!of!their!work!and!
to! a! great! extent! these! conflicts! arose! from! their! different! ideologies! on!
development!planning.!According!to!Stolper,!the!main!disagreement!between!them!
was!Prasad’s!!belief!that!the!poor!quality!of!the!statistics!meant!what!needed!to!be!
done!was!to!string!together!a!series!of!projects.486 !Stolper’s!approach!was!based!on!
the! need! to! “establish! a! macroeconomic! framework! within! which! the! effective!
demand! for! investment,! and! the! supply! of! domestic! and! foreign! finance,! can! be!
estimated.”487!He! believed! that! there! was! a! need! for! a! framework! in! which! all! the!
individual!projects!and!programs!could!be!placed.!If!there!was!no!such!framework,!
he!asked,!“How!else!could!one!decide!which!projects!to!omit!in!case!resources!were!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
485!Gray,!ed.,!Diaries'of'Wolfgang'Stolper,!97.!
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!

258!

!

not!forthcoming?!How!else!could!one!ensure!consistent!programs!and!projects?”488!
In!other!words,!Stolper’s!view!was!more!of!a!programmatic!approach!and!Prasad’s!
was!more!of!a!project\based!approach.489!
The*Art*of*the*Possible*
Despite! the! disputes! with! Prasad,! Stolper! was! the! architect! of! the! Nigerian!
plan.! Shortly! after! leaving! Nigeria,! Stopler! wrote! a! book,! titled! Planning' without'
Facts,! in! which! he! discussed! his! experiences! formulating! the! Nigerian! plan.! In! this!
book,!we!see!clearly!Stopler’s!approach!to!development!planning.!He!argued!in!the!
book! that! the! central! problem! of! development! is! how! to! allocate! resources! for!
growth.! He! wrote:! “This! mobilization! and! allocation! may! involve! the! creation! of!
institutions! and! of! a! political! consensus.! It! involves! economic! policies! and! specific!
action!by!government!and!the!private!sector.”490!In!Nigeria’s!case,!there!were!barely!
substantial! statistics! to! base! their! projections! on! and! he! himself! was! largely!
unfamiliar! with! the! country.! He! saw! the! plan! as! a! way! of! giving! sense! to! the!
direction! of! the! economy.! In! formulating! this! plan,! Stolper! recognized! the!
limitations!that!the!Nigerian!context!placed!on!him.!As!he!stated,!the!planner!must!
realize! that! “whatever! can! be! done! will! be! the! result! of! a! double! compromise!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
488!Ibid.,!95.!
489!It!is!important!to!note!that!this!is!Stolper’s!perspective!on!his!disagreement!with!Prasad.!My!

archival!research!has!not!yielded!any!results!on!Prasad’s!views.!Other!recent!works!that!have!
discussed!this!plan!have!also!relied!on!Stolper’s!diary.!See!Dibua,!Development'and'Diffusionism;!
Grubbs,!Secular'Missionaries;!Mary!S.!Morgan,!“On!a!Mission’!with!Mutable!Mobiles.”!Working!Papers!
on!the!Nature!of!Evidence,!34/08,!London!School!of!Economics,!London,!2008.!!
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/22500/1/3408Morgan.pdf.!
490!Wolfgang!F.!Stolper,!Planning'without'Facts:'Lessons'in'Resource'Allocation'from'Nigeria’s'
Development!(Cambridge,!Massachusetts:!Harvard!University!Press,!1966),!2.!
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between!conflicting!political!views!and!ends!and!between!what!is!ideally!desirable!
and!what!is!possible.”491!As!in!the!colonial!period,!development!was!negotiated!and!
this!was!the!realization!of!Stolper.!This!was!a!far!cry!from!the!bold!pronouncements!
of!modernization!theory.!!
In! Nigeria,! what! Stopler! dealt! with! was! the! conflicts! between! the! regional!
governments! and! the! federal! government.! As! noted! earlier,! the! federalization! of!
Nigeria!in!1954!meant!that!the!different!regions!had!more!autonomy!in!the!design!
of!their!plans.!The!three!regions!of!Nigeria!were!all!working!on!their!regional!plans!
and!then!there!was!a!federal!plan.!Thus,!there!were!actually!four!different!plans!that!
were! being! written.! Stolper! had! to! navigate! the! relationship! between! the! regions!
and! the! federal! government.! One! case! in! point! was! after! the! plan’s! white! paper492!
had!been!drafted.!The!PM!insisted!that!each!regional!parliament!would!debate!only!
its! own! plan! and! the! plan’s! white! paper! would! not! be! taken! to! any! regional!
parliament.!The!PM,!understanding!the!local!situation,!did!not!want!regional!plans!
debated! in! the! federal! parliament! and! vice! versa.! Despite! persuasions! by! Stolper!
and! his! team,! the! PM! refused.! He! declared! that! the! three! regional! plans! would! be!
printed! along! with! the! plan’s! white! paper! as! the! national! plan.! Stopler! was!
frustrated! and! disappointed! with! the! PM’s! decision.! He! met! with! Toby! Lewis! later!
and!expressed!his!disappointment!that!the!PM!had!vetoed!the!debate!of!the!regional!
plans! in! the! national! parliament! and! also! vetoed! debating! the! white! paper! in! the!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
491!Ibid.,!27.!

492!The!plan’s!white!paper!was!later!published.!Federation!of!Nigeria,!Federal'Government'

Development'Programme,!1962Y68,!Sessional!Paper!No.!1!of!1962!(Lagos:!Federal!Printing!Division,!
1962).!!
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regional! parliaments.! To! Stopler’s! surprise,! Lewis! immediately! congratulated!
Stolper.!Lewis!told!him!the!PM’s!“concern!was!to!hold!the!Federation!together,!and!
he!had!to!prevent!discussion!of!Regional!matters!in!the!Federal!Parliament,!which!
would! disrupt! the! national! effort.! He! thought! the! PM! had! acted! wisely,! in!
statesmanlike! fashion.”493!As! it! turned! out,! the! PM’s! action! saved! the! plan.! The!
ethnic! rivalries! between! the! three! regions! would! have! killed! the! national! plan!
because!of!brinkmanship!between!the!representatives!of!the!different!regions.!!
Stolper! also! had! to! deal! with! what! was! ideally! desirable! versus! what! was!
possible! in! practice.! This! also! happened! to! be! one! of! the! reasons! for! the! conflicts!
between! him! and! Prasad.! Stolper! viewed! planning! in! Nigeria! from! the! onset! as! a!
general! problem! of! “resource! allocation! and! mobilization! rather! than! merely! the!
development! of! capital! budgets.” 494 !On! the! other! hand! Prasad’s! approach! to!
development!was!in!line!with!Paul!Rosenthein\Rodan’s!Big!Push!model!in!which!he!
believed!that!large!amounts!of!investments!are!needed!for!“backward”!countries!to!
move! toward! economic! development.495!Prasad! told! the! different! regions! to! think!
big! and! that! the! money! would! come! through! foreign! aid.! The! regions! then! put!
together!gigantic!projects!that!they!did!not!have!the!financial!resources!to!execute.!
This!was!precisely!the!problem!of!the!Eastern!Region.!When!it!became!obvious!that!
the!resources!wouldn’t!be!available,!everyone!wanted!the!other’s!project!to!be!cut.!
Stolper’s!approach!was!that!the!resources!were!scarce.!He!believed!that!“all!uses!of!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
493!Gray,!ed.,!Diaries'of'Wolfgang'Stolper,!251.!
494!Stolper,!Planning'without'Facts,!44.!

495!Paul!Rosenthein\Rodan,!“The!International!Development!of!Economically!Backward!Areas,”!

International'Affairs!(April,!1944).!!
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resources!compete!at!any!one!moment!of!time!for!all!available!resources”!and!that!it!
was! a! mistake! to! see! development! and! growth! solely! in! terms! of! increased! capital!
formation.! He! also! believed! that! capital! expenditures! would! inevitably! build! up!
future!recurrent!expenditures!and!that!the!amount!of!“resources!that!can!be!raised!
will!depend!significantly!on!the!rationality!of!their!use.”496!In!planning!development,!
it! is! very! important! to! look! at! the! recurring! budgets.! For! example,! even! if! you!
receive!a!school!or!a!hospital!as!a!gift,!there!would!be!a!need!for!domestic!resources!
to!keep!these!running.497!!
In!designing!the!Nigerian!plan,!Stolper!had!in!mind!the!rational!allocation!of!
resources.! In! his! instructions! to! the! staff! of! the! Economic! Planning! Unit! (EPU)! in!
1961,!he!wrote,!“The!Plan!will!consist!of:!a!Capital!Budget;!a!Recurrent!Budget;!and!
Policy! Recommendations.! This! is! necessary! in! order! to! ensure! that! the! resources!
available!to!Nigeria!are!used!in!a!reasonable!manner.!For!present!purposes,!I!have!
asked! that! all! Ministry! programs! for! the! next! five! years! to! be! collected:! we! must!
know! their! total! capital! programs! as! well! as! the! expenditures! which! will! be!
generated! by! the! new! programs! and! the! expected! recurrent! expenditure! for!
continuing! programs.” 498 !Due! to! political! considerations,! the! Nigerian! plan! was!
bigger!than!the!resources!that!were!available!to!execute!it.!While!Stolper’s!view!was!
that!the!plan!should!be!scaled!down,!the!government,!for!political!reasons,!did!not!
cut!it!but!instead!extended!the!implementation!of!the!plan!from!five!to!six!years.!As!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Stolper! himself! concluded,! “it! is! a! mistake! to! expect! any! real! plan! to! be! wholly!
rational! in! economic! terms! or! to! be! wholly! consistent.! The! economist! may! regret!
that!this!is!so,!and!the!politician!may!come!to!regret!some!of!his!decisions!when!they!
have!begun!to!backfire,!when!they!fail!to!achieve!his!political!ends,!and!when!they!
raise!new!and!yet!more!disagreeable!problems.!But!it!is!futile!to!discuss!a!real!plan!
as!if!it!were!an!academic!exercise,!for!a!real!plan!is!inevitably!a!compromise.”499!So!
was!the!fate!of!the!Nigerian!plan.!
The*Nigerian*National*Development*Plan*
!

It! would! be! a! daunting! task! to! attempt! to! analyze! in! details! the! four! plans!

that! made! up! the! Nigerian! National! Development! Plan,! 1962\68.! The! plan’s!
published!version!presents!an!important!summary!in!pages!23!to!24.!The!target!of!
the! plan! was! to! achieve! a! growth! rate! of! 4! per! cent! per! year! and! to! raise! this! if!
necessary.!The!goal!was!to!achieve!this!growth!rate!by!investing!15!per!cent!of!GDP!
and!raising!per!capita!consumption!by!about!1!per!cent!per!year.!The!plan!also!had!
as!a!goal!to!raise!the!domestic!saving!ratio!of!9.5!per!cent!of!GDP!in!1960!to!about!15!
per! cent! or! higher! by! 1975.! This,! it! was! believed,! would! lead! to! self\sustaining!
growth.!The!plan!also!had!as!a!goal!to!develop!as!rapidly!as!possible!“opportunities!
in!education,!health!and!employment;!and!to!improve!access!for!all!citizens!to!these!
opportunities.”500!!!!

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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500!Federation!of!Nigeria,!National'Development'Plan,'1962Y68!(Lagos:!Federal!Ministry!of!Economic!

Development,!1962),!23.!!
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The!plan!summary!then!went!on!to!outline!specifically!the!things!that!needed!

to! happen! in! order! to! “achieve! a! modernized! economy! consistent! with! the!
democratic,!political,!and!social!aspirations!of!the!people.”501!The!goals!outlined!and!
the! specific! projects! associated! with! them! were! not! much! different! from! those!
carried! out! during! colonial! development.! In! fact,! only! the! first! two! listed! showed!
some!divergence!from!colonial!development.!Here,!they!are!as!summarized:!!
\
\
\
\

\
\
\
\

!

\

the!creation!of!more!jobs!and!opportunities!in!non\agricultural!occupations;!
the! provision! of! advisory! and! training! services! to! Nigerian! businessmen! to!
enable!them!to!compete!more!effectively!at!home!and!abroad;!!
the! increase! in! the! production! of! export! crops! through! better! seed!
distribution!and!more!modern!methods!of!cultivation,!as!well!as!through!the!
increase!in!the!area!under!cultivation;!
the! introduction! of! more! modern! agricultural! methods! through! farm!
settlements,! cooperative! (nucleus)! plantations,! improved! farm! implements!
such!as!hydraulic!hand!presses!for!the!expression[sic,!extraction]!of!palm!oil,!
and!a!greatly!expanded!agricultural!extension!service;!
the!expansion!of!the!installed!capacity!of! !electricity!generation!to!643!MW!
by!1968;!
the! expansion! of! railway! mileage! by! the! remaining! 293! miles! of! the! Bornu!
Extension;!and!an!additional!14!Diesel!Engines!and!1485!wagons;!
the!provision!of!7!new!!docks!in!Lagos!and!Port!Harcourt!capable!of!handling!
an!additional!3.6!million!tons;!
the! expansion! of! the! system! of! tarred! roads! by! about! 3,000! milies;! and!
completion! of! the! new! Niger! River! bridge! at! Onitsha! and! the! Second!
Mainland!Bridge!at!Lagos;!and!
the!expansion!of!cement!capacity!to!not!less!than!980,000!tons!per!year.502!

Though! rhetorically,! modernization! theorists! made! bold! proclamations! about!
remaking!these!former!colonial!holdings!that!have!remained!backward!as!a!result!of!
colonial! rule,! in! practice,! they! repeated! most! of! the! same! projects! that! had! been!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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carried! out! as! part! of! colonial! development! policy.! In! the! case! of! the! Nigerian!
national!plan,!there!were!not!many!new!ideas!on!the!table.!In!terms!of!agricultural!
development,!the!1962!plan!bore!resemblance!to!the!1945!agricultural!plan.!It!was!
not!uncommon!that!“postcolonial”!planners!returned!to!older!colonial!files!to!draw!
their! development! ideas! from! them.! In! some! cases,! the! same! buildings! and! offices!
which! housed! the! colonial! developers! were! also! the! ones! that! were! used! by!
“postcolonial”!developers.503!!
Financing*the*Plan:**American*Aid*
Despite! this! resemblance,! the! 1962! plan,! unlike! that! of! 1955\62,! would!
receive! a! significant! amount! of! financial! aid! from! the! US.! Two! important! changes!
were! responsible! for! this:! the! Nigerian! independence! from! Britain! on! October! 1,!
1960! and! President! John! F.! Kennedy’s! assumption! of! office! as! President! of! the! US.!
The! latter,! even! more! so! than! the! former,! was! chiefly! responsible! for! the! US!
generous! assistance! to! Nigeria.! On! the! occasion! of! Nigeria’s! independence,! the! US!
was! well! represented.! President! Eisenhower! wrote! to! Her! Majesty,! the! Queen! of!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
503!In!analyzing!the!nation\building!efforts!of!the!Americans!in!the!Plain!of!Reeds,!Vietnam,!David!

Biggs!shows!how!this!effort!failed!because!the!Americans!“could!not!escape!the!landscape,!webs!of!
bureaucracy,!and!political!movements!that!had!been!shaped!by!ninety!years!of!colonial!rule!and!ten!
years!of!anticolonial!warfare.”!Some!of!the!engineers!moved!back!and!forth!among!the!French,!the!
Vietnamese!and!the!American!domains.!Biggs!says!that!even!today,!the!engineers!and!planners!still!
occupy!the!same!offices!that!were!inhabited!by!the!pre!1975!and!1954!agencies.!See!David!Biggs,!
“Breaking!from!the!Colonial!Mold:!Water!Engineering!and!the!Failure!of!Nation\Building!in!the!Plain!
of!Reeds,!Vietnam,”!Technology'and'Culture!49,!3!(July!2008):!599\623.!Also!for!more!on!this!
continuity,!see!Elizabeth!Lunstrum,!“State!Rationality,!Development,!and!the!Making!of!State!
Territory:!From!colonial!extraction!to!postcolonial!conservation!in!Southern!Mozambique,”!in!
Christine!Folke!Ax!et!al.!(eds),!Cultivating'the'Colonies:'Colonial'States'and'their'Environmental'
Legacies!(Ohio,!Athens:!Ohio!University!Press,!2011),!pp.!239\274;!Andrew!Bowman,!“Mass!
production!or!production!by!the!masses?!Tractors,!Cooperatives,!and!the!Politics!of!Rural!
Development!in!Post\Independence!Zambia,”!Journal'of'African'History!52,!2!(July!2011),!201\221.!
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England! appointing! Governor! Rockefeller! of! New! York! as! his! personal!
representative! with! the! rank! of! special! ambassador! to! the! independence!
ceremonies.504 Also! appointed,! as! representative! and! special! ambassador! to! the!
ceremonies!by!Eisenhower!was!Mr.!Thomas!Chauncey!of!Arizona.!There!were!three!
other! representatives! of! the! US! government! at! the! event:! Mr.! Joseph! Palmer,! who!
was! the! Consul! General! at! Salisbury,! Mr.! John! K.! Emerson,! who! was! the! Consul!
General!at!Lagos,!and!Mr.!James!K.!Penfield,!who!was!the!deputy!assistant!secretary!
for! African! Affairs! at! the! Department! of! State.! America’s! independence! gift! to!
Nigeria!was!the!provision!of!“books,!library!furnishings,!films,!projection!equipment!
and!related!items!up!to!value!of!approximately!100,000!pounds!for!the!Institute!of!
International!Studies.”505!The!Nigerian!government!had!proposed!to!establish!such!
an!institution!as!a!center!of!learning!and!research!on!African!and!world!problems.!
On! the! occasion! of! the! independence,! Governor! Rockefeller! brought! a! personal!
message! from! President! Eisenhower! to! the! Prime! Minister! of! Nigeria,! Alhaji! Sir!
Abubakar! Tafawa! Belewa.! After! the! usual! congratulations! to! Nigeria! for! her!
independence,! President! Eisenhower! then! proceeded! to! write,! “I! am! keenly!
conscious!of!the!friendship!which!has!marked!the!relations!of!our!two!countries.!We!
take!great!pride!in!bonds!established!by!Nigerian!government!leaders!whom!we!are!
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privileged!to!receive!as!guests,!and!by!the!many!Nigerians!who!have!studied!in!our!
land.”506!!
Many!Nigerians!were!students!in!the!US!in!the!late!twenties!and!beyond!and!
many! of! these! returned! home! to! be! voices! of! the! independence! movement.! Chief!
among!them!was!Nnamdi!Azikiwe!who!arrived!the!US!in!the!late!1920s!and!studied!
at!Storer!College,!WV;!Howard!University,!Washington!DC;!and!Lincoln!University!in!
Pennsylvania!before!returning!to!Nigeria!in!the!early!1930s.!Through!his!influence,!
many!other!Nigerian!students!came!to!the!US!for!their!education.!British!officials!in!
Nigeria! did! not! encourage! education! outside! of! the! country! and! the! only! college!
opportunity! for! Nigerian! students! locally! was! the! Yaba! Higher! College! located! in!
Lagos.! This! college! did! not! award! degrees! in! the! liberal! arts.! Instead! it! trained!
students!to!fill!technical!vacancies!in!the!various!ministries!of!government!and!their!
degrees!were!considered!inferior!to!those!that!were!earned!from!British!colleges.507!
These! Nigerian! students,! and! in! fact! other! West! African! students! such! as! Kwame!
Nkrumah,! who! studied! in! the! US,! were! pivotal! voices! in! the! independence!
movement.!They!formed!alliances!with!their!counterparts!in!the!United!Kingdom!to!
fight!British!colonial!rule.!Azikiwe!would!become!the!first!president!of!Nigeria,!so!as!
would!Kwame!Nkrumah!in!Ghana.!Eisenhower’s!congratulatory!message!recognized!
these! bonds! that! already! existed! with! Nigeria! and! anticipated! the! pivotal! role! that!
the! US! would! play! in! determining! Nigeria’s! future.! Nigeria! was! of! an! important!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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economic! interest! to! the! US.! For! example,! in! the! published! statistics! by! the! U.S.!
Energy!Information!Administration,!Nigeria!was!exporting!about!6,000!barrels!of!oil!
per! day! to! the! United! states! in! the! 1960s! and! by! 1976,! the! exports! had! grown! to!
over!one!million!barrels!per!day.508!While!in!comparison!to!the!1970s,!the!exports!in!
1960s!were!paltry,!it!must! be! noted! that!oil!exploration!and! production!was!in! its!
early!years!in!Nigeria!and!large!deposits!of!crude!oil!had!already!been!discovered.!!!
In! his! congratulatory! message,! President! Eisenhower! continued:! “For! the!
future,! we! in! the! United! States! stand! ready! to! work! with! the! people! of! Nigeria! to!
reach!the!goals!we!all!share!of!health,!enlightenment!and!material!well!being.!I!am!
confident!that!in!years!to!come!our!two!countries!will!stand!as!one!in!safeguarding!
the! greatest! of! all! bonds! between! us,! our! common! belief! in! a! free! and! democratic!
way!of!life.”509!It!would!be!naïve!for!one!to!argue!that!his!message!was!just!a!normal!
diplomatic! message! offered! on! such! occasions.! Nigeria! was! of! great! importance! to!
the! US! economically! and! also! strategically! during! this! period! of! the! Cold! War! as! I!
have! already! shown! in! this! chapter.! The! language! in! Eisenhower’s! message! was!
suggested!by!the!State!Department.!While!this!is!not!unusual,!what!is!important!is!
the! cover! letter! that! accompanied! the! suggested! message! from! the! State!
Department.! In! the! cover! letter,! the! acting! secretary! wrote:! “Because! of! Nigeria’s!
size!and!importance!and!the!stabilizing!role!it!will!be!able!to!play!as!a!representative!
of! the! British! Commonwealth! in! Africa,! I! recommend! that! a! second! message!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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addressed! to! the! people! and! government! of! Nigeria! be! available! for! release! on!
September! 30,! the! day! prior! to! the! actual! independence! date.”510!This! he! writes!
“would!allow!us!to!demonstrate!the!extent!of!American!interest!in!Nigeria,!not!only!
in!that!country!but!elsewhere!in!Africa.”511!Both!the!people!in!the!State!Department!
in! Washington! DC! and! the! consulate! in! Nigeria! understood! the! role! that! Nigeria!
would!play!in!Africa!and!it!was!important!for!the!US!to!safeguard!its!interest!in!the!
country.! The! population! of! Nigeria,! the! most! populous! African! nation! even! to! date!
and! its! moderate! nationalists! convinced! the! US! that! Nigeria! would! be! a! country! it!
could! work! with! and! use! as! a! beacon! for! promoting! not! only! democracy! but!
America’s!economic!and!political!interest!in!Africa.!!
Nevertheless,! it! would! not! be! the! Eisenhower! administration! that! would!
forge! the! strong! development! ties! between! the! United! States! and! Nigeria! but! the!
Kennedy! administration.! At! the! time! of! Nigeria’s! independence! Eisenhower! was!
serving! the! last! months! of! his! second! term! as! president.! He! was! basically! a! lame!
duck! as! the! presidential! election! between! Nixon! and! Kennedy! would! happen! in!
about!a!month.!John!Kennedy!won!that!election!and!he!was!sworn!in!on!20!January!
1961.!Earlier!in!this!chapter,!I!presented!Kennedy’s!views!on!modernization!in!the!
third!world!and!how!he!enlisted!men!like!Walt!Rostow!and!the!Rostovian!disciples!
to!help!spread!America’s!vision!of!the!world!in!Asia!and!Africa.!I!showed!earlier!that!
Kennedy!himself!was!a!true!believer!in!Rostovian!theories!and!that!was!the!reason!
he! brought! him! into! his! administration! and! gave! him! and! his! disciples! the! kind! of!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
510!Memorandum!for!the!President,!26!September,!1960,!NA!II:!74H.02/9\2860.!
511!Ibid.!

!

269!

!

access! they! had! toward! US! foreign! policy.! One! disciple! of! Rostow! that! would! have!
enormous!influence!in!the!development!trajectory!of!Nigeria!during!this!time!period!
was!Arnold!Rivkin.!!
At! this! time,! Rivkin! was! supposedly! doing! research! on! Africa.! His! Africa!
project! at! MIT! had! received! the! grant! from! Carnegie! to! enable! his! team! to! do!
research! on! Africa.! He! had! both! Archibald! Callaway! and! Charles! Nixon! working! in!
Nigeria.!Also!there!was!Wolfgang!Stolper!who!was!associated!with!the!MIT!African!
project!working!in!Nigeria.!The!presence!of!Rostow,!who!had!been!associated!with!
the! CIS! in! the! Kennedy! administration! helped! to! forge! a! strong! collaboration!
between!the!CIS!(African!Project)!people!in!Nigeria!and!the!Kennedy!administration.!
Rivkin’s!appraisal!of!Nigeria!to!Rostow!was!that!Nigeria!would!play!as!important!a!
role! in! Africa! as! India! in! Asia.512!Rivkin! played! an! important! role! in! convincing!
Rostow! that! Nigeria! was! the! model! country! for! the! spread! of! the! modernization!
gospel!in!Africa.!It!was!the!task!of!Rostow!to!influence!the!Kennedy!administration’s!
policy!toward!Africa,!picking!Nigeria!as!a!model!country!for!America’s!development!
efforts! in! Africa.! This! task,! Rostow! successfully! accomplished.! In! March! of! 1961,!
Rostow! informed! Max! Milikan,! the! director! of! CIS,! that! the! White! House! had!
“selected!Nigeria!as!the!African!country!which!it!is!important!for!us!to!deal!with!in!a!
successful! way.”513!Rostow! also! wanted! to! know! if! MIT! had! some! studies! already!
they!could!use!in!estimating!the!kind!of!five\year!plan!that!Nigeria!could!or!should!
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produce.! Milikan! relayed! this! message! to! Stolper.514!Rostow! was! very! much! aware!
that! MIT! CIS! had! people! in! Nigeria! and! he! also! knew! that! Stolper! was! helping!
Nigeria! with! its! development! plan.! Basically,! he! was! requesting! for! Stolper’s! work!
on!the!Nigerian!development!plan.!!
The*United*States*Special*Economic*Mission*
On! 5! May! 1961! Stolper! found! out! from! Toby! Lewis! that! the! United! States!
would! be! sending! a! special! economic! mission! to! Nigeria! on! 16! May.! Interestingly,!
Arnold! Rivkin! headed! this! Mission.! The! news! had! been! communicated! by!
Ambassador! Palmer! to! the! prime! minister! that! the! United! States! was! willing! “to!
commit! itself! for! a! number! of! years! to! sizable! sums”! subject! to! congressional!
approval.515!The! choice! of! Rivkin! as! the! head! of! this! mission! was! not! a! surprising!
one! given! his! influence! on! Rostow! and! his! acclaimed! reputation! as! the! most!
knowledgeable! American! on! Sub\Saharan! Africa.! Stolper! knew! two! people! who!
were!on!the!mission:!Rivkin!and!Anthony!Gerber!whom!he!had!worked!with!on!the!
East!German!project.!Stolper!took!interest!in!explaining!to!Lewis!and!George!Dolgin!
who!was!the!Economic!Officer!at!the!US!embassy!in!Lagos,!what!the!kind!of!person!
Rivkin!was!and!what!the!expectations!of!these!mission!would!be.!In!a!kind!of!self\
congratulatory! note,! Stolper! wrote! in! his! diaries:! “What! they! want! to! know! and!
what!they!are!prepared!to!offer!is!something!of!a!triumph!for!me:!It!is!just!what!I!
have!been!arguing!we!should!do.!This!is!perhaps!not!surprising,!because!I!was!after!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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all!at!MIT,!and!it!is!ideas!from!the!Center!for!Foreign!Studies!which!are!now!coming!
back! at! me…The! Mission! will! want! to! know! our! resources,! what! we! can! finance!
ourselves,!how!many!grants!and!loans!we!need.”516!If!there!was!ever!any!doubt!that!
Kennedy’s! policy! on! Nigeria! was! being! driven! by! the! economic! ideology! of! the!
Center,!here!you!have!the!testimony!of!a!man!from!the!Center!saying!it!as!clearly!as!
it!could!be!said.!!
The! US! Mission! arrived! in! Lagos! on! Tuesday,! 16! May! 1961.! On! 20! May,!
Stolper!had!lunch!with!them!at!Dolgin’s!home!and!later!that!evening!took!Rivkin!for!
a! swim.! We! do! not! know! much! of! what! Rivkin! and! Stolper! discussed! during! that!
outing.! Stolper’s! diaries! tell! us! that! he! offered! his! home! for! Lewis! the! next! day! to!
brief! Rivkin! on! the! political! situation! in! Nigeria.! Toby! and! Rivkin! were! frank! with!
each!other!during!the!meeting!and!Stolper!found!Rivkin!impressive.!Whether!there!
was!a!connection!between!the!previous!day!outing!with!Rivkin!or!not,!Stolper!does!
not!tell!us!but!he!enthusiastically!records!in!his!diaries!that,!“I!can!take!some!credit!
for!any!success!the!American!mission!will!have!both!for!the!US!and!Nigeria.”517!My!
reading! of! this! statement! following! from! the! previous! day’s! event! is! that! Stolper!
must!have!used!the!social!opportunity!to!impress!on!Rivkin!the!need!for!aid!to!be!
provided!to!Nigeria.!The!Mission!met!with!the!JPC!on!22!May.!Hansen!presented!a!
paper! to! them,! which! was! based! on! an! earlier! paper! written! by! Stolper.! The!
members!of!the!Mission!asked!questions!based!on!the!paper!that!was!presented!and!
Stolper!was!very!impressed!with!their!responses.!He!remarked!that!he!“carried!the!
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ball”.!Stolper!gave!Rivkin!the!second!paper!that!he!had!written!for!the!Mission.!He!
shared! this! with! him! during! a! social! outing! while! the! rest! of! the! Mission! only!
received! the! paper! the! next! day.518!A! good! rapport! existed! between! Rivkin! and!
Stolper! and! their! association! with! MIT! helped! to! foster! this! relationship.! In! the!
meeting! that! was! held! on! 24! May,! a! question! came! from! Rivkin! on! what! Nigeria’s!
reaction!would!be!to!an!international!consortium!chaired!by!the!IBRD!in!the!manner!
of!the!“Aid!India!Club”?!It!was!agreed!that!Nigeria!would!be!favorable!toward!such!a!
consortium!provided!it!was!not!excluded!from!accepting!aid!from!other!sources!that!
might! offer! it.519!Rivkin! was! surprised! how! easy! it! was! for! an! agreement! to! be!
reached!on!this.!He!had!expected!a!lengthy!conversation!on!the!topic.!This!was!easy!
because!Prasad,!who!was!a!World!Bank!man!and!the!economic!advisor!to!the!prime!
minister,! had! done! most! of! the! legwork! earlier! convincing! the! prime! minister! to!
accept!such!a!proposal.!Rivkin’s!plan!was!to!use!such!an!international!consortium!to!
raise!money!to!match!the!contribution!that!would!be!made!by!the!United!States.520!
The!presence!of!Stolper!in!Nigeria!made!Rivkin’s!task!much!easier.!As!Larry!Grubbs!
writes,! “Stolper’s! influence! within! the! Nigerian! government! made! a! meeting! of!
minds! almost! automatic.! The! foundation! had! been! laid,! almost! casually,! for! the!
future! dominant! role! of! the! World! Bank! and! multilateral! lending! processes! in!
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Nigeria’s!economy.”521!In!one!of!the!final!meetings!the!Mission!had!with!the!Nigerian!
planners!before!leaving!in!June,!Rivkin!told!them!that!everything!was!dependent!on!
the! “structure! of! the! plan”! and! that! the! US! would! fund! “a! quality! plan,! not! quality!
projects.”! Rivkin! wrote! to! his! former! MIT! colleagues! telling! them! that! he! “enjoyed!
working!with!Stolper.”522!!
The! Mission! submitted! its! reports! to! the! Director! of! President! Kennedy’s!
Task! Force! on! Foreign! Economic! Assistance,! Mr.! Henry! R.! Labouisse! on! June! 17,!
1961.!They!wrote!that!the!responsible!officials!in!Nigeria!were!“cordial,!forthcoming!
and! cooperative”! with! them! and! that! they! discussed! “their! development! plans! at!
considerable! length! and! answered! the! many! queries! of! the! Mission! members! with!
frankness!and,!wherever!possible,!in!detail.”523!The!Mission’s!report!on!Nigeria!was!
very! glowing.! It! stated! that! Nigerians! were! hard! workers! and! were! determined! to!
improve!their!standard!of!living.!It!noted!that!with!the!help!of!an!economic!advisor!
from! the! IBRD! and! American! economists! supported! by! the! Ford! Foundation! and! a!
small! group! of! Nigerian! economists,! Nigeria! was! engaged! in! “attempting! to!
formulate! a! national! economic! development! plan”! and! to! “establish! priorities! and!
quantify! objectives”! of! the! planning! scheme.524!In! praising! Nigeria’s! determination!
and!hard!work,!the!report!noted,!“almost!all!of!Nigeria’s!economic!development!in!
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the! post\war! period! has! been! self\financed.”525!This! is! not! completely! true! as! the!
British! government! made! significant! investments! in! Nigeria’s! economic!
development!in!the!post\war!period.!What!the!report!did!was!to!try!to!construct!a!
dominant!narrative!in!which!the!US!became!the!hero!in!its!claim!to!remake!Nigeria!
from!a!“blank!slate.”!As!I!have!shown!earlier!in!the!chapter,!the!1962!plan!was!not!
really! new.! It! built! upon! the! colonial! development! plans.! Also,! many! of! the! senior!
civil!servants!and!experts!in!the!Nigerian!civil!service!were!British.!So,!the!attempt!
by!Rivkin!and!the!US!to!claim!hegemony!over!Nigerian!development,!papered!over!a!
much! more! complicated! reality,! one! with! important! late! colonial! connections! and!
continuities.!!
The! report! also! said! that! in! the! African! context,! Nigeria! “stands! out! with!
respect! to! its! potential! for! absorbing! significant! amounts! of! external! reserves.”526!
Though!it’s!agricultural!extension!services!were!considered!“poor!to!bad”,!and!thus!
were!identified!as!a!priority!to!the!forthcoming!development!plan.!In!terms!of!social!
justice,!the!report!observed!that!Nigeria!was!one!of!the!few!countries!in!Africa!“with!
a! substantial! and! growing! private! sector! involving! an! increasing! participation! of!
Nigerians’! and! it! was! one! of! the! few! African! countries! with! free! trade! unions,! a!
democratic! constitution! that! was! entrenched! within! its! civil! rights,! and! with! an!
independent! judiciary.! Based! on! these! findings,! the! report! concluded! that! with!
regards! to! the! President’s! “principal! criteria! for! foreign! assistance…Nigeria! would!
appear! to! be! one! of! the! most! promising! candidates! for! economic! development!
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assistance! –! grant! and! long\term! loan! –! in! Africa.”527!The! criteria! which! Kennedy!
had! set! forth! for! foreign! assistance! was! long\term! planning,! self\help,! absorptive!
capacity,!and!social!justice.528 !The!Mission!recommended!that!a!second!visit!should!
be!made!to!Nigeria!around!October!to!have!more!conversations!with!the!officials!in!
Nigeria! while! their! plan! continued! to! be! under! review.! At! the! time! the! report! was!
submitted,!the!Mission!had!estimated!that!external!assistance!to!Nigeria!for!the!five\
year!plan!would!be!in!the!range!of!$762!million!to!$882!million.529!!
The! Mission! returned! to! Nigeria! on! September! 26,! 1961.! Again,! Rivkin!
headed! the! mission! and! Stolper! was! at! the! airport! to! receive! them.! They! had! the!
first! meeting! with! the! JPC! on! September! 28! with! Prasad! chairing! the! meeting.!
Prasad! wanted! to! know! how! much! aid! the! United! States! would! give! to! Nigeria.!
Rivkin! told! him! it! depended! on! the! plan! and! that! no! project! was! going! to! be!
evaluated!“except!in!the!context!of!the!plan,”!and!he!hoped!to!have!the!plan!before!
the! Mission! departed.530!Again! and! again! Prasad! kept! pressing! Rivkin! at! further!
meetings! on! the! projects! the! United! States! would! support! but! Rivkin’s! continuous!
response!to!him!was!that!every!project!was!going!to!be!evaluated!on!the!basis!of!the!
whole!plan.!The!Mission!left!Nigeria!at!the!end!of!October.!!
Rivkin’s! report! had! considerable! influence! in! Washington! and! moved! the!
Kennedy! administration! to! commit! $225! million! to! the! Nigerian! national!
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development! plan.! Larry! Grubbs! writes! that,! “The! African! Bureau! of! the! State!
Department! believed! a! long\term! aid! commitment! to! Nigeria! would! ‘demonstrate!
the!advantages!of!long\term!planning,’!and!that!with!U.S.!help,!‘the!moral!equivalent!
of!anti\colonialism!could!become!‘the!plan’!throughout!the!region.”!Also,!the!head!of!
the! newly! created! USAID,531!Fowler! Hamilton,! advised! President! Kennedy! “of! the!
‘extraordinary’!character!of!Nigeria’s!development!plan,!which!he!described!as!the!
‘first!development!plan!of!such!scope!and!magnitude!on!the!continent!of!Africa’!and!
‘truly! national! in! scope! and! purpose.” 532 !Two! days! after! this! advice,! Kennedy!
approved! the! aid! package! to! Nigeria. 533 !The! news! reached! Stolper! through!
Ambassador!Palmer!at!a!cocktail!party!given!by!the!Ford!Foundation!on!December!
12,!1961.!At!first!instance,!Stolper!was!not!too!excited!because!the!plan!was!going!to!
cost!$600!million!and!he!expected!the!United!States!to!provide!half!of!it.!Seeing!the!
sour!reaction!on!his!face,!Stolper!writes!that,!Palmer!patted!him!on!the!shoulder!and!
said!to!him:!“It!can!get!bigger.”!Stolper!agreed!that!he!thought!it!was!a!pretty!good!
start.534!This! approval! of! aid! to! Nigeria’s! development! was! a! great! victory! for! the!
evangelists!of!modernization!to!Nigeria.!But!was!modernization!really!a!success!in!
Nigeria?!
*
*
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
531!The!USAID!was!created!in!November!of!1961.!It’s!primary!responsibility!was!to!administer!

civilian!foreign!aid.!!!
532!Grubbs,!Secular'Missionaries,!88!
533!Ibid.!
534!Gray,!ed.,!Diaries'of'Wolfgang'Stolper,!235.!!
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Problems*with*the*Plan*
The! goal! of! the! “missionaries”! of! modernization! to! recreate! Nigeria! in! the!
image! of! America! failed.! The! promise! that! Nigeria! was! going! to! be! for! Africa! what!
India! was! to! Asia! never! materialized.! The! promise! that! India! was! also! going! to! be!
the!model!of!Asia!did!not!materialize.535!Within!a!few!years!of!the!implementation!of!
the!Nigerian!plan,!the!country’s!advance!was!derailed.!Rather!than!becoming!a!great!
beacon!of!liberal!democracy!with!strong!civil!rights,!free!enterprise!with!expanding!
economic! growth,! and! social! improvement! in! the! lives! of! the! people,! Nigerian!
leaders!were!slaughtering!each!other!and!throwing!the!country!into!a!civil!war!that!
would! last! almost! three! years! and! would! have! severe! consequences! for! both! the!
nation’s!economic!and!political!future.!The!question!that!needs!to!be!posed!is:!what!
happened!in!Nigeria?!How!could!the!US!social!scientists!and!the!World!Bank!experts!
could!have!been!so!wrong!about!conditions!in!Nigeria?!!
The!planners!ignored!or!overlooked!some!important!factors!that!could!have!
derailed!the!plan.!This!Nigerian!development!plan!had!problems!right!from!the!very!
beginning,! problems! that! were! often! ignored! by! the! planners.! I! argue! that! there!
were!four!major!problems!that!were!responsible!for!the!failure!of!the!plan:!regional!
differences;! the! problem! of! international! “experts”;! corruption;! and! the! economic!
basis!of!the!plan.!!

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
535!!See!Nick!Cullather,!The'Hungry'World:'America’s'Cold'War'Battle'against'Poverty'in'Asia!

(Cambridge:!Harvard!University!Press,!2010).!!
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Nigeria!was/is!a!loose!amalgam!of!hundreds!of!tribes!and!ethnic!groups.!Two!
amalgamations! took! place! in! Nigeria! during! colonial! rule.! In! 1906,! the! British!
amalgamated! the! Lagos! colony! and! the! Southern! Protectorate! and! in! 1914,! they!
amalgamated! the! Northern! Protectorate! and! the! Southern! Protectorate! creating!
what!is!known!today!as!Nigeria.!Apart!from!the!numerous!minority!tribes!scattered!
all! over! Nigeria,! it! has! three! major! ethnic! groups:! the! Yorubas,! the! Igbos! and! the!
Hausa/Fulanis. 536 !Throughout! colonial! rule,! there! were! tensions! between! the!
different! regions! and! ethnic! groups.! The! regionalization! of! the! colony! in! 1939! and!
the! constitutional! reforms! introduced! thereafter! created! a! decentralized! system!
where! political! elites! and! activities! were! directed! to! local! and! regional! arenas.!
Political! parties! that! were! founded! were! not! truly! national! parties! but! regional!
parties!that!carried!with!them!strong!regional!biases.!This!made!it!difficult!for!the!
political!elites!who!were!responsible!for!the!plan!to!set!in!motion!a!national!vision!of!
development.! ! Beyond! this! was! also! the! historical! bias! of! the! colonial! state! to! the!
northern! part! of! the! country,! which! gained! the! most! from! the!
decentralized/regional! system! of! government.! These! historical! factors! were! at! the!
background!of!this!plan.!!
!Stolper,! the! architect! of! the! Nigerian! plan! confessed! in! his! diary! of! not!
understanding! the! ethnic! rivalries! which! he! had! to! learn! about! over! his! tenure! in!
Nigeria.! I! am! doubtful! how! much! he! understood! the! conflicts! and! differences! that!
existed! between! the! regions.! This! is! obvious! in! the! final! days! of! putting! the! plan!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
536!For!the!history!of!Nigeria!and!the!different!ethnic!groups,!see!Toyin!Falola!and!Mathew!M.!Heaton,!

A'History'of'Nigeria!(Cambridge:!Cambridge!University!Press,!2008).!!
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together.! As! discussed! earlier,! he! did! not! understand! why! the! prime! minister!
refused!that!the!regional!plans!should!not!be!debated!in!the!Federal!Parliament!and!
the! federal! plan! should! not! be! debated! in! the! regional! parliaments.! This! by! itself!
should!have!sent!a!red!flag!about!the!effectiveness!of!the!national!plan,!if!we!could!
call!the!final!plan!document,!the!national!plan.!This!“national!plan”!was!basically!the!
three! regional! plans! and! the! one! federal! plan! together.! In! an! ideal! sense,! the!
different!regional!plans!should!have!been!debated!in!the!federal!parliament!to!truly!
reflect!a!national!vision!for!the!country.!The!PM,!who!understood!and!appreciated!
the! regional/ethnic! conflicts! and! rivalries,! knew! such! a! plan! could! potentially! be!
torpedoed!because!of!regional/ethnic!biases.!The!federal!plan,!which!was!part!of!the!
national!plan,!could!not!do!much!because!the!driving!force!of!the!Nigerian!economy!
at!this!time!continued!to!be!agriculture!and!Stolper!based!his!plan!on!the!expansion!
of!agriculture!rather!than!industrialization,!a!contradiction!of!modernization!theory!
which! emphasized! industrialization.! The! problem! with! the! Nigerian! plan! however!
was!that!agriculture!was!not!within!the!domain!of!the!federal!government!but!the!
regional!governments.!Each!region!had!its!own!plans!for!agricultural!development.!
The! Eastern! Region,! for! example,! was! dabbling! into! extensive! agricultural!
settlement! schemes! with! the! Israelis,! which! Stolper! confesses! in! his! diaries! added!
no! economic! value! to! the! region! and! were! bound! to! fail.! Yet,! such! schemes! were!
allowed!to!continue!in!what!became!the!“national!plan.”!!
Though!Arnold!Rivkin!understood!that!the!ethnic!conflicts!were!potentially!a!
problem! to! the! success! of! the! development! plan,! he! chose! to! believe! that! the!
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development! plan! would! become! a! cure! to! the! problem! of! ethnic! conflicts.! He!
believed!that!economic!development!would!create!a!“national!economy”!that!would!
“allow! Nigerians! to! transcend! their! ethnic,! cultural,! and! regional! differences! and!
forge! common! national! interests! and! identities.”537!It! was! naïve! to! think! that! a!
quickly!put!together!economic!plan!would!suddenly!alter!several!decades!of!ethnic!
hostilities! and! colonial! institutional! structures! and! create! a! new! Nigerian! in! the!
image! of! America.! These! ethnic! and! regional! biases! that! became! a! major! factor! to!
the! failure! of! this! plan! question! the! assumptions! and! biases! of! American! social!
scientists!and!policy!makers!who!in!the!1950s!and!1960s!assumed!that!the!problem!
with! development! in! these! regions! of! the! world! was! a! lack! of! proper! prescription!
and! tools! to! move! these! places! to! developed! states.! It! is! obvious! that! history,!
institutions,!culture!and!traditions!all!matter.!!
The! Nigerian! development! plan! also! suffered! from! the! problem! of!
international!experts.!Throughout!this!study,!I!have!shown!how!developing!Nigeria!
has!been!the!work!of!foreign!experts!who!came!to!the!country!and!tried!to!impose!
their! ideas! on! the! country! and! its! people.! This! has! always! met! failure.! This!
development! plan! suffered! the! same! fate! that! the! pre\independence! development!
plans! faced.! One! may! argue! that! the! Nigerian! plan! was! a! local! plan! drafted! by!
Nigerians!because!the!National!Executive!Council!(NEC)!and!the!JPC!were!involved!
in!the!design!of!the!plan.538!Dibua,!however,!debunks!this!argument!by!noting!that!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
537!Grubbs,!Secular'Missionaries,!93.!!
538!This!argument!is!made!by!Allison!Akene!Ayida!and!referenced!in!Dibua,!Development'and'

DIffusionism,!76.!
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the! entries! in! Stolper’s! diaries! demonstrate! that! Stolper! played! a! “preeminent! and!
dominant”! role! in! drawing! up! the! plan..539!Beyond! these! arguments! presented! by!
Dibua! is! the! fact! that! foreign! experts! heavily! controlled! these! two! institutions,! the!
NEC!and!the!JPC.!The!chairman!of!the!NEC!was!the!PM!and!he!had!as!his!personal!
economic!advisor,!a!World!Bank!man,!Narayan!Prasad.!The!JPC!itself!was!crowded!
with! foreign! experts! and! Western! influence.! Prasad! and! Stolper! were! the! driving!
forces!of!this!committee.!It!is!also!important!to!note!that!the!initial!chairman!of!this!
committee! was! the! governor! of! the! Central! Bank! who! himself! was! British! colonial!
expert.! In! this! committee! were! also! permanent! secretaries! who! were! British!
expatriates.!It!is!hard!to!make!an!argument!that!this!plan!was!a!Nigerian!plan.!While!
Stolper!stressed!that!the!framework!that!was!setup!for!development!planning!was!
geared! toward! forcing! the! formulation! of! the! plan! to! start! from! the! grassroots,! he!
acknowledged!that!the!roots!did!not!go!as!deep!as!it!would!have!been!desirable.540!
Even! the! regional! plans,! which! one! may! argue,! started! from! the! grassroots,! had!
foreign! influence.! A! good! example! was! the! Eastern! Regional! plan.! Not! only! was!
Stolper!directly!influencing!the!course!of!events!in!the!Eastern!Region;!in!his!diaries,!
he! made! reference! to! an! African! American,! Daniels,541!who! had! great! influence! in!
the!region.542!Daniels!was!the!head!of!the!Industrial!Division!of!the!Eastern!Region!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
539!Dibua,!Development'and'DIffusionism,!76\77.!
540!Wolfgang!Stolper,!Planning'without'Facts,!39.!
541!No!first!name!given!in!the!diary.!!
542!Stolper!in!his!diaries!mentions!that!he!asked!Pius!Okigbo,!who!was!in!charge!of!economic!

planning!in!the!Eastern!Region,!for!a!copy!of!the!Executive!Committee!paper!that!was!only!seen!by!
ministers.!With!reluctance,!Okigbo!gave!it!to!him!on!the!promise!that!the!paper!should!not!be!shared!
with!anyone.!Stolper’s!reaction!in!his!diaries!to!the!paper!is!this:!“The!information!in!it!was!pretty!
much!what!I!had!worked!up!with!him!when!I!was!last!in!Enugu,!but!it!was!a!courageous!paper,!laying!
down!the!law!to!the!Prime!Minister,!pointing!out!that!the!ER!financial!situation!was!going!to!be!
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Development! Corporation.! Stolper! accused! him! of! being! an! empire! builder! who!
wanted!to!“sink!lots!of!money!into!crazy!industrial!undertakings,!when!it!should!go!
into! palm! grove! rehabilitation! and! hydraulic! palm! oil! presses.”543 !There! were! thus!
visible!and!invisible!hands!of!foreigners!everywhere!in!the!development!of!this!plan.!
The! use! of! expatriate! economists! came! under! criticism! early! on! in! the!
development! of! the! plan! by! a! Nigerian! economist! Ojetunji! Aboyade! whom! Stolper!
speaks!highly!of!in!his!diaries.544!Aboyade!noted!that!the!Nigerian!government!took!
the! view! that! “indigenous! economists! were! either! unavailable! or! incapable! of!
carrying! out! the! technical! responsibility.”! Though! he! believed! that! the! economists!
that!were!sent!to!Nigeria!were!able!economists,!he!writes!that,!“There!is!no!doubt!
that! they! have! not! come! from! an! economy! with! an! image! of! strong! planning!
tradition.” 545 !It! was! paradoxical! that! Stolper! and! his! US! based! team! would!
recommend! central! planning! for! Nigeria! when! the! US! did! not! use! strong! central!
planning!in!the!development!of!their!own!economy.!!
Aboyade’s! argument! that! the! Nigerian! government! should! have! used!
Nigerian!economists!is!somewhat!contradictory.!As!Inderjeet!Parmar!argues,!these!
elites! were! “developed! and! nurtured! by! British! colonials! and! supported! by!
American! aid.! Its! nationalism! was! always! skewed! toward! reliance! on! the! West! for!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
desperate,!that!the!Plan!had!to!stress!high!and!quick!payoff!projects,!if!the!Region!is!not!to!bog!down,!
and!that!more!taxes!would!be!needed.”!Gray,!ed.,!Diaries'of'Wolfgang'Stolper,!129.!
543!Ibid.,!129\30.!
544!Ojetunji!Aboyade!was!a!professor!at!the!University!College,!Ibadan.!He!later!succeeded!Stolper!as!
advisor!to!the!Federal!Government!for!the!second!Five!Year!Plan.!!
545!Aboyade,!Foundations'of'an'African'Economy:'A'Study'of'Investment'and'Growth'in'Nigeria!(New!
York:!Frederick!A.!Praeger,!1966),!154.!!
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defense,! trade,! ideology,! and! legitimacy.” 546 !What! is! also! true! is! that! Nigerian!
economists! and! educated! technocrats! who! did! not! hold! onto! the! pro\western!
viewpoints!were!branded!as!“communists”!and!legislated!against!for!employment!in!
the!Nigerian!civil!service.547!!
Despite!the!Western!influence!on!Nigerian!economists!and!political!elites,!it!
is!important!to!make!distinctions!between!the!colonial!approach!and!the!American!
approach.!In!the!colonial!period,!some!colonial!officials!tried!to!understand!the!local!
conditions!and!context!and!conducted!research!to!see!what!improvements!would!be!
more! successful! and! appropriate.! The! Americans! did! not! follow! such! a! thorough!
approach.! Be! that! as! it! may! be,! Nigerian! economists! were! in! better! position! to!
understand! the! needs! of! the! Nigerian! people! than! the! expatriate! economists.! As!
Aboyade!argued,!it!was!not!that!Nigerian!economists!were!scarce;!it!was!that!they!
were! “being! inefficiently! used! in! sub\optimal! occupations.”548!Nigerian! economists!
should! have! been! used! primarily! in! the! design! of! the! plan,! with! expatriate!
economists! playing! supporting! role.! It! was! however! determined! by! the! Nigerian!
political!class!that!these!foreign!experts!would!be!more!suitable!to!carry!out!the!task!
of!planning.!!
Corruption! was! another! problem! that! the! planners! had! seen! during! the!
development! of! the! plan.! Stolper! in! his! diaries! chronicles! corruption! that! had!
already! infected! the! Nigerian! government.! During! his! first! tour! of! Nigeria,! he! was!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
546!Parmar,!Foundations'of'the'American'Century,'176.!!
547!Ibid.,!173.!!
548!Aboyade,!Foundations'of'an'African'Economy,!153.!!
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told!of!the!“high!degree!of!corruption!that!existed!and!enrichment!by!local!robber!
barons”!and!how!these!ill\gotten!goods!are!stacked!in!accounts!in!Switzerland.549!In!
February! of! 1962,! Stolper! mentioned! in! his! diary! how! Festus! Sam,! the! Finance!
Minister! and! Theophilus! Otunba! Benson,! the! Minister! of! Information,! split! a!
substantial! contract! of! TV! contracts.! He! then! remarked,! “What! do! they! care! about!
the! development! program! as! long! as! they! can! control! the! contracts.”550!Stolper’s!
own!minister,!Waziri!Ibrahim!told!him!of!the!rampant!corruption!going!on!and!even!
wanted! the! contracts! to! be! transferred! to! the! prime! minister’s! office! but! the! PM!
objected.551!Though!Stolper!thought!of!Festus!as!a!very!corrupt!minister,!a!few!days!
later,! he! stated! despite! Festus’! “greed! and! corruption! is! a! darn! good! finance!
minister.”552!One!is!left!to!wonder!what!his!definition!of!“good”!was.!The!corruption!
that! was! already! endemic! in! the! system! was! bound! to! continue! during! the!
implementation! of! the! development! plan! although! Stolper! believed! that! he! had!
safeguards!in!the!plan!that!would!help!check!the!corruption.!Part!of!the!reasons!the!
plan! would! fail! would! be! the! corruption.! Contracts! were! awarded! to! cronies! with!
inflated!amounts!and!the!plan!was!rapidly!running!out!of!money.!!
The! final! problem! I! find! with! this! development! plan! is! it’s! economic! basis.!
Stolper’s! plan! favored! “short\term! benefit! over! long\term! investment,! free!
movement!of!capital,!unhindered!repatriation!of!profits!by!foreign!corporations,!and!

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
549!Gray,!ed.,!Diaries'of'Wolfgang'Stolper,!8.!!
550!Ibid.,!246.!!
551!Ibid.!
552!Ibid.,!252.!!
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complete!opposition!to!nationalization.”553!For!a!country!that!was!only!beginning!to!
find!its!economic!footing!in!a!global!economy,!this!was!a!bad!economic!prescription.!
The! plan! was! devoid! of! strong! social! services! that! would! have! led! to! long\term!
rather!than!short\term!growth.!Yet!such!services!were!necessary!for!the!long\term!
expansion!of!the!economy.!The!few!corporations!that!were!existent!in!Nigeria!were!
mainly!foreign!and!not!local!and!Nigeria!did!not!even!have!a!stock!market!yet.!This!
only! helped! in! facilitating! capital! flight! that! was! bad! for! Nigeria’s! economic!
expansion.! Stolper’s! anti\state! ownership! plan! was! bias! toward! free! and! private!
markets.!!
Conclusion*
This!chapter!has!shown!that!history,!institutions,!people!and!culture!matter!
when!it!comes!to!development!planning.!!Nigeria!was!not!a!blank!slate!to!be!written!
upon!by!the!planners!of!the!1962!pllan.!The!vision!of!American!social!scientists!such!
as! Rivkin! and! Stolper! to! remake! Nigeria! was! cut! short! by! the! Nigerian! civil! war.!
Even!before!the!war!started,!it!had!become!obvious!that!the!goals!of!the!plan!were!
not!going!to!be!realized.!Rather!than!the!plan!helping!to!build!a!national!consensus!
that! Rivkin! had! predicted,! Nigeria! was! further! driven! apart.! The! bold!
pronouncements! of! the! missionaries! of! modernization! to! remake! Nigeria! remain!
pure!rhetoric!as!they!faced!the!reality!of!the!local!conditions.!As!this!study!of!Nigeria!
has!shown,!in!practice,!modernization!theory!did!not!put!many!new!concrete!ideas!
on! the! table.! Many! of! the! colonial! era! policies,! most! especially! in! the! agricultural!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
553!Parmar,!Foundations'of'the'American'Century,'175.!!
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sector! were! continued.! Where! modernization! theory! derailed! from! colonial! era!
attempts! to! understand! local! contexts,! the! consequences! were! significant.! On! the!
whole,! “postcolonial”! development! did! not! mark! a! break! from! late! colonial!
development.!*
!
!
!
!
!
!
!

!

287!

!

CHAPTER SIX
Conclusion

I started this dissertation with a vignette which explains my “historical turn” to
find answers to why Nigeria experienced a socio-economic decline beginning in the
1980s and continuing well into the new millennium. In the course of my study, I
discovered that in order to understand this decline, it is important to go back further into
history to find the roots of the developmentalist agenda. This is important as it helps to
link the practice of development with the ideas and discourse of development. Linking
both reveals an approach to development that was not linear or guided by a singular
agenda. One discovers varied agendas that had significantly shaped the practice of
development. The starting point for this study was 1900, the year of Britain’s official
colonization of Nigeria. Though the colonial state opened up the interiors of Nigeria for
effective colonization and for the onward transfer of the resources of the colony to
Europe, development was not institutionalized until the period after the Great Depression.
What was important in this earlier historical phase was subjecting the people under
British imperial rule and exploiting the resources of the colony to help Britain in its
mission.
The post-World War II development program that would become a characteristic
feature of late British colonial rule emerged during the Great Depression. This started
with the passage of the 1929 Colonial Development Act. Even then, this Act was more or
less a job creation program for British citizens as its sole intention was to deal with the
problem of unemployment in Britain. Coordinated planning for development of the
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colonies started after the depression in response to the deplorable social conditions of the
colonies and flourished in the period after the war with the passage of the 1945 CD&W
act.
The 1945 CD&W Act was the revision and expansion of the 1940 CD&W Act.
This earlier act was not implemented because of the war. The bulk of the planning that
became part of Nigeria’s development plan in 1945 was done for the 1940 act and later in
anticipation of the 1945 act. By the time that the British parliament passed the 1945 act,
Nigeria had already drafted a substantial portion of its development program. It was for
this reason that the Secretary of State at the time, Oliver Stanley, thought that Nigeria’s
plan would be a model for the other colonies. In delimiting this study, it was important to
begin in 1945 because the 1945 CD&W Act and the Nigerian ten-year development plan
that arose in response to it was the first attempt at long term planning and the first time
that substantial resources were made available for the development of the colony. By
studying this plan, it becomes evident that colonial development, like colonial rule itself,
was plagued by contradictions and thus it is important not to use outcomes to judge
intentions.
The initial goal of taking this study through to the 1980s in order to answer the
question that prompted my enquiry became infeasible because to cover such a large
period of time meant a lot of important events had to be sacrificed, chief among them the
1967 Nigerian Civil War that had the greatest physical impact on Nigeria’s development
history as both humans and infrastructure were destroyed during the war. The destruction
and reconstruction that resulted from the war deserve a separate treatment. Another major
event that happened was the 1970s oil boom and the rapid expenditure of money by the
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Nigerian government on infrastructural development during this period. What also
happened with the boom was the neglect of agriculture that had been the main economic
resource of Nigeria from colonial times up to that moment. That alone deserves another
separate study. My work ends with the 1962 plan because I believe that the period after
the Nigerian Civil War belongs to a separate study and should not be lumped into the
earlier period considered in this work.
This work has revealed that the independence of Nigeria in 1960 was not the
rupture of colonial development. The real break was the Nigerian Civil War of 1967.
Some of the gains that had been made in the last twenty years of development in Nigeria
were destroyed by the war. However, the war did not end development planning. At the
end of the war, three more development plans were launched: the 1970 plan, the 1975
plan and the 1981 plan. The 1970 plan was a four-year plan. The plan was intended to
not only reconstruct the infrastructure that was destroyed during the war but also to
reconstruct the economy that had been negatively impacted during the war years.
Agriculture was very much a part of this plan. Agriculture was the third most important
sector in the plan. Transportation received 23.7% of capital allocation; the public sector
as a whole received 13.5% and agriculture received 10.5%. In actual expenditures, 23.1%
was spent on transportation, 11% on education and 7.7% on agriculture. Industry
received 3.9%.554 In the midst of the implementation of this plan, Nigeria experienced an
economic boom. This boom was as a result of the Arab oil embargo of 1973. This caused
the price of oil to spike. As a result, Nigeria’s foreign reserves rose from $222 million in
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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1970 to $5.203 billion in 1976. Nigerian oil revenues grew from 1.4 billion naira in 1973
to 12.86 billion naira by 1980.555 What emerged during this time was the increase in
public expenditure and a decline in the agricultural sector. There was evidence of the
“Dutch disease.”556 Nigeria became a rentier state.
It was during this time of boom that the third national development plan was
launched. The president of Nigeria at the time, General Yakubu Gowon, is believed to
have remarked that the problem of Nigeria was not money, but how to spend it. The third
plan was “the largest, most ambitious and imaginative development programme ever
launched, not only in Nigeria but in the whole of black Africa.”557 This plan was intended
to accelerate the growth of the economy and to increase the standard of living of the
people. Agriculture and mining was expected to contribute 55.5% of the GDP by the end
of the time period. Agriculture and mining accounted for 68.9% of GDP in 1974.
Agriculture received about 11% of total public capital investment. There was an urban
bias underpinning this plan as industry received 11.5%, transportation 37.5% and urban
development 9.0%.558 Massive road constructions were carried out in urban areas.
Moreover, the civilian administration of Alhaji Shehu Shagari that came to power
in October of 1979 continued the tradition of development planning. This administration
launched the fourth development plan in 1981, which was billed as a four-year plan. Due
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to declining oil revenues, the plan could not be effectively implemented. By 1985,
Nigeria was in a deep financial crisis and had to resort to IMF/World Bank loans. Nigeria
was forced to embrace neo-liberal economic policies that promoted the free market and
advocated the sale of government public enterprises. This ended an era of multi-year
development plans that started in the colonial period.
This work has also shown that there was a high level of continuity in
development between the late colonial period and the early “postcolonial” period. The
development policies of the late colonial era were continued after independence despite
the lack of success. Both plans lacked both the financial and human resources that were
needed for successful implementation. In both cases, there was a strong presence of
foreign “experts” both from America and Britain in Nigeria, who helped to midwife the
development agenda.
Having studied the 1945 and 1962 plans, it is evident that in both cases the
outcomes lagged behind the goals. Social and economic progress remained very slow in
the late colonial period and in the “postcolonial” period. The lack of socio-economic
progress and the entanglement with regional politics plunged Nigeria into the civil war. It
is also commonplace to blame corruption and poor implementation as culprits for the
failure of development in Nigeria or actually in most nations in the global south. This
study has challenged that assumption and has argued that there were other factors
responsible for the failure of development. While corrupt Nigerian politicians may be a
factor in the “postcolonial” plan, a fact that the drafters were very much aware of, they
(the Nigerian politicians/ elites) were not responsible for the late colonial plan. Granted
that these plans were poorly implemented, it still does not fully explain the failure of the
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plans. Thus, it is important to look beyond implementation to the planning process, a task
that this study undertook. This study reveals that the failure of the plans stemmed from
the planning process. There were a myriad of problems that plagued these plans from the
time they were put together and even if they were perfectly implemented as planned and
there was complete absence of corruption, the plans would still not have brought about
rapid social and economic progress. In the case of the two plans examined, this study can
identify five factors that had a significant impact on the failure of the plans: Development
ideology, human resources, financial resources, international experts/indigenous
knowledge, and corruption.
Development Ideology
One of the ideological debates in the late colonial period and even in the “postcolonial” period was the question of whether social welfare led to greater economic
development, or vice versa? During the formulation of the 1945 plan, this was one major
area of disagreement between Sydney Caine of the CO and the Nigerian officials who
were negotiating development. Caine saw the foundation of development as economic
growth and productivity and argued that the resources that are generated through these
could then be invested in social services. The Nigerian officials argued that the basic
needs of the people needed to be provided before one could require more from them
toward economic growth. While the colonial administration carried out some welfare
projects as part of its development of the colony, the planners of the first Nigerian
National Development plan were less interested in funding social welfare projects. For
example, only 2.5 percent was allocated to health and 0.7 percent allocated to social
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welfare in the federal plan.559 These planners believed that economic expansion would
lead to better social conditions. In a sense, this was trickle-down economics.
This became a major weakness of the “postcolonial” plan and in a sense even the
late colonial plan. Though the late colonial plan had social welfare elements, the level of
investment in such programs was too insignificant to leave a serious dent in the social
welfare needs of the people of the colony. Both plans were over reliant on the export of
agricultural products for economic expansion and provided little investment in social
welfare. This imbalance was a big reason that social and economic progress was slow.
What this meant was that they were only planning for short-term results and not for the
long-term development of the country. For example, building more high schools and
universities may not have improved the GDP of the country in the short term but a good
and expansive education system was sure to build a strong foundation for the future of
the economy. In 1962, there were only five universities with about fourteen hundred
students enrolled. The Eastern and Western regions alone had over 30,000 students
enrolled in the secondary schools. The absorption capacity of the universities meant that
only a tiny fraction of secondary school graduates could enter the universities. If the
planners were not limited by short-term economic growth, more investments would have
been made in education and other social welfare programs. The results from investing in
schools would not have been realized for five or even fifteen years but in the long run,
they would have been good for the economic growth of the country. The reason is that
schools are engines of growth as they fulfill the mission of being places for the
development of human capital. Nigeria suffered from the dearth of human power in the
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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late colonial and early “post-colonial” period because the colonial state failed to invest
earlier on in higher education. The failure to make meaningful investments in higher
education and other social welfare programs in the Nigerian plans rested on a
development ideology that favored short-term economic growth over basic needs.
Human Resources
The failure of the colonial state to develop human resources through significant
investments in education became a major problem for development not only in the late
colonial period but also in the period after independence. This was not a problem that
eclipsed the minds of the planners. The 1945 plan called for the use of development
officers. The planners argued that they could not source them in Nigeria. They had to cast
their nets wide, as far as Canada even, to recruit such officers for development work. And
these officers were not even technical staff. The recruitment of technical staff posed an
even bigger problem. They could not find enough irrigation engineers or agricultural
supervisors to carry out development work in Nigeria. The few technical staff they had
were saddled with enormous responsibilities which meant it was almost impossible for
them to carry out their assignments effectively. For example, one irrigation engineer had
to cover a whole province. The same was true for agricultural officers. The area allotted
to them for supervision was too large.
James Mackie had foresight when he identified this problem as one that would be
a stumbling block to the development of Nigerian agriculture. He pushed very hard for a
university in Nigeria devoted to training agricultural officers. Mackie’s goal of having an
agriculture university in Ibadan associated with the Moor Plantation was never fulfilled.
As early as 1921, an agricultural training center was established in Samaru, Northern
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Nigeria. In 1932, this was converted to an agriculture training college. It was not a
college that offered bachelor or advanced degrees. Graduates were trained as agricultural
assistants and it remained so even after the independence of Nigeria. The college is today
affiliated with Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria and it offers the National Diploma and the
Higher National Diploma. Samaru’s graduates were limited in what they could do
because they did not have the kind of advanced specialized training in tropical
agriculture, as did the expatriate agricultural officers that had studied at the Imperial
College of Tropical Agriculture in Trinidad. In the period after independence, Nigeria
had to continue to rely on expatriate agricultural technical staff.
The same was true of other aspects of the Nigerian bureaucracy. In the period
after independence, many heads of service were British, many technical officers, college
professors, secondary school principals and so on were expatriates who continued to
provide services to Nigeria. The lack of human resources meant that the state was limited
by what it could do. The fear that they may not find the needed human capital for projects
prevented them from adopting more bold projects. This was more so with the 1945 plan
than the 1962.
Financial Resources
The problem of inadequate financial resources was one that plagued both plans
studied. The financial resources needed by Nigeria were greater than what was available
for development. This study has shown that the figure that was arrived upon by the
British government for development was a random figure without any careful study of
what the financial needs of the colonies were. The S of S, Oliver Stanley, had requested
£150 million for development. This figure was not based on any careful statistical
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analysis of the economic and social needs of the colonies. The Chancellor of Exchequer
would only agree to £110 million which he broke down to £10 million a year and an
additional £1 million a year specifically for research. They arrived at a compromise of
£120 million. Nigeria was to receive £23 million. Nigeria’s plan called for £55 million.
The rest of the money was to be sourced by the Nigerian government through loans,
increased taxation, etc. Like the problem of human resources, it was obvious to the
planners that Nigeria would have problems contributing financially to its own portion of
the development plan. An argument was made that Nigeria should receive in the early
years of the plan a sizeable portion of the grant from the CD&W fund with the hope that
in the later years of the plan, some of the economic benefits of the plan would have
started to take effect and Nigeria would be able to sustain development and recurring
expenditures. An example was in the recurrent expenditures such as the hiring of new
staff. The Nigerian colonial government wanted CD&W funds to pay the salaries of these
staff because they could not afford to pay the salaries from their own revenues. The hope
was that toward the end of the ten years, Nigeria would see sufficient economic
expansion to enable it pay the salaries of these staff. By 1950, the plan was revised and
broken into two five-year periods. The amount of resources that was committed to the
development of as large a territory such as Nigeria remained meager and as a result, the
plan had to focus on specific sectors such as transport, communication and agriculture.
The focus of agriculture was on cash crops with the idea being that these would help
generate the needed revenue for further development.
The 1962 plan, like its 1945 predecessor, also was starved of needed funds for
effective development. The architects of this plan were aware of the problem. The lack of
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funds was one of the major contentions between Prasad and Stolper. Prasad told the
regions to go ahead and plan as the money would not be a problem and Stolper wanted to
limit the cost of the plan. At the end, it was difficult for the regions to get the money they
requuired for their development needs. Even the $225 million that was promised by the
United States was not forthcoming as they had to write grants and qualify for it. The
Nigerian leaders thought that since the plan had received the approval of the US
Economic Mission led by Arnold Rivkin and the $225 million promise was based on the
plan, the money would simply be given to them. They soon found out that they had to go
through an extensive approval processes from the US for each project they wanted to
carry out before they could receive the grants. Receiving development money and loans
from around the world became a major preoccupation of the Nigerian leaders and they
were never able to fully implement the plan because of a lack of financial resources.
International Experts/Indigenous knowledge
Development planning in late colonial and early “postcolonial” Nigeria was
primarily the work of international experts. In the late colonial period, this was done with
little input from the local Africans. Colonial Officials dominated development
committees and the few Africans present were ex-officio members. It was not the
Africans that chose the projects that were part of the development plan. What this means
is that development planning ignored the voices of the local people as well as indigenous
knowledge. The international experts were both the producers and custodians of
knowledge, isolating the indigenous people from this important process. In the fourth
chapter of this dissertation, the Niger Agricultural Development Scheme in Mokwa
provided a good case study of how this process had severe consequences for late colonial
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development. This scheme, by far the largest agricultural development scheme in colonial
Nigeria, was planned and executed without any input from the locals. The Oilseeds
Mission that came to Nigeria conceived it; the CO supported it and convinced the CDC to
partake in it; it was planned and executed by the Nigerian government, the CDC and the
managing company, NAP. International experts ran NAP with no input from the locals.
Had local knowledge been consulted some of the problems that plagued the scheme
would have been avoided. It is however important to note that the approach to the setting
up of Mokwa was a break from the pre-1945 period when agriculture officers such as
James Mackie advocated careful field trials and experimentation as well as learning the
local conditions and the practices of the people. NAP failed because of the planning
experts ignorance of the culture, topography and farming practices of the locals and their
refusal to consult them in the planning process
This problem was not limited to the colonial period. In the “postcolonial” period,
the use of international experts from the United States and the World Bank to design the
plan also was responsible for the failure of the plan. In the conclusion of the fifth chapter
of this work, this problem has been discussed in detail and the chapter shows how these
experts contributed to the failure of the plan. Though there was a stronger African agency
in this plan as Nigeria was already an independent nation, the role of Nigerians was still
negligible because they were working within the economic framework that was handed
over to them by Stolper and his team of development experts.
Corruption
Development planning was also besieged by corruption. The designers of the
1962 plan were very much aware of this problem and the fifth chapter has carefully
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looked at this problem. Beyond the corruption of the Nigerian leaders, there was also a
corrupting influence that lay at the heart of the plans themselves. To put it succinctly,
plans were corrupt. In the late colonial period, the projects that were funded were skewed
toward the benefit of the British. Emphasis was on cash crops to help with the balance of
payments problem Britain was facing and the transportation and communication systems
that also occupied a significant part of the plan were to help facilitate the onward transfer
of goods from Nigeria. That the projects funded by the late colonial plan were solely for
the benefit of the British was corruption of the highest order. Nigerians were meant to
believe that the colonial government was helping them with development. They even
congratulated Her Majesty’s government for her contribution of £23 million from the
CD&W vote. Nigerian people had to come up with the remaining £32 million to fund the
plan, money that was borrowed on the backs of future generations of Nigerians.
However, the primary beneficiary of development was not going to be the Nigerian
people but the British. How different was the British government from the corrupt
Nigerian leaders who in the “postcolonial period” tried to fund projects of which they
were going to be the primary beneficiaries?
Conclusion
In this work, I have shown both the British and American influences in
development planning in Nigeria and I have shown the shift from colonial led
development to American led development. I believe this is a unique contribution to the
scholarship on development planning in “British West Africa.” I have also shown in this
work that the characters and institutions that design these development plans are
important in understanding development planning. Devoting a substantial portion of the
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work on colonial officials both in London and in Nigeria and on other major figures such
as James Mackie, Wolfgang Stolper, and Arnold Rivkin has helped to shed light on the
ideology that drove these plans and also on the human element. Mackie had an approach
to agriculture development that emphasized research and extension. His agriculture
department found itself constantly in ideological fights with the political department. This
eventually caused him to resign from Nigeria shortly after submitting the agriculture
proposal. This had an impact because for more than a decade, he had been working on
that proposal and he did not believe that he was going to be given the freedom he needed
to implement it. Stolper on the other hand had to deal with Narayan Prasad, the adviser to
the prime minister. Their disagreements got very personal and this also stood in the way
of the plan as they gave conflicting advice to the regional governments. Though Rivkin
was not caught up in any of the Nigerian feuds, he had a personal agenda to recreate
Nigeria into a capitalist democracy like America. In the process of doing this, he took for
granted the strong ethnic biases and tensions that existed in Nigeria and had a naïve view
that the fulfillment of such a dream would eliminate those biases and tensions. He gave
the Nigerian planners a false hope that America was going to adequately fund a good
plan. The plan was written to fit the United States expectations. At the end, the US did
not come through with all the promised funding.
Studying these individuals as well as the institutions that supported them is
important to understanding the development process. That is the approach that this
dissertation has followed. I believe this approach is a unique contribution to the
scholarship in colonial and “post-colonial” development planning. More work remains to
be done in this field and most especially as it relates to British West Africa and more
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specifically, Nigeria. There is need to explore more the major influences of the post-civil
war development plans. Also, within the time period covered in this dissertation, more
work needs to be done, approaching the subject from the perspective of the locals who
were not responsible for the planning but were drafted to help execute these plans. By
these, I mean the settlers and their families, the civil servants who had to take orders and
the farmers who were told to cultivate certain crops over others. Their response to the
development plans is helpful in understanding how they helped shaped the
implementation of these plans. This is a goal I have given myself for future research.
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EPILOGUE

A question that up until now has remained unanswered in this dissertation is what
accounts for the changes that took place in my neighborhood and in Nigeria as a whole
between 1995 when I graduated high school and 2010 when I returned to the
neighborhood? As I look back, the changes did not begin in 1995 but were several years
in the making. Living through them did not allow me to see how dramatic they were.
Stepping out of that environment for several years and returning there allowed me to
appreciate how significant they were. Electricity had stopped being very regular before
1995, so did public water supply. All these kept getting worse over time because of
neglect, and today are almost in a state of complete disrepair.
Though problems started cropping up beginning with the falling oil prices in the
late 1970s and early 1980s, it was however the imposition of IMF Structural Adjustment
Programs in the late 1980s that was the death knell to social services. The Nigerian
currency, which up until that point was stronger than the US dollar, was significantly
devalued and since then it has been almost in a free fall. Even with the Nigerian
government using its foreign reserves to shore it up, it is still exchanging at N170 (Naira)
to a dollar and sometimes even higher on the black market. The devaluation of the
currency led to runaway inflation. Between 1986 when SAP was introduced and 1989,
Nigeria’s inflation rose from 5.4% to 40.9%. Inflation forced the interest rates to go up
which in turn discouraged investment. Also, the prices of domestic products went up
relative to those of foreign products and this inhibited exports while at the same time
stimulating imports, thus “depleting the nation’s scarce foreign reserves and worsening
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the balance of payment position.”560 The rise in prices of domestic products and the
inability of producers to export these items meant a significant loss of income for local
producers. Farmers were more reluctant to produce cash and food crops if their products
were not able to compete with the prices of imports. The decline in agricultural
production affected the lives of a majority of Nigerians who continued to rely on
agriculture for their livelihood. Nigeria in the late 1980s did not only go through a food
crisis but also massive poverty. As Nigerians then joked, “SAP has sapped life out of us.”
The economic situation of Nigeria exacerbated poverty in rural areas, as there was
high unemployment. The resultant effect of this was a large number of people migrating
to urban areas with hope of finding jobs. This migration created its own problems as the
urban areas did not have the resources and facilities to accommodate the growing
population. The Nigerian government’s solution to the problem of poverty in the rural
areas was the introduction of two programs: the Directorate for Food, Roads and Rural
Infrastructure (DFFRI) and the Better Life for Rural Women. DFFRI was established in
1987 and its target was “to provide water for 250 communities in each of the states of the
federation, to construct 90,000km of feeder roads, and to promote rural housing, health
and agriculture. To facilitate industrial growth, and improve the attractiveness of the rural
environment….”561 This program was criticized for making false claims on the roads
constructed, as well as receiving poor funding and not engaging in any direct food
production.562 As with most Nigerian programs during this time period, it was marred by
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corruption. The wife of the president of Nigeria, Maryam Babangida and with the
financial backing of the Nigerian government established Better Life for Rural Women in
1987. Its focus was on empowering rural women toward growth and development. It
helped women’s organizations establish cooperative farms and cottage industries. The
impact of these interventionist programs by the government was negligible as they were
unable to stem the tide of rural poverty.
The financial crisis, which had started from the early 1980s, reached its peak by
1992. The neoliberal economic policies which were introduced from 1986 did not help
the economy to grow but actually saddled the country with more debt and a high rate of
unemployment. From 1986, the government started privatizing public enterprises and
merging some. Many workers were retrenched from government services and even those
who still had jobs did not show up to work because the government owed workers several
months of salary. The government became unable to invest in social services because it
lacked the resources to do so. 47% of the overall budget of the government went into debt
servicing and little was left for public investments. For example, prior to 1982, the
government spent more than 6 percent of total expenditure on education, but by 1992,
less than 1 percent was spent on education. As Olumide Ekande argues, “This had severe
repercussions for infrastructure, teaching, and research activities, and on the quality of
students produced. It affected the morale of teachers who were owed arrears of salaries
for several months and who had to abandon their duties out of necessity to seek other
means of sustenance.”563
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The root of today’s crumbling infrastructures has been in the making for decades
because of corruption, the mismanagement of the economy and the introduction of
neoliberal economic policies that favored economic growth and expansion over social
welfare. Recently, Nigeria’s economy was declared the largest in Africa after a rebasing
calculation determined that its gross domestic product was more than $500 billion and the
economy was determined to be growing at over 6 percent a year. For the over 70 percent
of Nigerians living in poverty, this means nothing as they continue to experience poor
social services such as failing schools, rationed electricity, pot holes laden roads, and
other crumbling public infrastructures. Most Nigerians who have the financial means do
not educate their children in public schools but in private schools. Even families with
very modest incomes have to purchase power generators because the National Electric
Power Authority (NEPA) is now an acronym for Never Expect Power Always. As I look
back, there was no private elementary school or secondary school in my town when I was
a child. Today, there are over twenty. What Nigeria is going through today is economic
growth without development.
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